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Multilateral environmental agreements have exploded in

years since the 1972 United Nations Conference on the

in

Stockholm.

Over

the

same

number

in the thirty-five

Human Environment (UNC’HE)

period, there has been a considerable resurgence in the

popularity of institutional approaches to the study of international relations (IR).

This

dissertation evaluates the different explanations for institutional design that are provided

by three leading theoretical approaches

to

institutionalism,

IR: realism, rational

and

constructivism.

This dissertation argues that there are three

that

any theory of

flexibility.

a given

institutional

Delegation

design must explain:

Membership encompasses two

agreement, and, second,

is

understood

in

critical

its

membership, delegation, and

related concerns:

who must

terms of

elements of institutional form

first,

participate for an

Adaptive

flexibility

allows

to

succeed.

what resources and

Institutional flexibility

members temporarily

participation in specific circumstances, transformative flexibility allows

vi

participate in

agreement

structure and substance:

authority are delegated to third parties, and to what specific ends?

can take three forms.

who may

to

members

suspend
to alter

the terms of cooperation over time, and interpretive flexibility provides discretion to

members

in

implementing agreement-related obligations.

After reviewing recent literature on institutional design, the dissertation derives

hypotheses from

realist,

rational

institutionalist,

and constructivist theory concerning

each of these three elements of institutional form.

These hypotheses point

to

the

importance of five explanatory variables, distribution problems, enforcement problems,

hegemony, the number of relevant
These hypotheses are

states,

and scientific uncertainty/knowledge.

tested against a database of international environmental

agreements compiled by the author and based
International

Regimes Database (1RD). Membership

norm of non-exclusion. Delegation
and

is

in

is

to

on the recently published

rules are

highly circumscribed

predicted primarily by the distribution of

modest exceptions

part

found generally

to reflect a

among surveyed agreements,

power among negotiating

states.

Finally,

reduce transaction costs notwithstanding, institutional flexibility

is

dramatically undersupplied compared to the expectation of rational institutionalist theory.

The

dissertation concludes

theoretical

debates,

as

by suggesting how these findings are relevant

well

as

policy

debates

concerning

international environmental agreements and institutions.

vii

the

to

ongoing

reform of specific
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

There has been

a substantial increase in the

number of international

institutions in

the last half-century, inspiring considerable scholarly attention to their design

and

Scholars have been interested in the nature of international institutions,

effectiveness.

their design, their role in global politics,

largely centered around

institutions (or

two views.

among

international institutions as used

by

their effectiveness.

Institutionalists

regimes more broadly)

the prospects for cooperation

and

emphasize the importance of

in mitigating the effects

states

These debates have

of anarchy and enhancing

while others, primarily

states only

when

it

realists,

view

suits their self-interests (Mitchell

and Hensel 2007).

The competition between these two views

is

reflected in the scholarship that

addresses institutional design. This work explores such questions as

the structure

institutions,

how

of the institutions

and what

sort

that they negotiate, define the

of authority they delegate

issues of power, interests, and

knowledge

questions are interesting both on their

own

to

them.

how

membership
It

states

choose

rules for those

also seeks to understand

affect institutional design.

These

merits, and because they provide theoretical

leverage on the question of institutional effectiveness. Institutional design, then,

many ways

at

the heart of the study of international institutions.

Although there
institutions

is in

have grown

is

wide agreement among IR scholars

in

number over

that international

the past thirty years, there

is

no consensus among

IR scholars concerning exactly what international institutions are (Duffield 2007).

when

Previous studies of international institutions,

have tended

to rely

they have offered a definition at

on parochial definitions of institutions. Rational

all,

institutionalists often

conceptualize institutions as rules, while constructivists often conceptualize institutions

as

norms (Duffield 2007).

definitions of institution

A

major problem with

make

it

theoretical approaches to talk to

difficult, if

this practice is that

incommensurable

not impossible, for scholars from different

one another, forming a

2007; Ostrom 1986). This study gets around

this

scientific

community (Duffield

problem by operationalizing

“international institutions” as explicitly negotiated multilateral agreements

agreements may

By

norms.

entail formal rules.

They

also

focusing on negotiated agreements,

major theoretical approaches

may
this

reflect or

1

Such

.

promote international

study will be able to leverage three

to international relations (institutionalism, realism,

and

constructivism) to study institutional design.

The Value of
The

Institutional

Design

topic of institutional design traditionally has

political science (e.g.,

drawn

Goodin 1996), public administration

international relations (e.g.,

Koremenos

et al

1988). and economics (e.g., Schotter 1981

),

international actors continue to grapple with

attention from scholars in

(e.g.,

Hult and Walcott 1989),

2001a), organization theory

and

is

(e.g.,

DiMaggio

likely to continue to attract attention as

managing

globalization.

Studies have

addressed several dimensions of institutional design from a number of theoretical
perspectives

(Koremenos

et al

2001a; Raustiala 2005; Goldstein

institutional design is not universally regarded as a proper focus

et al

2000).

of attention. Some

scholars have argued that the study of the design of international institutions

1

This study focuses on multilateral environmental agreements

neglected

in the

scholarly literature on institutional design.

2

in particular,

Still,

is less

which have been

largely

important than the study of institutional effectiveness. Specialists in environmental

politics are particularly

prone

to this

view since they are interested primarily

in

environmental outcomes; institutions are a means to that end, and are not as important

their

own

right (Mitchell 2003;

in

Susskind 1994). Another group of scholars, while

acknowledging the importance of institutional design, argues

that institutional design

is

comparatively well-understood and therefore researchers should instead focus on
explaining institutional effects (Martin and

While understanding
in the study

Simmons

institutional effects

1998; Duffield 2003).

and effectiveness are crucial components

of international agreements, organizations, and regimes, both of these

criticisms are premature

and misplaced.

institutions without understanding

It is

impossible to fully understand the effects of

what they are and how they come

to be.

In

other

words, institutional effectiveness cannot be understood fully without a theoretical
understanding of design;

we

cannot understand or evaluate indicators of effectiveness

without linking outcomes to political actions. The study of institutional design
necessary because

it

provides insight into

how

states interact

is

also

and the nature of their

relationships.

The Study of Institutional Desmn
Institutional design has

been a recurring theme

cooperation from the early functionalist work

(e.g.,

in research

on international

Mitrany 1976), through game-

theoretic approaches in the 1980s and 1990s, to rationalist approaches in recent years

(Katzenstein, et

institutions

al

1998). Early approaches tried to explain the significance of

by paying attention

approaches attempt

to their formal, legal design,

while game-theoretic

to explain institutions as equilibrium solutions to generic

3

problems of

international cooperation.

Recent rationalist approaches have

tried to

complicate the

assumptions of both of those understandings, looking for patterned behavior while
understanding the complexity of international interactions.

One

research program, introduced in a

International Organization has examined
,

Summer 2000

why

states

special issue of

sometimes cooperate through the

negotiation of formal treaties rather than informal cooperation.

international cooperation as being

more or

less “legalized,”

It

conceptualizes

depending on cooperative

arrangements’ obligation, precision, and delegation (Goldstein,

et al

2000). International

agreements vary across each of these variables. The myriad possible combinations of
these three variables yield

and “anarchy” - and

a

two polar

ideal types

of international cooperation - “hard law”

broad spectrum of legal forms arrayed on a continuum between the

two.

This research program draws on

liberal, rational institutional,

and constructivist

theories to explain the legalization of international cooperation. “Legalized institutions,”

according to

this research

the preferences

program, “can be explained

and incentives of domestic

particular international

norms” (Goldstein,

theoretical concept of legalization,

in

terms of their functional value,

political actors,

et al

and the embodiment of

2000, 396). After elaborating the

members of the

legalization project illustrate their

conceptual framework in a number of empirical settings, concentrating primarily on

institutional

economic

of “legalization”

in

relations.

Though

the authors claim to demonstrate the usefulness

understanding international cooperation, they generally do not

develop formal hypotheses concerning the causes or consequences of legalization.
Rather, their

main goal

is

to establish a

framework

4

for future research (Kahler 2000).

Though

the legalization project undoubtedly has been influential,

under criticism from
a

number of corners.

a

narrow understanding of international

Toope 2003). Rational

institutionalists

difficulty to operationalize

Constructivists have criticized

institutions

it

come

for adopting

and cooperation (Finnemore and

have criticized

(Koremenos 2005b).

has also

it

its

theoretical imprecision

and

Finally, other international legal

scholars have criticized the legalization framework as being an inaccurate representation

of actual

state practice.

Kal Raustiala (2005) exemplifies
states vary cooperative

their actual

make

practice.

a series of

this last criticism,

arguing that the notion that

agreements along a spectrum of legalization

is

inconsistent with

Instead of calibrating institutional designs, Raustiala argues, states

dichotomous choices, such as whether

to

make an agreement

in the

form

of a contract or a pledge and whether or not to provide mechanisms for enforcement
(Raustiala 2005, 582).

a function

The design of individual agreements thus should be understood

as

of a series of tradeoffs.

Finally, a third line

of recent research on institutional design - and the one that

provides a point of departure for this project -

is

program on the “rational design of international
Scholars working in this research program
create international agreements

and

size

institutions”

(Koremenos,

et al

from the basic presumption

institutions to further their

them accordingly. These scholars observe

number of dimensions:

start

the rational institutionalist research

own

that existing institutions

2001a).

that states

goals, and design

vary greatly along a

and openness of membership, internal decision-making

procedures, extent of centralized authority, and the extent to which the specific terms of

cooperation are flexible. The key explanatory variables of institutional features identified

5

by

this research

program include

( 1 )

the presence of distribution problems, (2) the

presence of enforcement problems, (3) the number of relevant

among

asymmetries

states, (4)

relevant actors, and (5) the extent of uncertainty surrounding an issue.

(Koremenos,

The

et al

2001a, 773-779).

rational design project

advances sixteen “conjectures” derived from prior

neoliberal institutionalist research regarding the impact of these explanatory variables on

particular institutional designs ( cf

Conybeare 1984; Keohane 1982, 1984; Olson 1965;

Smdal 1985a, 1985b; Stein 1983, 1990; Ziim
rational design

framework

is its

emphasis on

1993).

Though

a

key advantage of the

specific, falsifiable hypotheses, the only

systematic test of these conjectures to date remains the very preliminary use of eight case

studies in the

Autumn 2001

special issue of Internationa! Organization.

The authors of

the rational design project claim to find strong, though not complete, support for the

majority of their conjectures (Koremenos,

The

et al

2001b).

rational design project also has been criticized

from a number of comers.

variables are chosen entirely from the canon of neoliberal institutionalism

Pierson 2004).

Though

it

actors, the rational design

power

in

(Wendt 2001;

claims to examine the significance of asymmetries

framework does not adequately take account of the

shaping international cooperation (Gruber 2000). Likewise,

it

Its

among
role

of

does not

adequately account for the explanatory value of norms and knowledge (Duffield 2003).

Finally,

many of its

conjectures are vague, failing to explicitly specify causal mechanisms

and, thus, precluding the rational design framework from distinguishing rival

explanations with similar expectations

(Thompson 2005).
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Though
its

‘external’ criticisms of the rational design project are important,

limitations follow

original

from shortcomings

volume (Koremenos,

design project.

First,

et al

some of the

hypotheses, rather than empirical

because they
question.

A

start

Poor case selection

in its research design.

in the

2001a) presents several problems for the rational

cases are primarily formal extensions of rational design

tests.

These do not constitute

tests

of rational design

by assuming the presence of the very hypothesized relationships

in

second, more severe, limitation follows from the near-exclusive focus on

These may be sufficiently distinctive

institutions regulating international trade.

difficult to

many of

make

that

it is

valid generalizations to institutions in other issue areas (e.g., security,

environmental protection). Third, the previous research from which the rational design
hypotheses were derived also focused mainly on the design of international trade
agreements. Thus, the rational design project ends up testing

same data

that generated the

framework

in the first place.

project did not consider sufficient cases to test

example, none of the cases

in the original

all

volume

its

hypotheses using the

Fourth, the rational design

of the proposed hypotheses. For
test their

hypothesis that the scope of

an institution increases with the number of relevant parties.
Finally, although

one

may sympathize

with the rational design project’s desire to

avoid a “three-cornered fight” between realism, rational institutionalism, and
constructivism, the project’s exclusive focus on rational institutionalist explanations

further limits

its

explanatory power. Unable to engage alternative explanations

anything but an ad hoc fashion, the rational design project can do
establish congruence

between

its

little

more than

expectations and observed evidence. Since

consider whether other explanations better

fit
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the data, and

it

is

in

it

does not

sketchy about the causal

mechanisms underlying

its

own

hypotheses, the rational design project

finding convincing evidence, either for or against

More

its

is

incapable of

conjectures.

recently rational design conjectures have been tested against a larger

of evidence. Koremenos (2005a) examines hypotheses concerning institutional
in a large-N study

of sunset clauses

in international

in international

flexibility

agreements. Similarly, Koremenos

(2007) uses a large-N design to study states’ decision

mechanisms

body

to incorporate dispute resolution

agreements. Although these studies represent a step forward

for the rational design project, a

number of problems remain. Recent

institutional design fails to distinguish

between

bilateral

large-n

and multilateral

work on

institutions,

despite the fact each type involves distinctive consequences for design. Furthermore, the

narrowness of recent studies precludes them from identifying possible interactions

in the

design of agreements, which was a potential strength of the original, comprehensive

framework.

The Design of International Aureements
This project aims to improve the study of institutional design in a number of

ways, including breadth, depth, and method. This project,

in contrast to those

before

it.

derives and tests hypotheses from each of the three major current approaches to

international cooperation: realism, rational institutionalism, and constructivism.

a

more comprehensive approach than many of the

to focus

on

a

number of causal

studies that have preceded

it,

It

adopts

choosing

factors over three design variables, rather than narrowly

researching a single design variable and/or a single causal factor. The third improvement

that this project brings,

and perhaps

its

most substantial contribution,

empirical test of institutional design hypotheses.
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It

is

a large-n

pairs this large-n empirical test with

case studies to analyze the causal chains that statistical analyses predict. Finally, this

project’s empirical test

focused on multilateral environmental agreements, an area of

is

substantive interest to scholars and policymakers alike.

Evaluating Competing Hypotheses of Institutional Design

While theory-building can proceed from a single
testing

is

Although

better

performed with alternative hypotheses and explanations

this project

became evident

theoretical perspective, theory-

was

originally inspired

by the

rational design project,

that the question “if not rational design, then

addressed in a more systematic

way

mind.

in

it

what?” needed

quickly

to

be

than simply conjecturing possible alternatives in a

conclusion. Instead, this study tests hypotheses derived from the rationalist paradigm

against hypotheses derived from the realist and constructivist paradigms.

simply asking
interests,

how

states further their interests,

and knowledge

in states’

determine not only which theory
explanatory leverage, suggest

is

how

it

tests the relative

weight of power,

choices of agreement design. This

“right,” but also,

the causal

when more

mechanisms might

Rather than

is

meant

to help

than one theory provides

interact.

Comprehensive Analysis of Causes and Effects
Another way
agreement design

is

hypotheses from the
institutional

that this study

that

it

broadens the explanatory value of studies of

addresses more than one dependent variable.

realist, rationalist,

I

derive

and constructivist paradigms specific

membership, delegation, and

flexibility.

to

While other projects also derive

hypotheses for more than one dependent variable, most of those projects either do not
involve empirical tests or only

test the

Koremenos 2005a; 2007). Such

hypotheses about one dependent variable

(e.g.,

studies miss the opportunity to explore the possibility of
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multiple responses to specific problems.

By

using an array of dependent and independent

variables, this study hopes to get the broadest look yet at agreement design.

The Importance of Empirical Tests
Most of those empirical

tests

of institutional design hypotheses are case studies,

and do not include either cross-case analysis or an exploration of alternative hypotheses.
This study endeavors to be the

first that tests institutional

large

number of institutions.

large

number of settings, asking

design hypotheses across a

Statistical tests discern patterns

not only what

actually choose. This provides a link

is

of design choices over a

theoretically predicted but

what

states

between the formal models which are theory-driven

and the case studies which do not cover

a large

number of designed

institutions.

Only

a

large-n statistical test can provide insight into the question of whether or not institutions

(generally) are actually designed, to

This study pairs large-n

what degree, and how.

statistical tests

chains predicted by the statistical

tests.

with case studies to evaluate the causal

As Andrew Bennett

notes, “there

awareness among the practitioners of each of the leading methods
formal modeling,

among

statistics,

a

in political

growing
science

-

and case studies - of the great potential for complementarity

these methods” (2002,

1

Stephen Van Evera explains, “more

).

than fewer, strong tests are better than

this project serves

is

both functions;

histories of specific negotiations,

it

it

weak” (1997,

provides more

29).

tests,

tests are better

The addition of case

studies to

and, using the diplomatic

strengthens the tests' conclusions in light of particular

cases. This methodological choice intends to further research in institutional design

Goldstein and Freeman's (1990) study of reciprocity

in international

regard
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cooperation

is

exemplary

by

in this

gaining insight into the degree and type of agreement design generally, patterns of
design, and specific applications of design principles,

MEAs:

Studying the Design of Environmental Agreements

In addition to broadening the scope of the study of institutional design and

strengthening

its tests, this

particular theoretical

study focuses on an area of agreement design likely to be of

and practical

classified as related to economics,

interest.

human

Broadly, international agreements can be

rights, security,

and the environment. This

study focuses on environmental agreements.

This focus on environmental agreements

is

for a

number of reasons.

First,

is

it

an

area of institutional design that has been understudied. Existing large-n studies have

focused primarily on other sorts of institutions
analysis in those studies can be

effect

compared with

(e.g., alliances

or trade agreements); the

the analysis in this

of institution type on the design of institutions. Second,

one

to

understand the

until recently, there

been a paucity of large-n data on environmental agreements and regimes. That
beginning

to

recently, the publication of the

Regimes Database (1RD). The 1RD makes available

large-n dataset of environmental regimes covering variables on a

problem structure and
study draws from

IRD

institutional design (Breitmeier,

for the first time a

number of aspects of

Young, and

Ztirn 2006).

This

data to build a dataset suitable for testing hypotheses concerning

membership, delegation, and
environmental agreements

complex

is

change, with the continued development of the International Environmental

Agreements project (Mitchell 2003-2007) and, more
International

has

flexibility in

fail to

MEAs.

Third, existing datasets which include

distinguish between bilateral cooperation and

multilateral negotiations.

Because

bilateral

agreements

far

outnumber

more

multilateral ones, existing empirical studies

tell

multilateral environmental agreements. This

us very

little

about the design of

unfortunate because the highest-profile

is

environmental issues and institutions on the international agenda today are inescapably
multilateral.

Multilateral Environmental

Multilateral environmental agreements

Agreements

(MEAs)

are

one of the major mechanisms

of international environmental governance, specifying the particular obligations

governments have accepted regarding issues of environmental protection. The creation
of such instruments has grown rapidly
Nations Conference on the

in the thirty-five years since the

Human Environment (UNCHE)

the International Environmental

in

1

972 United

Stockholm. According to

Agreements Database, 257 of the more than 800

MEAs

were concluded during the 1990s alone (Mitchell 2003-2007). Some of these agreements
are well-known, even

States

among

non-specialists: the

ongoing clashes between the United

government and European governments over climate change has put the Kyoto

Protocol at the center of international attention.

Twenty years ago,

it

was

the United

States pushing for international cooperation, as states negotiated the Montreal Protocol on

Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.
states

have also cooperated

to

manage

In addition to these high-profile

agreements,

international marine resources, global

international fishing resources, international rivers, and the like.

The

commons,

dataset this study

uses covers agreements spanning a wide range of issues.

Project

Overview

In an attempt to study the design of these

previous work

in

the area and

its

MEAs,

conceptual foundations.

12

this

It

study begins by reviewing

then lays out the hypotheses

to

be tested and the methods to be used. These preliminary materials are followed by

three chapters, testing hypotheses on

The study concludes by evaluating

delegation.

how,

mechanisms

MEAs

for

membership,

results in terms

its

and

flexibility,

of the questions

if,

and

are designed by states.

Chapter

2,

‘Theorizing Institutional Design’, begins by reviewing the

development of the

rational institutionalist literature

on international cooperation,

explaining the theoretical origins of current rational institutionalist research on

institutional design.

drawn from

realist

Next,

it

discusses alternative approaches to institutional design,

and constructivist

literatures

on international cooperation, explaining

the points of departure that lead these approaches to have different expectations

concerning institutional design.

Chapter

3,

MEAs: Hypotheses,

‘Designing

Data, and Methods’, begins by

defining and explaining the main explanatory variables used in this study: distribution

problems, enforcement problems, number, hegemony, and uncertainty. Next,
the three dependent variables

flexibility

examined

- and describes hypotheses

in this

for each

drawn from

Chapter 3 then discusses the data used

the analytic

methods used

The next

to

do

defines

study - membership, delegation, and

constructivist literatures on international cooperation.

this study.

it

institutionalist, realist,

Having

set forth the

and

framework

to evaluate these hypotheses, as well as

so.

three chapters comprise the empirical heart of this project. Chapter 4,

‘Elements of Institutional Design: Membership’, examines the design of membership
rules in

MEAs.

dimensions:

for

It

argues that institutional membership varies along two broad

in the negotiation

of any

MEA,

states
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must decide which

parties

may

participate in a cooperative arrangement,

and which

parties

must participate

for

cooperation to take place. Next, Chapter 4 describes a number of indicators of

membership design and provides descriptive

among surveyed agreements.

Third,

it

statistics

concerning membership design

evaluates the hypotheses concerning membership

rules set forth in Chapter 3, finding that surveyed agreements

were generally open,

perhaps following a norm of non-exclusion, and second, that enforcement problems

(e.g.,

worries of free-riding) lead negotiators to design more specific and more demanding
conditions for entry into force. Finally, the chapter discusses these findings in light of the
negotiation of the 1979 Convention on

Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (and

subsequent Protocols) and the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone

Layer (and the 1987 Montreal Protocol).
Chapter
delegation in

5,

“Elements of

MEAs,

‘outside’ help in

addressing questions such as

why

independent parties;

what specific functions do

how much

in

MEAs.

Next,

provides descriptive statistics concerning delegation

It

sometimes look

for

states

authority do states delegate; and

states entrust to such parties?

number of dimensions of delegation

study.

states

examines influences on

implementing agreements; which factors encourage or discourage

to delegate authority to

a

Institutional Design: Delegation’,

it

Chapter

5 begins

by identifying

describes those dimensions and

in the

agreements surveyed

in this

then evaluates the hypotheses concerning delegation set forth in Chapter 3,

finding that states generally delegate administrative

power

to

(newly created or existing)

independent organizations, but also that states generally do not delegate significant levels

of resources or discretion. Chapter

5 also finds that states regularly delegate specific

functions in response to certain conditions (e.g., enforcement problems). Finally, these
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findings are discussed in light of two specific cases dealing with transboundary hazards:

the 1979

LRTAP

Chapter

Convention and the 1989 Basel Convention.

6,

‘Elements of Institutional Design: Flexibility’, examines the role that

institutional flexibility plays in the design

of questions. What
to

make agreements

is

institutional flexibility?

What

flexible?

Which forms of flexibility
first

Third,

described in Chapter

3.

so,

it

addresses a

number

options are available to negotiators

factors influence negotiators to seek flexibility?

defines institutional flexibility. Next,

flexibility

What

serve which purposes?

among surveyed agreements.

two

of MEAs. In doing

it

it

To answer

these questions, this chapter

describes the institutional flexibility found

evaluates hypotheses concerning institutional

Finally, this chapter discusses these findings in light of

specific cases.

Finally,

Chapter 7 concludes

this

analysis that this study has produced.

Chapters 4-6, and identifies patterns

study by drawing together the

First,

it

summarizes the study’s

in those results.

Next,

it

many

strands of

results presented in

reverses this study’s

perspective, adopting an “effects of causes,” or “x-centered” approach in order to delve

more deeply

into the question

(Gerring 2007). Building on

among

the

many

of which explanatory variables are meaningful for design

this.

Chapter 7 examines which aspects of agreements,

possibilities suggested

by

rational institutionalism, realism,

and

constructivism, negotiators actually design and which are artifacts of custom or habit.

concludes by exploring and demonstrating productive avenues for future research on
institutional design in

MEAs.
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It

CHAPTER 2
THEORIZING INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

Proponents of rationalist,

all

developed approaches

to

realist,

and constructivist research programs

the rational institutionalist approach.

treaties

and other

IR have

understanding the design of international institutions. The

most developed of those research programs - and the primary inspiration
is

in

The

rational institutionalist

for this project

approach regards

institutions as rationally designed contracts that vary in predictable

ways depending on

the underlying cooperation problems they address

(Thompson 2005).

After setting the stage by describing the problem of ‘cooperation under anarchy’, this

chapter explores the rational institutionalist approach

alternative approaches to the design of

MEAs

in detail.

It

then discusses

drawn from realism and constructivism.

Sections addressing these theories explain the basis for their critiques of the
institutionalist approach,

and the points of departure which lead

constructivists to understand institutional design differently.

realists

The

and

final section

of the

chapter discusses the analytical and predictive differences between rational

institutionalist, realist,

and constructivist approaches

to

MEAs.

The Problem of Cooperation under Anarchy
The question of the extent of cooperation

among

Many

scholars

who

likely

under anarchy

study international institutions, and

is

is

a central debate

central to this study as well.

scholars of international relations agree that the international system

(Waltz 1979; Oye 1985). Where they diverge

meaning of that anarchic system

for states

is in

and

16

their

is

“anarchic"

understanding of the content and

their interactions with

each other

Structural realism argues that anarchy

endogenous. In

this interpretation,

is

constitutive,

and

states’

responses to anarchy are

anarchy compels states that wish

to survive to

question

other states’ intentions, seek offensive capability, think strategically, and look for

opportunities to obtain relative gains. In such an atmosphere, structural realism argues,

states

do not cooperate because they seek or aspire

make

the world a better place. Instead,

when

to the creation

of mutual benefit, or

to

doing so out of

states cooperate, they are

fear.

Rational institutionalist approaches to institutional design and function developed

in

response to a major empirical puzzle confronting realism. As Martin and Keohane

describe, institutional theory “began with observation of a persistent

neorealist theories”

(

1999,

5).

in

Neorealists argued that engaging in extensive and

persistent forms of cooperation

in their policy choices

anomaly

would be contradictory

(Martin and Keohane 1999,

5).

and infrequent

to states’ interest

However,

do “engage

states

in

deep, persistent patterns of cooperation. In addition, they constructed] institutions to
sustain and enhance these patterns of cooperation” (Martin and

Keohane

Keohane 1999,

5;

1984). In response to this empirical anomaly, early rational institutionalists

“sought to show that international institutions provided a way for states to overcome

problems of collective action, high transactions costs and information

deficits or

asymmetries” (Simmons and Martin 2002, 195).
Constructivist approaches provide yet another perspective on the

international anarchy. If realism emphasizes the importance of anarchy

rational institutionalism foregrounds the strategic pursuit

and power, and

of material gain

world, constructivism focuses on the influence of ideas and norms

17

meaning of

in

in an anarchic

global politics.

In

constructivist theory, ideas and

rule

and governance even

norms can serve

in a formally anarchic

as informal “rules”

which create

system (Onuf 1989,

7).

states

of

The difference

in

these theories" approaches to anarchy and states' behavior therein forms the foundation

for their different approaches to the study of institutional design.

Rational Institutionalist Approaches

Rational institutionalism seeks to understand the creation, existence, and function

of international

institutions,

which they define as “persistent and connected

sets

of rules

(formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape
expectations” (Keohane 1989,

institutionalists

bounded

and expectations. Deriving

Economics (NIE), IR's

in the field

its

analytic

of economics, rational

Although a self-conscious

Institutional

New

and game theory.

Economics

of “New Institutional Economics” did not appear

field

1970s (Williamson 1975),

framework from the

rational institutionalism connects concepts of

rationality, transaction costs, contract theory,

New

until the

work

developed a research program exploring the design and function of these

rules, constraints,

Institutional

Inspired by

3).

origins can be found in Ronald Coase's

its

work on

“the nature of the firm” (Coase 1937). While neoclassical economics had assumed

transactions to be costless, Coase introduced the idea that there are “costs of negotiating,”

involved

in

cooperation

negotiating, doing business, arranging institutions, and engaging in

(

1

937, 390).

NIE

took up this argument in

its

emphasis on the impact of

“transaction costs” (Williamson 1979). Transaction costs are the cost of a negotiated

exchange. According to Furubotn and Richter, these costs “arise in connection with the

exchange process, and

their

magnitude

affects the
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ways

in

which economic

activity

is

organized and carried out. Included within the general category of transaction costs are
search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, and policing and

enforcement costs” (2005, 36). Along with recognizing the existence of transaction
costs,

NIE

scholars

scholars

mean

that

saw

that actors’ rationality is

economic actors

bounded. By bounded rationality, these

are “ intendedly rational but only limitedly so”

(Simon

1957).

The combination of transaction
find fault with neoclassical

traditional

economic

costs and

A

contracts.

parties,

NIE

complete contract,

between parties and accounts

in

international

NIE
to mitigate

(economic and

simple terms, expresses

all

effects

on

While

terms of the agreement

performance of the

politics, the uncertainty

of the future, and the

each other, such a complete contract

is

impossible in

political) relations.

scholars argue that while incomplete contracting

its

scholars to

as a complete expression of the terms of the

for all possible contingencies in the

trust for

NIE

scholars questioned the possibility of complete

agreement. Given the complexity of world

incompleteness of states'

rationality led

theories’ understanding of contracts.

economic theories saw contracts

agreement between the

bounded

is

unavoidable,

actors' ability to cooperate through the creation

which provide information about other

actors, predictable patterns

it is

possible

of institutions

of negotiation, and

information about the reliability and credibility of transacting parties. Institutionalists in
IR considered the implications of these observations for agreements in global politics.

The Adaptation of NIE

to International Relations

Realization that transaction costs exist in international relations inspired IR
scholars to think about the implications of NIE for the study of international regimes and
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institutions. Part

of “regime theory,”

this

asked questions about the difficulties
to success

in

new

research program in international relations

forming international agreements, the challenges

of a formed agreement, and the relationship between agreements in global

politics.

Coase (1960) demonstrated

that Pareto-optimal solutions

among independent

situations of decentralized bargaining

externalities.

even

in the

For Keohane, the analogy to international cooperation was

international system

is

actors,

were attainable

is

anarchic insofar as

a decentralized system in

However, the analogy

is

it

which actors -

not perfect.

in

presence of

clear.

The

lacks centralized authority. Furthermore,

i.e.,

states

- possess formal

As Keohane (1984,

it

sovereignty.

87) acknowledges:

Coase specified three crucial conditions for his conclusion to
a legal framework establishing liability for actions,
presumably supported by government authority; perfect information; and zero
transaction costs (including organization costs and the costs of making side
payments). It is absolutely clear that none of these conditions is met in world
In the

first

hold.

place,

These

were:

politics.

Although the structure of the international system does not meet the conditions
required for Coase’ s theorem,

Keohane argues

that

one can understand the conditions

necessary for international cooperation to occur by reasoning backwards from
rational states recognize that potentially beneficial cooperation

uncertainty and transaction costs, they

may

is

it.

If

being thwarted by

reasonably be expected to create institutions

with the functional capabilities to reduce uncertainty and lower transaction costs. As

Keohane (1984, 87-88) puts

it,

“inverting the Coase theorem allows us to analyze

international institutions largely as responses to problems of property rights, uncertainty,

and transaction costs.”
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According

to

inhibit cooperation,

this

IR institutionalists, rational states see that international anarchy can

even when

understanding, states

it

is in

may come

the interest of all parties involved.

to see a

In

response to

need for international institutions to redress

the “market failures” of the international system

(Keohane 1982,

151

).

Institutions are

created by rational forward-looking actors, in anticipation of the market-correcting

functions that they will serve.

Collaboration and Coordination in Rational Institutionalism

IR institutionalists frequently turn to the tool of game theory, also used in the

NIE,

to

develop systematic theories to explain the existence, form, and function of

international institutions.

A

game-theoretic approach recognizes

that,

even though

actors’ interactions are continuous, “they will tend to face generic types of cooperation

problems over and over again” (Martin and Simmons 1998, 743; Lake and Powell 1999).
Institutions frequently address

Stem

(

problems

that

can be

fit

into generic typologies.

By

1983) provides one of the clearest early examples of this approach.

examining a succession of 2x2 game matrices, Stein demonstrated

that, in

many

cases,

actions that are individually rational for the actors involved lead to results that are

collectively suboptimal.

International regimes, he argued, are “created to deal with the

collective suboptimality that can

According
problems

that

institutional

to this line

regimes

forms

to

may

emerge from individual behavior” (Stein 1983,

123).

of argument, there are essentially two types of cooperation

be created to solve, and such regimes will require different

be effective depending on the underlying structure of the

cooperation problem that they address. “Regimes established to deal with the dilemma of
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common

interests differ

The former

from those created

to solve the

dilemma of common

aversions.

require collaboration the latter coordination’'' (Stein 1983, 128).
,

The paradigmatic example of a dilemma of common
dilemma” (Herz 1950)

that

plagued attempts

Specifically, Stein characterizes the

US

game, wherein the

and

USSR

SALT

had a

at

interests is the “security

arms control during the Cold War.

agreements as a Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD)

common

interest in limiting arms, but also a

strong interest in avoiding military inferiority. Stein (1983, 129) argues that “arms
control agreements are highly institutionalized, for these regimes are highly concerned

with compliance and policing. They must define cheating quite explicitly, insure that

it

be observable, and specify verification and monitoring procedures.” Thus, from an

regimes addressing collaboration problems should use

institutional design standpoint,

relatively precise rules,

and should incorporate mechanisms for monitoring and

verification.

In contrast,

regimes addressing dilemmas of common aversion are (once

concluded) self-enforcing (Stein 1983, 130). Thus, they have

mechanisms, and

may

relatively

nevertheless be difficult to reach in the

outcome need not

need for enforcement

will tend to be less institutionalized than collaboration regimes.

However, although coordination requires
it

less

translate into

agreement

cooperative outcomes are possible

equilibria), distributional conflict

(i.e.,

in

first

little

place.

institutional capacity to sustain,

Agreement

support of another.

when

the coordination

may ensue concerning which

developed further by Krasner (1991).
Cooperation under Anarchy
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When

game
to

to avoid

one

several

contains multiple

choose -

a point

The coordination-collaboration
development of rational

distinction had a lasting effect

institutionalist theory

on the

on international cooperation, framing work

well into the 1990s (Keohane 1994; Martin 1992a). However, scholars soon recognized
the limits of the one-time, two-player

models on which

it

was based. Accordingly,

the

next significant refinements to rational institutionalism involved considering the effects

that the

number of parties and

iterated interactions

over time have on international

cooperation (Axelrod 1984).

Kenneth Oye incorporated both of these insights
rational institutionalism.

in

an influential reformulation of

In this statement, there are three variables

along which

cooperation problems - and institutional solutions - vary: payoff structure, shadow of the

future,

and number of parties (Oye 1985). The variable 'payoff structure’

the typology

of games described by Stem (1983). Shadow of the future refers

(expectation of) continued interactions. This

make

rests largely

is

on

to parties'

significant because repeated interactions

possible strategies of reciprocity, and reduce uncertainty through reputational

effects

(Oye 1985,

14).

Finally,

and most directly relevant for the "rational design”

approach, the third variable concerns the consequences for cooperation of multiple
parties.

Oye

(

Building on earlier work by Olson

1965; 1971) and Russett and Sullivan

1985, 18) argues that “the prospects for cooperation diminish as the

significant actors rises.” This

of state
the

(

is

interests, the probability

number of parties

the probability that

increases.

true for three reasons.

of fully

common

First,

interests

owing

(i.e.,

(

1971

number of

to the heterogeneity

harmony) decreases

as

Second, as the number of parties increases, so too does

one or more parties

will

have a relatively small shadow of the future

with respect to the issue under negotiation, further hampering cooperation. Third, as the
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),

number of parties

increases, strategies of reciprocity

enforcement problems

become more complicated, and

become more

(e.g., free riding)

salient

(Oye 1985,

18-20).

Various institutional design strategies are available for dealing with these three
issues.

States

issue-linkage.

future.

may

alter

payoff structures by increasing the scope of cooperation through

Likewise, issue-linkage

number of parties

Finally, if the

participation or

may be used

decompose problems

also to lengthen states’

inhibits cooperation, states

to

may

shadow of the

restrict

decrease the number of parties relevant to a

given negotiation (Oye 1985, 9-20).

From

the

A number

Game Theory

of International Politics

of factors led rational institutionalist scholars

use of typologies of cooperation problems,
the disaggregation of individual

The

first

was increasing

for international cooperation.

interaction effects

among

common

to

Design

move away from

to the earlier literature,

mechanisms and formation of specific,

hypotheses concerning institutional design.
discussion.

to Rational

Two

and toward

testable

are particularly relevant to the present

dissatisfaction with the use of

The second involved

structural variables,

the

games

as a

metaphor

the identification of important

which threatened conventional

understandings of key concepts such as ‘coordination’ and ‘the shadow of the future'.
Early on, scholars warned of the dangers of facile application of

international politics (e.g.,

reliance on metaphors

Stag Flunt, Chicken,

Snyder and Diesing 1977). According

drawn from game

game models

to this criticism,

theoretic concepts (e.g.. Prisoners’

etc.) inappropriately shift

focus

Dilemma,

away from empirical puzzles

international relations.

We

metaphor simply by translating it into a game matrix. Glib
assertions that “Issue Vis Prisoners’ Dilemma,” or that the “Cuban Missile Crisis
was a game of Chicken,” efficiently convey a metaphor, but do not make the
do not improve

a

24

in

to

metaphor more plausible or take much advantage of the power of game theory.
Typically, such statements simply restate what

we

already

know

.

.

.

Real rigor

requires tightening the correspondence between the metaphor and the issue at

hand(Snidal 1985b, 30).
All too often in practice, scholars proceeded from

paying close enough attention

game

to empirical matters,

theoretic

made by

actors

games were

back

,

.

without

)

it

that

happened. Simple-minded

lead to circular reasoning from the choices

Ultimately, however, the difficulty

to their preferences.”

was

that

apply in anything other than a metaphorical manner. Writing

difficult to

fifteen years later,

,

first,

Smdal (1985b, 40-41 points out

“ what has happened cannot serve as an explanation of why

uses of the ‘revealed preference’ approach

metaphor

Beth Simmons and Lisa Martin observed that the primary difficulty

with this method of analysis “lies in accurate ex ante specification of games. Empirical
researchers wanting to test functional explanations often find

precisely what

interaction”

games

are being played without observing the

(Simmons and Martin 2002,

The second problem

is

that

it

difficult to

determine

outcome of state

196).

simple

game models obscure

the actual range of

choices available to states in negotiating agreements. For example, the single, optimal
solution portrayed by a Prisoners’

Dilemma game simply does

negotiating practice (Koremenos, Lipson, and

not accord with actual

Smdal 2001a). The simplifying

assumptions of earlier game theoretic models also obscure interactions
variables.

First,

many

among key

‘benign’ coordination problems actually entail significant

distributional conflict.

outcome does not mean

As

Stein (1983) observed, the fact that states share a least favored

that they will agree

on

a specific, favored

rational institutionalism traditionally has not identified

variable, empirical analyses of such distribution
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power

outcome. Although

as a significant explanatory

problems have shown

that they

may

be

very relevant to explaining institutional outcomes under such circumstances (Krasner
1991). Similarly, rational institutionalists traditionally have

long shadow of the future

is

assumed

that a sufficiently

necessary to sustain cooperation (Oye 1985). Yet, longer

agreements - especially those involving enforcement mechanisms - often spur
distributional conflict over the initial terms

the future

is

a longer

shadow of

not a reliable indicator of successful cooperation (Harris and Holmstron

1987; Fearon 1998;

As

of an agreement. Thus,

a result

Koremenos 2005a).

of these

difficulties, current scholarship has shifted

of general models of cooperation

in

away from

the use

favor of disaggregated variable-based explanations.

The “legalization” research program,

for example, focuses attention

on the factors

influencing three specific variables of international agreements: obligation, precision, and

delegation (Goldstein et

program introduced

al

2000). Shortly afterwards, the “rational design” research

a highly disaggregated, variable-based

design and form of international institutions (Koremenos
“rational design project explicitly

framework

et al

for studying the

2001a). The authors of the

acknowledge the shortcomings of prior game-theoretic

approaches.
Unfortunately, such general models of international institutions are well beyond
the reach of current 1R scholarship.
tightly derived models.

circumstances that
predictions

about

Our

But those tended

we had

to

initial

conjectures were guided by

be partial models of fairly specific

to adapt in a looser fashion to “derive”

international

institutions

more general

(Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal

2001b).

Accordingly, the rational design research program proceeded by identifying the
explanatory variables behind earlier

game

theoretic

work on

international institutions,

and hypothesizing the independent effects of each on the design of international
institutions.
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.

The Rational Design of International
The “Rational Design of International

Institutions” project

2001a; 2001b; Koremenos and Snidal 2003) represents a

The scholars working on

institutionalism.

rational choice

goals,

presumption that

Institutions

state

membership and membership

delegated to them by

identified

by

states,

(Koremenos

this research

art in rational

from

et al

criteria,

choice

a basic

own

2001a, 762). They observe

number of dimensions,

scope of the substantive issues

decision-making procedures, extent of centralized authority

member

organizational structure

et al

states use international institutions to further their

that existing international institutions vary greatly along a

that they address, internal

of the

the rational design project start

and they design them accordingly (Koremenos

including: size of

(Koremenos

and the extent
et al

to

which they possess formal

2001a). The key independent variables

program include

the presence of distribution problems, the

presence of enforcement problems, the number of actors involved in negotiations, the

degree of asymmetry

among them, and

the presence of uncertainty (concerning

preferences, policy effects, and the state of the world)

on prior neohberal

institutionalist research

(Koremenos

on institutional design

et al

(cf.

2001a). Drawing

Conybeare 1984;

Keohane 1982, 1984; Martin 1992b, 1993; Olson 1965; Snidal 1985a, 1985b;
1990), the rational design project presents sixteen “conjectures,”

797) which are

To
the

listed

date, very

below

in

Table

few empirical

2.

(Koremenos

Stein 1983,

et al

2001a,

1

tests

of these conjectures have been conducted. Even

most comprehensive of these remains very preliminary: the “rational design” special

issue of International Organization included eight case studies that touched on several of

the hypotheses listed above.

Based on these cases, the authors claimed
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to

have found

strong, though not complete, support for the majority of their conjectures

2001b).

al

More

recently,

Koremenos (2005a) has

the use of “sunset clauses” as a

Harris and

et

tested refined hypotheses concerning

form of institutional

Holmstrom (1987) on

(Koremenos

flexibility,

drawing on prior work by

the duration of contracts. Nevertheless, empirical

evidence for the majority of rational design hypotheses remains scant.

Table

2.1

Rational Design Conjectures

Restrictive MEMBERSHIP increases with the severity of the enforcement problem.
M2 Restrictive MEMBERSHIP increases with uncertainty about (others’) preferences.
M3 MEMBERSHIP increases with the severity of the distribution problem.
5
SCOPE increases with the number of relevant parties.

Ml

1

52
53

Cl

C2
C3
C4

V

1

V2
V3
FI

F2

F3

SCOPE increases with the severity of the distribution problem.
SCOPE increases with the severity of the enforcement problem.
CENTRALIZATION increases with uncertainty about (others’) behavior.
CENTRALIZATION increases with uncertainty about the state of the world.
CENTRALIZATION increases with the number of relevant parties.
CENTRALIZATION increases with the severity of the enforcement problem.
Individual

CONTROL

decreases with the

Asymmetry of CONTROL

CONTROL

increases with

number of relevant parties.
asymmetry of parties.

increases with uncertainty about the state of the world.

FLEXIBILITY
FLEXIBILITY
FLEXIBILITY

increases with uncertainty about the state of the world.
increases with the severity of the distribution problem.

decreases with the

number of relevant

parties.

In addition to limited empirical testing, the rational design project suffers

number of theoretical

blind spots, and has been criticized from a

(Wendt 2001; Duffield 2003; Pierson 2004).

Its

from

a

number of directions

variables are chosen entirely from the

canon of neohberal institutionalism. The project does not take account of the possible
role of

power asymmetry

2000). Likewise,

it

as an explanatory variable in institutional design (cf

Gruber

does not adequately account for the possible explanatory power of

norms or ideas (Duffield 2003).

Finally,

its

reliance on correlative evidence prevents

from explaining causal mechanisms, and thus from distinguishing
similar expectations

(Thompson 2005).
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rival explanations

it

with

)

Assessment

Most of the

from shortcomings

rational design project’s limitations follow

research design. These limitations can be grouped into three general categories:

failure to theorize possible interactions

between the independent variables used.

(

in its

1

(2)

poor

case selection, and (3) failure to engage alternative explanations in any systematic

manner.

The

rational design project’s nearly exclusive focus

The authors of the

constitutes a significant limitation of the approach.

project admit the possibility of significant interactions

and acknowledge

that

because problem structures

institutional solutions,

will be selected

it is

difficult for

(Koremenos

et al

shortcoming, and propose that

The case
First,

it

them

may

to specify

among

their

rational design

independent variables

permit multiple ‘rational’

ex ante which specific solution

2001a). The project’s authors recognize this

be addressed by future work (Koremenos

et al

2001a).

selection produced four further limitations of the rational design project,

some of the cases

are primarily formal extensions of rational design hypotheses,

rather than empirical tests of rational design hypotheses.

limitation derives

trade.

on bivariate relationships

from the near-exclusive focus on

These may be sufficiently distinctive

that

it

A

second, more severe,

institutions regulating international

is

difficult to

make

valid

generalizations about institutions in other issue areas (e.g., security institutions,

environmental institutions). Third, because

much of the

authors’ previous research has

focused on the institutional management of international trade,
that the rational

to

design project has tested

generate them in the

first

instance.

its

hypotheses on

it

is

legitimate to worry

many of the same

cases used

Fourth, the rational design project did not consider
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a

number of cases

sufficient to test all of their

design project's empirical

hypotheses (S2:

SCOPE

(e.g.,

was completely

increases with

Finally, although

cornered fight”

test

proposed hypotheses. Indeed, the rational
silent regarding

one of their most central

NUMBER).

one may sympathize with the project’s desire

to avoid a “three-

between realism, liberalism, and constructivism), the

project’s exclusive focus on neoliberal, rational choice hypotheses limits

can

test for the

its

analysis.

presence of certain, specified (rational, functional) hypotheses

number of cases, but
ad hoc fashion

rational design

it

In fact,

is

it

unable to engage alternative explanations

may

be the case that institutional design

in

is

It

in a

anything beyond an

conducted within

parameters set by normative/ideational and power-based factors (Duffield 2003).
Therefore, any truly persuasive account of institutional design must take account of the
possible influence of state power, as well as the

the design of international institutions

power of shared norms and

beliefs,

on

and agreements.

Realism
Realist scholars challenge rational institutionalists’ belief that such institutions

may

permit states to overcome the security concerns intrinsic to an anarchic international

system

that, in their

view, strongly favors self-help. They do not deny the existence of

cooperation in global politics. As

Gneco

long recognized that cooperation

is

729).

explains, “scholars in the realist tradition have

an important feature of world politics.” (Grieco 1993,

Rather, they challenge rational institutionalists’ understanding of the nature of

international cooperation and institutions.

the existence of institutions as a product of

Early realist work on institutions focused on

hegemony

(Gilpin 1971, 1975, 1981;

Kindleberger 1973; Krasner 1976, 1985, 1991). This focus was
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later

broadened

to

include the effects that the security

dilemma has on cooperation

1985), economic cooperation inspired by military alliances

changes
1990),

in the

power balancing and

turf,

(Gowa

Van Evera

1989), the effects of

balance-of-power on chances for international cooperation (Mearsheimer

1990; Walt 1987, 1988).

own

(Jervis 1978;

military alliances

More

(Aron 1973, Mogenthau 1948; Snyder

recently, realists

have engaged

institutionalists

on

their

arguing that institutions are created for functional reasons, but to further power

exchange (Drezner 2007; Gruber 2000).

politics rather than efficient

John Mearsheimer summarizes contemporary

realists’ position

on the

effectiveness of institutions;

institutions cannot get states to stop

For

behaving as short-term power maximizers.

realists, institutions reflect state calculations

on concerns about relative power; as a

of

self-interest

based primarily

outcomes
do
significant independent effects on state behavior.
However, realists
that great powers sometimes find institutions - especially alliances reflect

the

balance

of power.

result, institutional

Institutions,

realists

maintain,

maintaining or even increasing their share of world power

It is

from

this

vantage point that

creation, design,

hegemonic

realists derive their

(

invariably

not

have

recognize
useful for

1995, 82)

understandings of institutional

and function. Realist theories of institutional design and function include

stability theory, research

on

how

relative gains concerns shape

cooperation, and the strategic use of institutions for coercion

-

all

and constrain

of which offer

alternatives to the rational institutionalist theories described above.

Hegemonic
Hegemonic

stability theorists

‘hegemon’) has the capacity and
(Kindleberger 1973).

When

stability theory

argue that only a single predominant power

interest to provide international public

there

is a

power

in the international

supply an institution or public good completely by
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itself,

it

(i.e.,

goods

system great enough

may do

so.

a

to

The function of

institutions is to facilitate the

possibilities for

will not exist.

hegemon’s

distribution of such goods.

genuine cooperation are limited, when there

is

They can only be sustained through hegemonic

Most current

studies using the

hegemonic

Because

hegemony

not

institutions

imposition.

stability hypothesis separate

benign and

coercive hegemons (Ikenberry 2004; Miller 2000; Gruber 2000). The notion of benign

hegemony, developed from
pursuing their

international

own

the

work of Kindleberger (1973), explains

interest, establish institutions

community.

A

which benefit

all

that

hegemons,

members of the

benign hegemon, “functioning as the dominant

member of a

privileged group, supplies institutional arrangements to others as collective goods”

(Osherenko and Young 1993). As Haas summarizes:
The benign

Keohane and Charles Kindleberger,

version, presented by Robert

based on a presumption that

many
may

is

cases of international cooperation are positive-

sum games, and

that all states

are leery about

initially

benefit from cooperation, even though they

participating, out of fear of non-reciprocity.

In this

view of leadership, the hegemon pursues its own long-term
objectives; however, because of the nature of the issue, all benefit from such
benevolent

arrangements. (Haas 1990, 41

A

).

coercive hegemon, in contrast, “exercises structural power to impose institutional

arrangements favorable
1993).

In

Krasner’s

(

1976) and Gilpin’s

advantage of their power

(

1975, 1981,

(Osherenko

987) expositions, hegemons take

parties to

,

.

.

argue that because outcomes depend

dominant party and that party’s willingness to
comply, coordinated arrangements will occur in terms

on the leadership of

compel other

1

to others”

in order to obtain short-term gains.

Robert Gilpin and Stephen Krasner
entirely

of the consequences

to itself, regardless

a

favorable to that party. Coordinated policies will reflect the short-term interests

of the hegemon, rather than the more generous, longer-term ones proposed by

Keohane and Kindleberger (Haas 1990,

It is

42).

difficult to derive specific expectations

the theory

of hegemonic

particular

hegemons

stability.

at particular

concerning institutional design from

Especially if the theory

moments

is

interpreted as applicable to

in international history,
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it

is

difficult to derive

hypotheses concerning specific rules without ex ante specification of hegemonic
interests.

Since specification of state interests

necessary to be modest

said

is

that

when

it

certainly will

do

so.

If

outside the scope of this project,

is

a necessary condition for

hegemon can achieve

its

is

hegemonic

ends fully through unilateral action,

cannot, the benefit of including other states

it

it

What can be

inferring implications for institutional design.

some degree of interdependency

creation of institutions. If a

lies

is

twofold. First,

although the hegemon ultimately will be responsible for maintaining the institution! s),

may

attempt to pass costs onto other

states.

it

Second, hegemonic creation of institutions to

provide public goods, such as a stable global economy, necessarily involve coordination
with other state governments. Therefore, one can expect that institutions of hegemonic
stability will incorporate inclusive

membership

rules.

Relative Gains: Extending Realism to Study International Institutions

Realists’ understanding

game of international

of coercive or malign hegemons’ role

relations informs their later

Gneco

central role in developing realist approaches to institutional design

institutionalists

realists see the

world fundamentally differently than do

because they use a “thicker” sense of anarchy. Rational

is

in international relations.

Realists use a thicker sense of anarchy than

institutionalists’

“thin,” focused on the lack of formal supranational authority

emphasizing

that the lack

no form of recourse other than self-help
are acutely concerned with

has played a

and function.

understanding of anarchy

institutionalists,

zero-sum

emphasis on the importance of relative

gains in institutional design, function, and participation. Joseph

Grieco contends that

in the

to

do

rational

of supranational authority means states have
secure their survival and security. Thus, states

and highly attuned
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to their relative

power

in the international

system, as this power

interests.

On

is

the only

means by which they can achieve

their national

the basis of their interpretation of international anarchy, realists have

developed two major propositions
cooperation (Gneco 1990,
First, realists

oppose

to

liberal

understandings of international

4):

argue that states are preoccupied with their security and power; by

consequence, states are predisposed toward conflict and competition, and they
often

fail

even when they have

to cooperate

common

interests.

Second,

realists

claim that international institutions can mitigate the inhibitory effects of anarchy

on the willingness of states

These propositions predict
liberals

that

to

cooperate only marginally (Grieco 1990,

cooperation will happen substantially less often than

contend and with substantially
Relative Gains:

A

4).

less success in

Realist Research

most issue-areas.

Program on

Institutions

Rational institutionalists claim that, even granting the realist assumption of

international anarchy, institutions could

participants.

interest

is

At

the crux of the debate

understood in relative

non of international relations

still

was

and function

the issue of

mutual benefit of all

whether rational

power, and power

is

to the

states’ self-

absolute (institutionalist) terms.

(realist) or

for realists

exist

is

The sine qua

an inherently relational

concept. According to Grieco, “for realists, the emergence of the problem [with

cooperationj

change

is

predicated upon the prospect of gains that are unequal and lead to a

in relative position

among

Grieco characterized

partners” (1993, 730).

realist theories

of institutional cooperation as understanding

states as “defensive positionalists” while liberals see states as “rational egoists”

28).

He

(

1990.

explains:

Realists understand that states seek absolute gains and worry about compliance.

However,

realists

do not believe

that

anarchy causes states

but instead to be defensive positionalists.
in addition to their

to

be rational egoists,

Realists consequently argue that states,

concerns about cheating, worry that their partners might gain

more than they from

their joint

endeavors (Grieco 1990, 28).
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According

Gneco,

to

liberals underestimate the

degree to which “states are

fundamentally concerned about their physical survival and their political independence”'
(Grieco 1990,
security

first

Concern

10).

and

defend their existence and

for their survival leads states to

treat all other

concerns as secondary. Because of this, states are

concerned exclusively with relative gains. Grieco explains the logical
Defensive state positionalism, in

turn,

link:

generates a relative-gains problem for

cooperation: a state will decline to join, will leave, or will sharply limit

commitment

to a cooperative

arrangement

if

it

believes that gaps

mutually positive gains favor partners (Grieco 1990,

“Realism, then, finds that there are

at least

in

its

otherwise

10).

two major

barriers to international

cooperation: state concerns about cheating and state concerns about relative achievement

of gains” (Grieco 1990, 28). Grieco contends

that rational institutionalism ignores the

substantive content of anarchy (states’ fear for survival and relative power)

in

favor of the

procedural content of anarchy (the need to create governing structures for enforcement),

so

is

unable to identify, analyze, or account for the

“from

a logical viewpoint, realism offers a

latter”

As

(Grieco 1990, 28).

a result,

more complete understanding than

neoliberalism of the effects of anarchy on states and, by consequence, the problem of

international cooperation” (Grieco 1990, 29).

must overcome two

“Hence,

barriers to cooperation; the

realists

have argued

that states

problem of enforcement and the problem

of relative gains” (Grieco 1993, 729). Concern with these two barriers shapes
approaches

to institutional

From Hegemonic

institutionalists to

hegemons

design and function.

Stability

Realist hypotheses

and Relative

Gams

to Realist Institutional

Design

modify and compete with the specific suppositions of rational

varying degrees. Hegemonic stability theorists

as benign

realist

do not fundamentally challenge many
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who

characterize

institutionalist

understandings

of existing

institutions, but they

requires the existence of a

membership

hegemon and

Hegemonic

rules.

do claim

that the creation

that those institutions will incorporate inclusive

stability theorists

expect that institutions will be designed

consequences for other participating

of those institutions necessarily

to

states.

who

characterize

hegemons

as coercive

favor the hegemon’s interests, regardless of

While

it

is

impossible to predict the specific

content of these rules without the ex ante specification of hegemonic interests,

is fair

it

to

claim that since coercive hegemons are instituting arrangements in their self-interest,
other, less powerful states will often lack an interest in

complying with

institutions

designed to favor the hegemon. Because less powerful states have less interest in
compliance, enforcement provisions will figure heavily in the design of international

institutions.

Relative gains theorists extend the challenge. Joseph Grieco advances several

direct realist alternatives to liberal hypotheses about institutional design.

explains that

all

attempts

at

international cooperation are governed

First,

he

by "the need

for self-

help sufficiency” which “leads states to value autonomy and independence” (Grieco

1993, 734).

The concern

because they

for

independence “causes

may become dependent on

that an institution

is

a threat to

wary about cooperation

their partners” (Grieco 1993, 734).

autonomy and

concern hinders cooperation, except

states to be

To

the extent

security, states will not participate, This

in situations

where

states see cooperation as

necessary to survival, such as alliances (Grieco 1993).

In

addition to this overarching concern, realists put forth specific hypotheses

about the properties of institutional design.

In
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answer

to the liberal

hypothesis that

restrictive

membership increases with

(Koremenos

uncertainty about preferences

is

severity of enforcement problems and the

2001a), realists hypothesize that

et al

if a state

uncertain about which partners would do relatively better, the state will prefer

more

partners, for larger

numbers would enhance

the likelihood that relative

gains advantaging (what turns out to be) better-positioned partners could be

by more favorable sharings arising from interactions with

offset

(as

matters

develop) weaker partners” (Grieco 1990, 228).

gams of participants decreases

Further, uncertainty about relative

agreement will be reached
according to

As Grieco

at all.

realists, is a vitally

explains, “uncertainty about one’s partners,

important cause of state concerns about relative gains.

Instead, the condition of insecurity

future intentions

the likelihood that an

-

at least the uncertainty

and actions - works

,

of each about the other 's

against their cooperation”

( 1

979,

1

05)”

( 1

993,

733).

In contrast to the institutionalist expectation that issue

problem because of the potential of gams from

severity of the distribution or enforcement

issue linkages

and exchange (Koremenos 2001a),

threat to cooperation.

According

realists see issue linkage as a possible

to Grieco:

Assume

Realism, again, offers a very different proposition.
that

two issue-areas

linkage

is

that

are linked,

changes

abilities in the other

provide

additional

.

.

in
.

and

that

it

relative capabilities

the state

capabilities

In

sum,

belief that the

two

realists believe that

implicitly

issue areas

in

one domain affect relative

would then believe

to

the

were

that a state believes

believes that one element of this

partner

Cooperation would therefore be unattractive to
its

scope will increase with the

.

that
in

cooperation would
linked

this state in direct

issue-areas.

proportion to

interrelated (Grieco 1988a, 506).

cooperative agreements employing issue linkage either

or explicitly increase the chance

gains. Therefore, agreements

that a state’s counterparts

employing issue linkages are more

international cooperation will tend to be narrow.
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may

realize relative

difficult to

conclude and

Finally, in contrast to the liberal hypothesis that fear of cheating

iterative,

is

mitigated by

longer-term arrangements, realists propose that “if two states are worried or

uncertain about the relative achievement of gains, then each will prefer a less durable

cooperate arrangement, for each would want to be more readily able to exit from the

arrangement

if

gaps in gains did

come

in favor

of the other” (Grieco 1988a, 510). To the

extend that longer-term agreements are reached,

emphasize

flexibility

escape clauses

realists

expect that their design will

arrangements, including periodic renegotiation, and, especially

if states fear that

others are going to obtain relative gains.

Although the “relative gains” debate featured prominently
relations theory in the late 1980s, into the 1990s,

wave of realist

scholarship,

which has

in international

has since been overtaken by a

it

shifted focus

away from macro-level

new

theories of

cooperation toward more precise, middle-range mechanisms influencing cooperation,
mirroring recent developments in rational institutionalist theory. For example, Gruber

(2000) maintains the traditional

emphasis on power-based explanations of

However, he moves beyond

international politics.

characteristic of

realist

much

prior realist

work

a strictly structural approach,

in the field, to

pay attention

to the

domestic

determinants of international politics.

Though

this

seems

strikingly similar to liberal theory,

processes by which domestic interests inform foreign policy

which focuses on the

(e.g.,

Moravcsik 1997),
of power

Gruber emphasizes the importance not of specific domestic

interests but, rather,

distributions within states. In this view, the leaders of great

powers create international

institutions not just to secure favorable international cooperation but also to bind their

domestic successors,

who may have

diverging preferences.
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Insofar as certain actors in the international system have what

power, one should not be surprised

it-alone

I

have termed go-

to find these actors establishing

supranational governance structures for the express purpose of locking in or

“congealing” their distinctive tastes and preferences (Gruber 2000, 89).

If there

power

is

powerful domestic opposition to the proposed international cooperation, great

leaders

may

select permissive

amendment

rules, to increase the probability that

successors with divergent preferences will continue to work within the original

institutional

opposition

is

framework, rather than withdraw or dismantle
absent, leaders will

reason, leaders

may employ

make arrangements more

it.

Conversely,

inflexible.

if

such

For the same

issue linkage to enlarge the domestic constituency for the

proposed regulation.

Although

and preferences

it

lie

international realm.

is

not possible to evaluate these hypotheses here

outside the scope of this study -

In Gruber’s view,

institutional bargaining

(Young 1989a)

much

it

is

- domestic

politics

possible to adapt them to the

international cooperation does not reflect

but, rather, is

imposed as a fait accompli by an

“enacting coalition” with “go-it-alone” power (Gruber 2000, 6-7). Thus, even

powerful states would prefer not to cooperate, they nevertheless

may choose

if less

to

do

so,

because they regard exclusion from great power institutions as worse. The internationallevel variable in this hypothesis, clearly,

is

the degree to

which

the enacting coalition

possesses the power to impose institutional arrangements.

Extending Gruber’s analysis of domestic

number of states needed

to

politics,

impose an international

one may infer

that as the

institution increases, so too

does the

likelihood of significant domestic opposition in at least one state. Therefore, larger

enacting coalitions will lead to institutional designs that favor issue linkage and

permissive

amendment

rules.

This

is

the case because great
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powers seeking

to

impose

cooperation on favorable terms will not form larger enacting coalitions than

in

order to maximize the benefits they receive from the agreement.

However,

as

Gruber (2000) concedes, not

all

international cooperation

imposed. Picking up where Gruber’s analysis leaves

have focused on the role of power

in multilateral

off,

diplomacy. Drezner’s (2007) recent

is

exemplary

in this regard.

Drezner regards two variables as particularly important for understanding the

form

divergence of interests

that a global regulatory will take: the

among

and the divergence of interests between great powers and the other
participation the great

powers

desire.

between great powers and other

conflict

among

great powers, with

lead to “rival standards;”

states will

High

levels

conflict

states

institutional

great powers,

whose

of conflict among great powers as well

states will lead to

low

is

other contemporary realists

research on the determinants of global regulatory outcomes

as

necessary,

is

“sham standards;” High

levels

between great powers and other

of

states will

low conflict among great powers and high conflict with other

produce “club standards;”

between great powers and other

finally,

low conflict both among great powers and

states will lead to

“harmonized standards” (Drezner

2007, 72).

These types of cooperation imply distinctive
entail institutions with inclusive

authority,

and

little

membership

institutional forms.

criteria,

ambiguous

Sham

standards

rules, little delegation

of

or no use of monitoring or enforcement mechanisms. These are

designed primarily to address domestic audiences; they permit governments “to claim the

de )ure existence of regulatory coordination” when deeper cooperation
undesirable.

great

Rival standards are produced

when

the primary conflict

powers only, Under these conditions, great powers
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is

impossible or

of interest

will design inclusive

is

among

membership

rules as they seek to

expand

number of allies and,

their

thus, their control

over policy. Drezner (2007, 80) points to the International Whaling Commission (after
1986) as an example of rival standards

which

arise

when

great

in international cooperation.

powers are united, but

Club standards,

conflicts of interest exist with other,

smaller states, are similar to Gruber’s case of imposed cooperation. In these cases, “the

combined market

size of a great

power concert

will induce

most

However, there

shifting their standards” (Drezner 2007, 75).

recalcitrant states into

will be a constant

temptation for the most disadvantaged states to defect from cooperation, creating a

“Prisoners’

Dilemma

institutions created

aspect

[to]

enforcement” (Drezner, 2007, 75). Therefore,

under these conditions will emphasize mechanisms for monitoring

and enforcement. Finally, harmonized standards are created when there
of interest among any of the
dispute resolution.

On

will feature inclusive

These require very

states.

little

is little

conflict

monitoring, enforcement, or

the other hand, such arrangements will set forth specific rules, and

membership

rules.

Assessment
Notwithstanding Koremenos’s (2005a) claim

shown

that

it

is

possible to derive a

institutional design.

inclusive

Realist

membership

rules

to the contrary, this section

number of specific

work on

relative

realist

gams suggests

when such concerns

are salient.

hypotheses concerning

that states will

Moreover,

about the possibility of free riding suggests that states will choose
entry into force

when enforcement concerns

strict

choose

realists’

concern

conditions for

are present. Second, realists’ concern with

the preservation of state sovereignty suggests that there

multilateral agreements, although realists

has

do expect
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is little

room

for delegation in

states to delegate resources as

>

necessary to support specific functions

salient.

(e.g.,

monitoring)

when enforcement problems

Finally, with respect to institutional flexibility, realists expect that

imposed by

a

hegemon

will permit

little

are

agreements

discretion in rule implementation, and will

include only modest flexibility mechanisms. Conversely, agreements created through

bargaining

among roughly

equal powers will feature higher levels of institutional

flexibility.

Constructivism
If realism

emphasizes the importance of anarchy and power, while rational

institutionalism forefronts the strategic pursuit of material gains, constructivism focuses

on the influence of ideas and norms

in global politics.

theory of the social construction of the political world.

Loosely, constructivism

Though

there are

many

is

a

diverse

research programs in constructivist IR, “all strands of constructivism converge on an

ontology that depicts the social world as intersubjectively and collectively meaningful
structures and processes” (Adler 2002, 100).

Many

IR scholars credit the introduction of a constructivist approach to

international relations to the

work of Friedrich Kratochwil

(

1989) and Nicholas

(1989), and the popularization of constructivism to Alexander

some

Wendt

truth in this popular narrative about constructivism’s birth

roots are

much more

(

Onuf

1992). There

is

and development, but

its

diverse (Adler 2002) and can be seen in the earlier scholarship on

international cooperation, such as Karl Deutsch’s (1957)

and Ernst Haas’ “neofunctionalist” approach

to

international organization (1964).
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work on

security

communities

European integration (1958) and

Constructivist Approaches to International Cooperation

As mentioned above,

there are

be described as ‘constructivist’, and
incorporate

all

it

many
is

distinctive research

beyond

of these approaches. Therefore,

especially relevant for this study.

programs

The following

work

the scope of any single

this section highlights

in

two

IR

that

may

to

that are

section focuses on these approaches’

implications for institutional design.

Ernst Haas (2001, 26) has identified three main schools of constructivism in the

study of IR: “norms and culture” constructivism, “soft rationalist” constructivism, and

“systemic” constructivism. The ‘norms and culture’ school subsumes two strands of

One examines

theorizing.

norms

the creation, spread, and explanatory

in international politics (e.g..

Keck and Sikkink

power of intersubjective

1998); the other examines the

influence of global culture on international cooperation and institutional form (e.g.,

Meyer

et al

1997).

The

‘soft rationalist’

school agrees with rational institutionalism that

political actors act instrumentally to further their interests, but

is

always bounded. ‘Soft

least

two ways.

First,

rationalist’ scholars

go beyond

argues that such rationality

rational institutionalists in at

they explicitly theorize the source of interests

(e.g.,

consensual

knowledge) rather than take them as given; second, they theorize processes by which
actors' interests change, such as

school includes work that

politics in

is

by learning (Haas and Haas 1995). The ‘systemic’

predominantly state-centric, and that explains international

terms of state identity

constructivist theory identified

(e.g.,

Wendt

by Haas,

we

1994). Finally, to the three schools of

can add a fourth: sociological

institutionalism. This approach pays particular attention to the

ways

in

which

bureaucratic and organizational culture influences the behavior of international
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institutions.

In

comparison

to rational institutionalism

and realism, which

treat

international institutions primarily (though not exclusively) as dependent variables

as

outcomes of international

politics), sociological institutionalism

(i.e.,

examines the power of

international institutions as agents in international politics (see, e.g., Barnett and

Finnemore 1999; 2004).
This study focuses on the ‘norms and culture’ approach and the ‘soft rationalist’

approach because they yield testable hypotheses concerning institutional design that are
compatible with the design of this project.

knowledge of state

identities,

which

lie

In contrast,

systemic constructivism requires

outside the framework of this study. Likewise,

although sociological institutionalists have generated

many

provocative hypotheses

concerning the behavior of international institutions, these are analytically distinct from
those central to this project.

Recent applications of sociological institutionalism and

organization theory “systematically exclude questions of agency, interest, and power”

which

are central to the

problem of institutional design (Checkel 1998, 341

Norms, Culture and

As described above,

Institutional

).

Design

the ‘norms and culture’ school of constructivism

subsumes

two separate strands of theorizing. One focuses attention on the power of intersubjective

norms
shape

to

shape institutional outcomes. The other focuses on the power of culture to

political institutions.

Norms of Multilateralism

One ‘norm and
as a

culture' approach

is

Ruggie’s (1993b) account of multilateralism

form of cooperation based on certain principles of ordering relations among those

states.

These principles “specify appropriate conduct for
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a class

of actions without regard

to the particularistic interests

of the parties or the strategic exigencies

any specific occurrence” (Ruggie 1993b,
arrangements will give

all

In practice this

11).

means

that

may

exist in

that multilateral

interested parties the opportunity to participate, that

participating parties should benefit, and that multilateral decisions will be

all

made using

consensus procedures (Ruggie 1993b, 11-14). To the extent that notions of
multilateralism have a decisive, constitutive influence on institutional design, institutions

norms of universality,

will reflect general

impartiality,

and legitimacy.

World Culture

One
culture

is

research program within the ‘norms and culture’ school argues that world

becoming increasingly globalized and,

different cultural contexts are

Meyer (2000, 233-4),

many

means

to

John

expanded flow of instrumental culture

the

common models

of social order become authoritative

in

difference social settings.” Without the prior specification of the substantie content

of ‘world culture',
the

becoming increasingly homogenized. According

“globalization

around the world. Put simply,

as a result, political institutions in

this

form of specific

argument does not yield

institutions.

However,

specific, testable

if this

claim

is

correct,

should expect to see an ever-increasing degree of isomorphism
institutions

hypotheses concerning

it

does follow

among

that

one

international

and agreements.
Learning and Institutional Design

Constructivists

who emphasize

the significance of social learning provide another

source for hypotheses concerning institutional design.
“learning

is

a political process

As Haas and Haas

whereby ‘consensual knowledge’

policymakers to change their policy projects”
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(

1

995, 259),

To

is

define

applied by

the extent that

it,

policymakers view learning as necessary, they will value design characteristics conducive
to learning.

We may derive

hypotheses for institutional design by employing a

functionalist logic for organizational learning

and

institutional design.

As Haas and Haas

describe.

Learning by and in the 10
ideas

and

information

is

not possible unless there

‘upwards’

from

is

universities,

an unimpeded flow of
think

tanks,

national

bureaucracies, and advocacy groups. Such groups serve as an early warning

system of potential challenges

to the organization as well as a conduit

of new

responses. (Haas and Haas 1995, 263).

Because learning requires consensual knowledge, one would expect organizations
intended to be capable of learning to exhibit design characteristics conducive to

developing consensual knowledge. Specifically, one would expect institutions

open membership
level

rules,

to

have

and consensual decision making processes. One would expect

of delegation sufficient

to support the

a

information gathering functions necessary to

support knowledge development. Finally, other things equal, one would expect

institutionalized

agreements

in a learning

environment

to exhibit a

scope based on the

complexity of the issue being governed.

The

literature

on social learning also directs our attention

crises in triggering learning processes.

leaders and negotiators

is

to the significance

of

Specifically, the perception of crisis by political

important because such events help to produce what Kingdon

(1984, 203) has termed “policy windows" that facilitate getting an issue onto the
international agenda.

It

also

is

important in driving policymakers'

information in formulating a response to the

crisis.

demand

for

Thus, by influencing the international

agenda, focusing policymakers’ attention, and driving demand for information, crises
play a central role in learning processes.

As

Peter
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Haas (2001, 11581) describes:

New

ideas will be solicited and selected only after crises, for crises will alert

politicians to the
will trigger

Thus,

in

need

agenda

for action

setting

and

,

.

.

about their interests and options. Crises

and the search for new information.

addition to paying attention to the presence of consensual policy knowledge

-

or

uncertainty - this study will take account of the role of crises in driving learning

processes.

Assessment
This section has described four broad approaches to constructivism in the study of

IR,

two of which

are particularly relevant to this study.

It

then

showed how those two

approaches contain hypotheses concerning the design of multilateral agreements and
institutions.

First,

it

described the "norms and culture’ school of constructivism. This

approach subsumes two research programs that yield general hypotheses concerning

form and design. One examines the significance of the norm of

institutional

multilateralism; the other examines

how

the globalization of culture affects institutional

form.

The norm of multilateralism has
international institutions.

several implications for the design of

The commitment

to “generalized principles

characteristic of multilateralism entails "‘an indivisibility

collectivity”

entails

(Ruggie 1993b,

1

1

).

Based on

norms of non-exclusion and

agreements

will feature inclusive

this,

impartiality,

membership

we

among

members of a

should expect that multilateralism

and accordingly

rules,

the

of conduct”

that multilateral

and equality of participation with

respect parties’ control over the agreement or institution.

The ‘world

culture' approach,

concerning specific design features

by contrast, does not yield general hypotheses

(e.g.,

that increasingly globalized cultures will

membership

rules).

However,

produce increasingly similar
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it

does expect

institutions.

Over

time, then, this approach expects to find increasing isomorphism

among

multilateral

agreements.
Finally, the ‘soft rationalist’ school directs attention

toward the significance of uncertainty and knowledge

rationality,

interests.

away from

It

preferences

also directs attention to specific processes and

may

change.

Key explanatory

full

instrumental

in actors’ calculation

of

mechanisms by which these

among

variables here include,

others, the

existence of a shared perception of crisis, presence of epistemic communities and their

access to negotiators and political leaders.

Conclusion: Evaluating Theories of Institutional Design
This chapter has described the intellectual development of contemporary
theoretical accounts of international cooperation, with particular focus

design.

It

examined three approaches -

constructivism - and explained

how

on

rational institutionalism, realism,

each of these approaches

predictions concerning the design and form of

may

institutional

and

yield different

MEAs.

Each theoretical approach provides different predictions concerning the design
and form of

MEAs,

institutionalist

but these predictions are not taken here to be exclusive. Rational

approaches expect interest-based bargaining aimed

Realist considerations expect interest-centered negotiation

relative gains.

aimed

at

absolute gains.

at positionality

and

Constructivist approaches predict that institutional design will be reliant

on questions of intersubjective norms and knowledge. Chapter

3 constructs specific

hypotheses based on these varying expectations. Given the complexity of global political

situations,

it

is

to institutional

possible and even likely that

all

approaches have something

to contribute

design or that different approaches better explain different aspects of the
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design and form of

MEAs. Given

this possibility, this

study tests the relevant hypotheses

individually as well as in their function as representatives of their respective theoretical

approaches.

It

hopes

to construct a

model of the relevant influences on

design coming from each approach, or spanning across approaches.
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institutional

CHAPTER 3
DESIGNING MEAS:
HYPOTHESES, DATA, AND METHODS

This chapter proceeds

in

four stages.

variables emphasized in this study

The

- membership,

the several manifest indicators used for each.

from

realist, institutionalist,

It

and constructivist

dependent variable. The second

first

describes the three dependent

delegation, and flexibility - as well as

also

summarizes the hypotheses, drawn

literatures,

which correspond

sets forth the five explanatory variables

study, and describes the specific indicators used for each of them.

The

each

to

used in

this

third section

describes the data that were used to test these hypotheses, which were partly derived from

the International

Regimes Database (IRD), and

partly

coded by the author. Finally, the

fourth section reviews the specific methods and procedures used in this study to evaluate

hypotheses on institutional design
chapter.

Appendix

1

in light

of the empirical evidence described in

this

provides specific information on the data source for each indicator

and indicates whether data regarding the indicator was drawn from the International

Regimes Database (IRD) or another source.
Dependent Variables
Analysts of institutional design have identified

a

number of dependent

variables

along which international agreements and institutions vary. For example, Koremenos

al

et

(2001a, 763) identify ‘"membership rules, scope of issues covered, centralization of

tasks, rules for controlling the institution,

(2005, 581

)

and

flexibility

of arrangements.” Kal Raustiala

focuses attention on the “legality,” “substance,” and “structure” of

agreements.
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Given

that

it

simply

is

not possible for any single study to examine every

potentially interesting aspect of institutional design, this study focuses on the following

three elements of institutional form:

were selected because they
negotiators have

design of

in the

relate to the aspects

enough control

in response to specific

membership, delegation, and

to

engage

problems, and thus

These three

flexibility.

of institutional form over which

in strategic

design of international agreements

much of the

theoretically interesting variation

MEAs.
Membership

Some of the most fundamental

decisions in designing a multilateral environmental

agreement concern whether or not the agreement should be multilateral, and
states

should be included. Negotiators

who choose

to

if

so what

develop a multilateral agreement

face the question of whether to include any state desiring to participate or to restrict

membership

to states that

meet certain

criteria.

Geography provides one such

criterion:

multilateral environmental agreements can be specific to a local resource (e.g., the

River Convention and agreements), a regional one
agreements), or be open to

all

(e.g. the several Baltic

because they deal with a global resource

Rhine

Sea

(e.g., the

Conventions on Biodiversity and Climate Change).

Yet

it

would be

a

mistake to claim that the scope of membership

in multilateral

environmental agreements follows directly from the scope of the issue being addressed

Some agreements
of, the

are

open

to states that are neither directly responsible for,

environmental problem

at

hand

The United

States, for

example,

is a

nor victims
party to the

Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) despite not being
victim of European acid rain

Likewise, membership in the International Whaling

5

!

a

Commission

is

open

to

1959 Antarctic Treaty,
In fact,

Some

more

states.

Participation in other agreements, such as the

restricted.

criteria in multilateral

number of dimensions.
Agreements

restricted.

restrict

is

membership

significantly along a

be open or

non-whaling

membership only

membership on geographic,

environmental agreements vary

Participation in multilateral agreements can

that restrict

membership do so on

to “relevant” states,

political, or

by some

definition.

Others

restrict

economic grounds. Some agreements are

restricted to original contracting states, while others permit states to

Some agreements

a variety of grounds.

establish different categories of membership.

universal ratification to enter into force, or they

may

accede

at a later date.

Agreements may require

establish an alternate

minimum

threshold of participation. In summary, the variable ‘membership’ captures whether an

agreement
is

is

restricted;

universal or whether participation

is

restricted;

and the conditions for an agreement’s entry

by what

criteria

into legal force

membership

membership

concerns.
Rational Institutionalist Hypotheses on

Membership

Rational institutionalists accord primary significance to enforcement problems in

explaining variation

in

membership

problematic, negotiators must find

members of the agreement
Olson

(

1965, 16) puts

it,

They agree

criteria.

some way

if states are to

to restrict an

agreement's benefits to

have any incentive

to participate.

“large organizations that are not able to

compulsory must also provide some noncollective goods

members an

that if enforcement is

incentive to join.” Similarly,

Koremenos

52

As Mancur

make membership

in order to give potential

et al

(2001a. 23) draw from the

economic

literature

restrictive

membership increases with

There are

on “club goods”

few

a

to support their

claim that the likelihood of

the severity of the enforcement problem.”

difficulties in applying this expectation to multilateral

environmental agreements, however. Trade regimes and military alliances provide types

of benefits that nonmembers can be excluded from receiving.

In contrast,

environmental goods are not easily excludable. Though different parties
different significance to the issues of biodiversity loss

possible to design agreements that

many

may

and climate change,

it

accord
not

is

would exclude nonmembers from enjoying

the

benefits of stable climate or biodiversity.

One way

to resolve the analytic difficulty presented

environmental problems

is to

control for problem type

of selective membership

that use

criteria in multilateral

by the public nature of many

when

evaluating the hypothesis

environmental agreements

increases with the salience of enforcement problems. This study classifies multilateral

environmental agreements according to the type of collective good that they address:
public goods,

common

see also Barkin and

pool resources, or shared natural resources (Breitmeier

Shambaugh 1999 and Sandler 2004). Unfortunately,

et al

collective

2006;

goods

type alone does not provide enough information; the three types include non-excludable

as well as excludable goods. Therefore, this study focuses

on whether or not a

agreement specifically provides excludable individualized benefits

multilateral

(e g.

technological or financial transfers).

The
•

IM

1

only

first

.

rational institutionalist hypothesis

is:

Negotiators facing enforcement problems will provide excludable benefits

when

also

employing

restrictive

membership
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criteria

This dynamic

is

present in agreements establishing military alliances, which provide an

excludable good (security) and

It

members.

restrict benefits to

would be misleading, however, simply

claim that restrictive membership will

to

correlate positively with enforcement problems.

Rather, rational institutionalism

is

agnostic about the use of restrictive membership absent enforcement problems; there

no particular reason

absence of enforcement problems, by

to believe that the

negotiators to select inclusive

membership

Enforcement Problems and Entry

itself,

is

causes

criteria.

into Force

Rational institutionalists agree with realists that entry into force conditions are an

important feature of multilateral agreements. However, they relax the Realist assumption

that states will

universal

-

respond

to

enforcement problems and relative gains concerns by requiring

or nearly universal

-

participation.

Rather, institutionalists see a potential for

entry into force conditions to serve as a “tipping point” in multilateral environmental

cooperation. Scott Barrett (2003, 260) provides a clear statement of this process:
the agreement to come into force only if a
to do this is to require
minimum number of countries has ratified the agreement; otherwise, signatories
may act as they please. This way, becoming a signatory to the treaty becomes a

The way

.

.

.

(weakly) dominant strategy for every country; a country cannot lose by signing,
but

be

it

will

gam provided enough

in the interests

others sign

of every country to sign.

.

,

.

A

[OJnce enough others sign,

it

will

kind of bandwagon will have been

created.

States that

would

like to ratify

do as well - are thus
with the agreement

free to

until

it

into force until a sufficient

do

an agreement and participate - but only

so.

They

if

enough others

are assured that they will not have to

comply

enters into legal force, and that the agreement will not enter

number of states have

rational institutionalist hypothesis

and

its

ratified

different
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This insight yields the second

emphasis than the Realist counterpart.

•

When

IM2.

facing enforcement problems, negotiators will set

specific conditions for entry into force,

comply with an agreement

to

Given enforcement problems,

prior to

states will not

and

its

states will not

promise

entry into legal force.

promise

to act prior to entry into force.

Rather, they will agree to participate in an agreement only if they are protected from

minimum

unreciprocated cooperation by a meaningful

participation threshold, expressed

as a condition for entry into force.

Realist

Hypotheses on Membership
Realist hypotheses concerning the role of

multilateral environmental

international cooperation,

membership

criteria in the

design of

agreements center on the problems of relative gains

and the problem of free riding (Grieco 1990,

in

28).

Relative Gains

While both the power-maximizing

Mearsheimer 2001

)

and the defensive

Waltz 1979; Grieco 1993) are consistent with

positionalist positions (e.g..

relative gains, the claim that

associated primarily with the

to

(e.g.,

membership
latter.

criteria

a

concern for

can mitigate relative gains problems

Whereas offensive

realists

is

understand relative gains

be states’ paramount concern, defensive positionalists understand relative gains more

as a

dampening influence on

acknowledge

The

that states

the

more

states that are

agreement
less likely

pursue other goals as relative gains concerns permit.

strategic use of

relative gains concerns

is that

membership

criteria offers

one way

for states to mitigate

and successfully conclude multilateral agreements.

members of an agreement,

will be spread

it

Defensive positionalists thus

international cooperation.

The more widely

that

the

more widely

the benefits of an

an agreement distributes benefits, the

there will be meaningful differences
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In general,

between individual

states’ shares

Thus, by distributing gains broadly, inclusive membership

dampening influence of relative gains concerns on
rational,

power-seeking

wish

states will not

necessary to permit cooperation. The

first

criteria

may

mitigate the

international cooperation.

to distribute benefits

However,

more widely than

is

hypothesis derived from realist theory can be

expressed:

RM

•

1

.

Negotiators will design inclusive membership rules in response to

distributional concerns.

Free Riding

The second
problem of free

barrier to international cooperation that Realists

The most

riding.

direct

way

emphasize

is

the

problem

for negotiators to resolve this

is to

include strong monitoring and enforcement provisions in a multilateral agreement.

However

Realists believe that such solutions simply shift the

First, to the

extent that

it

is

costly for

some

states to

problem

for

two reasons.

“punish” others, there

may be

a

similar enforcement problem with respect to sanctioning. Second, intrusive enforcement

provisions trigger strong sovereignty concerns, which present an obstacle to reaching

cooperation in the

first

place.

In

response to

this

dilemma. Realists usually

stress that the

substantive terms of multilateral agreements must be self-enforcing (Susskind 1994;

Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996;
The

Barrett 2003).

strategic use of entry into force provisions offers an additional

way

for

contracting states to address concerns about cheating or free riding. Although Article 18

of the

1

969 Vienna Convention on

treaty, or

the

Law of Treaties

requires states that have signed a

otherwise expressed their consent to be bound by

would defeat

the object

and puipose of the treaty” prior

to

it,

its

“to refrain from acts

entry into force,

oblige states actually to comply with a treaty’s provisions prior to
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its

it

which

does not

entry into legal

By making

force.

specific

entry into force conditional on ratification by specific parties, or a

number of parties,

negotiators can mitigate relative gains concerns arising from

the possibility of free riding. This yields the second realist hypothesis concerning

membership.
•

RM2. Agreements concluded

As

in spite

of relative gains concerns will use very

entry into force conditions.

strict

be explained below,

will

this

claim

is

relevant for rational institutionalists as

well as defensive positionalists, like Grieco and Waltz.

The difference

is

primarily one of

emphasis; defensive Realists would argue that agreements concluded against a

background of relative gains concerns
participation.

be

Rational institutionalists,

less skeptical

of lower -

if still

Constructivist hypotheses on

One

will tend to require very high, if not universal,

who

judicious

more with absolute

are concerned

-

gains, will

entry into force conditions.

membership

strand of recent constructivist research on international cooperation

emphasizes the significance of issue framing on agenda setting and policy choice
example, Schon and Rein 1994; Payne 2001; Fischer 2003).

‘SHOCKNEG’

(see, for

In this study, the indicator

captures the degree to which the negotiating agenda

was driven by

the

presence of external shocks and successful issue framing by nongovernmental actors, as

opposed

to the instrumental interests

of the negotiating

This distinction reflects another

line

parties.

of constructivist research on

institutions: the

contrast between rule-following and utility-maximizing contrast popularized especially

by March and Olsen

(

1989; 1996; 1998). The implication for this study

negotiations are driven by external shocks or perceptions of crisis, the

institutional design

is

to follow a logic

is

that the

more

likely

of appropriateness. Likewise, the more that
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more

negotiations are driven internally

interests

-

i.e.,

they are driven largely by the instrumental

of negotiating states - the more likely institutional design

consequences. Specifically,
perceived

crisis,

when

is

to follow a logic

of

negotiators are responding to an external shock or a

they will be significantly less likely to impose

membership or on an agreement’s entry

into legal force.

strict

conditions on

Rather, they will seek to

conclude and implement an “appropriate” agreement as soon as possible. This yields the
first

constructivist hypothesis on

•

CM1
will

.

be

membership.

Negotiators responding primarily to external shocks or perceived crises
less likely to

choose

restrictive

membership or

strict

entry into force

conditions.

A
takes a

second strand of research on international cooperation and international law

dynamic view, exploring the implications of different

institutional

pathways

to

cooperation (Abbott and Snidal 2004). Constructivist accounts of international
cooperation, especially, have focused on the institutional benefits of the ‘convention-

protocol’ approach to international environmental law.

include as

many

model, negotiators seek to

states as possible, as early as possible, to build the broadest possible

political support for future,

more substantive policy making. Substantive policy

measures are negotiated separately,

framework convention.
are the

In this

in protocols or

amendments

Two well-known examples

to the original

of the convention-protocol approach

Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol on ozone depletion and the

Framework Convention on Climate Change and
This convention-protocol strategy
scientific uncertainty and/or lack

the

UN

Kyoto Protocol.

especially appropriate for situations in

is

of political

will forces negotiators to

between scope of participation and depth of agreement
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When

make

which

tradeoffs

such tradeoffs are

1

inevitable. Constructivists argue that

agreement depth,
participation.

is

expense of

because the former approach permits normative socialization

among convention members,
In contrast,

participation, at the

preferable to maximizing agreement depth at the expense of

is

This

maximizing early

ideally paving the

way

for

deeper cooperation

in the future.

emphasizing agreement depth before resolving uncertainty or distributional

concerns runs the risk of calcifying opponents’ understanding of their preferences, thus
hindering social learning as well as future attempts to broaden participation. This yields
the second constructivist hypothesis concerning

•

CM2.

membership.

Negotiators will choose inclusive membership initially (over depth of

cooperation,

if

necessary).

Hypotheses on the design of membership rules are summarized
Table

3.1

Table

in

3.

Hypotheses Concerning Membership

Source Theory

Label

Hypothesis

Rational

IM1

Negotiators facing enforcement problems will restrict

membership when providing excludable

Institutionalism

Rational

When

IM2

confronted with enforcement problems, negotiators

will set specific conditions for entry into force,

Institutionalism

require states to promise to
prior to

Realism

benefits.

RM1

its

and

will not

comply with an agreement

entry into legal force.

Negotiators will design inclusive membership rules in

response to distributional concerns.

Realism

RM2

Agreements concluded

in spite

of relative gains concerns

will use very strict entry into force conditions.

Constructivism

CM

1

Negotiators responding to perceived crises will be less
likely to restrict

membership or use

strict entry into force

conditions.

Constructivism

CM2

Negotiators will choose inclusive membership initially
(over depth of cooperation, if necessary).
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Operationalizing Membership

Membership

rules are fundamentally related to the issue of participation in

membership

international cooperation. Negotiators can use

criteria strategically in

primary ways when designing multilateral environmental agreements.
criteria

can be used to enlarge or

the agreement.

for an

restrict the set

of states

Second, negotiators can select a

agreement

to enter into legal force.

First,

two

membership

that are eligible to participate in

minimum

level

of participation necessary

Table 3.2 shows the indicators used

to

represent each of these dimensions of membership.

Table 3.2

Indicator

MEMCRIT
RESTRICT

Indicators of Membership

Measurement
Nominal

Dichotomous

Description

What

criteria

(e.g.,

geographic, economic, political,

Is

govern

membership

eligibility for

membership?
etc.)

an agreement restricted?

in

(0-1)

(yes/no)

ELIGIBLE

Ratio

How many

states are eligible for

NRATIFY

Ratio

How many

states

must

ratify

membership 9

an agreement for

it

to enter

into legal force?

PCTRATIF

Ratio

What percentage
for

EIFCOND

Dichotomous
(0-1)

it

state parties

must

ratify

an agreement

to enter into legal force?

In addition to a

minimum number of ratifications, does

the agreement include substantive conditions for entry
into force? (yes/no)

ACTEARLY

Dichotomous
(0-1)

BENEXCLU

NSTNEGOT

Dichotomous

Did
its

states

promise

to

comply with an agreement

prior to

entry into legal force? (yes/no)

Does

the

agreement provide excludable benefits?

(0-1)

(yes/no)

Ratio

How many

states actively participated in the negotiation

of the agreement?
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The

three indicators correspond to

first

membership

nominal measure of the conditions for membership
agreements

(e.g.,

RESTRICT
is

a

is

membership

in

dichotomous indicator
estimates the

PCTRATIF

ratification

is

whether additional

that reflects

whether

The

last

meet the

in

an agreement

criteria for

agreement

to enter

expresses this threshold as the proportion of negotiating states

needed for an agreement

criteria

states

for an

NRATIFY

to enter into force.

must be met, beyond

promised

to

a

EIFCOND

minimum number of ratifications,

ACTEARLY

is

a

comply with agreement

dichotomous indictor

BENEXCLU

for

that

rules prior to entry into force.

two indicators are included because they are necessary
membership.

indicates

is

a

to evaluate

dichotomous indicator

whether an agreement provides potentially excludable benefits.

NSTNEGOT

simply reflects the number of states actively participating in the negotiation

of an agreement.

It is

vital for the

agreements. For example,

it

is

standardization of measurements across different

impossible

to

judge the ‘strictness’ of an agreement's

entry into force conditions by considering only the total

for entry into force. This study resolves this

for the

that

number of ratifications necessary

specific hypotheses concerning

that reflects

whether membership

number of states

an agreement to enter into force. Finally,

reflects

a

environmental

indictors correspond to criteria for entry into force.

indicates in absolute terms the

whose

is

an agreement.

The next four

into force.

in multilateral

MEMCRIT

geographic location, activity in regulated issue area, or unrestricted).

ELIGIBLE

restricted.

criteria.

number of ratifications necessary

problem by using

number of potential members.
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NSTNEGOT

to control

Delegation
In this study delegation refers to the degree to

agreement formally confer functional

multilateral

programmatic authority on a

third party

expert committee, a tribunal, or

specific term

is

some

-

which

states negotiating a

responsibilities, resources,

and

an intergovernmental organization, an

i.e.,

Although the

entity other than another state.

borrowed from the 2000 special issue of International Organization on

“Legalization and World Politics” (reprinted as Goldstein

concept has played a primary role

in a

et al

number of published

2001

),

the underlying

studies of institutional form.

Close analogues include the rational design project’s variable, “centralization”

(Koremenos

2001a), and the concept of agreement “structure” (Raustiala 2005, 605).

et al

According

to

Abbott

been granted authority

and (possibly)

to

to

make

(2000,

et al

1

7),

implement, interpret, and apply the rules;

further rules.”

dimensions of significant variation

Among

these,

in delegation:

The most highly delegated forms of dispute
formal judicial bodies

“delegation means that third parties have

Abbott

et al

to resolve disputes;

(2000, 32) identify two

dispute resolution and rule making.

resolution involve creating or delegating to

(e.g., courts, tribunals,

or other arbitral institutions) possessing

general jurisdiction over activities covered by an agreement, and binding decision making

power. Abbott

et al

(2000a, 32)

list

a

number of other

institutional forms, in order

of

descending degrees of delegation:

•

Establishment of formal courts possessing general jurisdiction and binding
decision making authority (highest delegation)

•

Establishment of formal courts with limited, or
jurisdiction;

•

Use of binding ad hoc

arbitration;
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strictly

consensual

•

Use of nonbinding

•

Provision of mediation services;

•

Providing

•

Pure political bargaining (least delegation)

a

arbitration;

forum

for institutionalized bargaining;

Within the “legalization” framework advanced by Goldstein
closely related

to,

and interacts with, “precision” (Abbott

indeterminate rules permit greater discretion
specific and determinate ones.

remain free

to interpret the

agreements

may

By

itself,

et al

in interpretation

et al,

2000a, 31

).

delegation

is

Vague and

and application than do

such imprecision reflects low legalization; states

very rules that were meant to govern them. Imprecise

nevertheless be highly legalized

when

the

power

to interpret rules

is

delegated to a third party. While this study does not follow the legalization project in

considering precision as a “top-level” variable of institutional design,

it

will account for

precision as necessary to evaluate specific hypotheses concerning delegation

-

as

it

did

with membership

The second dimension of delegation described by Abbott
making and implementation. Abbott
dimension

in

et al

et al

(2000a, 32)

is

rule

(2000a, 32) summarize variation along this

descending order of delegation:
with centralized enforcement provisions;

•

Binding

rules,

•

Binding

rules, with

•

Binding rules with decentralized enforcement;

•

Coordination of standards;

•

Monitoring and publicity of compliance;

•

Confidential monitoring;

consensual enforcement and withdrawal provisions;
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In

•

Normative or aspirational statements;

•

Forum

for negotiating

summary, delegation captures;

multilateral

agreement have transferred

(a) the extent to

which

political authority to a third party,

specific kind of political authority that they

institutional

and (b) the

have transferred. Thus, the significance of

delegation for theories of international cooperation will follow,

theories’ understanding

the parties to a

in large part,

of the significance and power of state sovereignty

to

from those
shape

outcomes.

Rational Institutionalist Hypotheses on Delegation

Rational institutionalists consider multilateral agreements as contractual

arrangements between sovereign actors. Yet, as

many

rational institutionalists

noted, multilateral treaties are necessarily incomplete contracts.

specify rules governing every possible circumstance that

account fully for the impact of new knowledge
uncertainty.

in issue

may

It

is

arise,

have

never possible to

nor

is

it

possible to

domains currently marked by

Since the international system remains formally anarchic - lacking any

central authority capable of securing participation in,

and compliance with, a multilateral

agreement - any successful multilateral agreement must be self-enforcing. States can
never

know

with complete certainty the intentions and preferences of their counterparts,

further amplifying the challenge of designing multilateral contracts.

According
can be mitigated

to rational institutionalist theory,

in institutionalized settings.

problems of incomplete contracting

Thus, rational institutionalists generally

explain the existence and form of international institutions
efficiency in mitigating contracting problems (e.g.,
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in

Keohane

terms of their functional

1984).

They have

identified

a

number of mechanisms by which

delegation, in particular,

is

negotiation and operation of multilateral agreements. These

into

two broad

consequential for the

mechanisms can be grouped

categories, according to their functional purpose: handling problems of

incomplete contracting (including enforcement problems) and reducing transaction costs.

Problems of Incomplete Contracting

One

characteristic of incomplete contracting that

negotiation of multilateral agreements

is

(2000, 42) explain the credible

“one party

to

problem of 'credible commitments’. Abbott

commitment problem

an agreement must carry out

required to perform, or

especially relevant to the

the problem of non-simultaneous performance.

In rational institutionalist theory, this is the

al

is

its

as occurring in situations

et

where

side of the bargain before other parties are

more generally when some

parties

must make relation-specific

investments in reliance on future performance by others.” Delegation of monitoring

powers and implementation review routines can mitigate

this

problem by reducing

states'

uncertainty about whether their counterparts in a given agreement are, in fact, behaving

as promised. This yields the

first

hypothesis on delegation drawn from rational

institutionalist theory.

•

ID

A

1

.

Delegation increases with the severity of the enforcement problem

second feature of incomplete contracts particularly relevant

environmental agreements

is

the

to multilateral

problem of substantive uncertainty - what Koremenos

Lipson and Smdal (2001a, 18) have termed “uncertainty about the state of the world.”
Substantive uncertainty often forces states to frame obligations vaguely, subject to

(re)interpretation as

new knowledge becomes

available.

Furthermore, under conditions

of substantive uncertainty, states have an incentive to delegate resources to centralize
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information-gathering and distribution. Both of these mechanisms independently

support the following rational institutionalist hypothesis:

ID2. Delegation increases with uncertainty about the state of the world.

•

Under conditions of scientific

power

to (re)interpret rules in

uncertainty, states have an incentive

first to

delegate

response to the development of new knowledge, and

second, to centralize information resources to facilitate the production and spread of

new knowledge. These

theoretical expectations run in the

same

direction,

and

may

complement one another.
Reducing Transaction Costs

The second category of functional explanations
agreements focuses on strategies
negotiation process

itself.

activity; a multiplicity

to

for delegation in multilateral

reduce transaction costs - costs specific to the

The term, “transaction cost”

is

not specific to any single

of specific factors can be responsible for the expense of

negotiating and concluding a multilateral agreement.

The simplest and most

intuitive

source of transaction costs follows from the number of parties relevant to a given

negotiation.

find

it

As

the

number of parties

relevant to a given issue-area increases, states

increasingly difficult to successfully govern that issue through informal, ad hoc,

and/or bilateral agreements. Successful policy coordination
creation and delegation of centralized bargaining fora

on delegation derived from rational
•

issue-area

As Pollack

(

facilitated

by the

This yields the third hypothesis

institutionalist theory.

1D3. Delegation increases with the

Finally, transaction costs

is

may

number of relevant

parties.

be associated with the complexity of

1997, 104) explains, “institutions
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may

a

given

be delegated

authority to adopt regulations that are too

detail

by the principals.”

It

may

authority to a third party than

it

complex

to

be considered and debated

in

be more efficient for states to delegate rule making

would be

to invest the resources

necessary for direct

negotiation of rules in highly complex issue-areas.

One should

not carry this line of argument too

far,

however.

It

does not follow

simply that delegation increases with complexity. Highly complex issues with clear
distributional conflicts, as

is

the case in the global climate

change regime, may create

Thus, a final rational institutionalist hypothesis on

lower incentives for delegation
delegation can be stated:

When

ID4.

•

the salience of distributional conflict

is

low, delegation increases

with complexity.

Hypotheses on Delegation

Realist

Maintaining sovereignty and autonomy

is

the sine

qua non of any

state’s foreign

policy for realist theories of international relations. States are the primary components of

the international system, and the fundamental goal of

secure their

vigilant

state.

own

of threats

politics is to

element of the

Since delegation in multilateral agreements fundamentally challenges state

would expect
Absent

in their interests to yield

and most primary,
•

world

to their sovereignty, since sovereignty is a constitutive

multilateral agreements.

it

states in

well-being. Achieving security, in this sense, requires states to be ever

sovereignty, realists

find

all

RD1

.

realist

to find

a major,

generally low levels of delegation

in

compelling justification, states simply will not

sovereign control over policy. This logic yields the

first,

hypothesis concerning delegation:

Multilateral agreements in general will be characterized by

levels of delegation.
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no or very low

In addition to

prevailing concern for the preservation of state sovereignty,

thought typically also pays close attention to the distribution of power

realist

political setting.

For

whether a specific
there

its

is

realist

political

explanations of international relations,

system

is

it

in

any given

matters greatly

dominated by a single actor (hegemon), or whether

a less hierarchical distribution of power.

If a

hegemon

is

present during the negotiation of a multilateral agreement, realism

expects that the resulting institutional form will strongly reflect the hegemon’s interests.

There may

still

be significant delegation

if

it is

in a

hegemon’s

interest.

Realists expect

agreements with high levels of delegation are characterized also by high levels of

that

precision because dominant states want to use international institutions as tools of

statecraft.

By

delimiting delegated authority within sharp confines, a dominant state

seeks to use a multilateral institution to “internationalize”

policy

its

own

preferred domestic

(DeSombre 2000).

When

negotiations are driven by a

number of smaller

states,

having grievance(s)

against a hegemon, realists doubt that any deep cooperation can occur.

agreement

that is

Any

multilateral

reached will be characterized by extremely low levels of delegation,

imprecise rules (the better for a strong, self-interested state to interpret according to

own

its

preferences), and sufficiently broad issue scope to permit the sort of payoffs from

weak

states to the

and Keilbach 2001

hegemon
).

that are necessary to secure the latter’s participation (Mitchell

This yields the following

realist

hypothesis concerning delegation

under hegemony:

•

RD2. Under hegemony, high
high levels of precision

when

levels of delegation will be strongly associated with

a

hegemon seeks

domestic or foreign policy.
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to internationalize its

own

Although

hegemon’s concern

a

multilateral agreements,

it

is

also a necessary condition for

absence of a dominant power,
will prevent

for sovereignty sharply constrains the use of delegation in

Realists

it.

assume

that in the

overarching concern for their relative well-being

states’

them from agreeing on any

significant level of delegation in a multilateral

agreement.
Constructivist Hypotheses on Delegation

Constructivist analyses of the significance of institutions and institutional form in

international cooperation tend to ask different questions and, therefore, to seek different

answers than their rational

institutionalist

and

realist counterparts.

of institutional choice and development generally have sought
depth than have their

realist

and

institutionalist counterparts.

Constructivist studies

to reach greater causal

However,

if constructivist

accounts of international institutions have demonstrated a comparatively greater focus on
internal validity, they

generalizability. This

have also exhibited a relatively lower concern for external validity

is

hardly surprising; the notion that international relations are

governed by universal, generic rules

that are

independent

history, perception, intersubjective belief, or culture

Indeed, for

many

constructivists, the relationship

is

is

of,

and analytically prior

anathema

to

to,

most constructivists.

just the opposite. Culture

and

cognition precede instrumental rationality in what Legro (1996) has described as the
“international cooperation two-step.”

The following sections elaborate hypotheses concerning delegation
multilateral

agreements derived from recent constructivist work. However,

in

it

bears

noting that this study’s design refects an instrumentally rationalist approach to

explaining institutional form. Such an orientation
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is

well suited for examining both

/

realist

and

liberal

way

that

some

a

hypotheses. However,

it

constructivist hypotheses

frames the issue of institutional form

may gam

in

such

only a partial purchase on the

question of design. Put differently, a self-consciously constructivist research design

would shun
one

that

the sort of comparative statics approach used here in favor of a diachronic

allowed a greater role for history

(at the

expense, perhaps, of generalizability).

Legitimacy

The

first

constructivist hypothesis to be considered concerns the role of

legitimacy in institutional design. Here, legitimacy plays a similar role to that of

‘credibility' in rational institutionalist theory.

work, legitimacy

is

it

to

1993b).

The

Multilateralism, in this sense, entails a

To

of constructivist

of general rules to

commitment

implementation; self-interested application of rules runs counter

multilateralism.

line

distinctive feature of multilateralism

entails basing cooperation the consistent application

participants.

one

conceived as a constitutive element of the broader, more generic

norm of multilateralism (Ruggie
that

According

is

all

to generalized rule

to the

very meaning of

the extent that the international agreements are negotiated

according to such a norm of multilateralism, one would expect to see generally high
levels of delegation

-

at least

with respect to rule interpretation.

argument does not necessarily

entail the delegation

On

the other hand, this

of coercive enforcement powers.

This yields the following hypothesis concerning delegation:

•

CD1 Genuinely
.

multilateral agreements will be characterized

levels of delegation with respect to rule interpretation

by generally high

and adjudication.

Knowledge

A

second constructivist explanation of delegation

in multilateral

centers on the interplay between uncertainty and scientific
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knowledge

agreements

in the

international policy process.

Although the epistennc community

policy-specific uncertainty with

demand

for expert

literature associates

knowledge, one cannot simply read

the presence of expert groups during multilateral negotiations as evidence that states are

seeking to delegate authority. Critics

knowledge plays

a

much

(e.g.,

Jasanoff

different role in cases

1

where

996) have noted that scientific
the political

/

consequences of various policy options are well-established - even
the underlying problem(s) remains shrouded in uncertainty.

groups

may

distributional

if the cause(s)

of

In such cases, expert

be selected by parties to multilateral negotiations, not on the basis of

general qualifications but, rather, on the likelihood they will

make

specific politically-

favored policy recommendations. This yields the following hypothesis concerning

delegation in institutional design:

•

C’D2. Delegation will increase

when

(

1

)

expert groups participate in

negotiations by (2) supplying policy knowledge to state parties.

Hypotheses on

institutional delegation are

summarized below,

in

Table

3.8.

Operationalizinu Deleuation

Relevant indicators of delegation include whether or not a secretariat was

what degree of independence

established and,

if so,

independence

a function not

is

it

enjoys from

member

states.

Such

only of policy making authority but also revenue

stability.

The most basic

indicator of delegation in an

centralizes functional responsibilities in a secretariat

MEA

is

whether or not

There are various levels of

centralization of functional responsibilities. Other things equal,

agreements

that

it

we can

describe those

do not use any form of secretariat as demonstrating the lowest

delegation, those that delegate such responsibilities to an
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NGO or IGO as

level of

demonstrating greater delegation, and those that create

new

bodies for the specific

purpose of implementing an agreement as demonstrating the highest level of
delegation.

lable 3.3

Hypotheses Concerning Delegation

Source Theory

Label

Rational

1D1

ID2

Institutionalism

Rational

ID3

of the world.

Delegation increases with the number of
relevant parties.

ID4

When

the salience of distributional conflict

is

low, delegation increases with complexity.

Institutionalism

Realism

Delegation increases with uncertainty about the
state

Institutionalism

Rational

Delegation increases with the severity of the

enforcement problem.

Institutionalism

Rational

Hypothesis

RD1

Multilateral agreements in general will be

characterized by no or very low levels of
delegation.

Realism

RD2

Under hegemony, high

levels

of delegation

will be strongly associated with high levels

precision

when

internationalize

a

hegemon seeks

its

of

to

own domestic

or foreign

policy.

Constructivism

CD1

Genuinely multilateral agreements will be
characterized by generally high levels of
delegation with respect to rule interpretation

and adjudication.
Constructivism

CD2

Delegation will increase

when

(

1 )

expert

groups participate in negotiations by (2)
supplying policy knowledge to state parties.
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Centralization of functional responsibilities

is

only one representative measure,

however. Degree of delegation also varies within the specific functions delegated and
the capacity of the secretariat to

implement or oversee programmatic

activities.

Programmatic tasks typically include managing financial and/or technology
verification of compliance, monitoring, implementation review, research

causes and effects, and providing expert advice to

The degree of delegation
perform

may

its

tasks,

member

also varies with the capacity of the secretariat to

and the independence

it

An agreement

enjoys in making decisions.

sufficient authority or capacity to serve these functions effectively.

study examines the discretion delegated to agreement bodies to
the source of funding for administrative and

which an agreement delegates authority

Table 3.4

Indicator

SECRETAR

lists

problem

states.

create an institution with broad programmatic responsibilities but

Table 3.4

transfers,

programmatic

fail to

delegate

In addition, this

make

activities,

policy decisions,

and the degree

to external bodies.

the several indicators of delegation used in this study.

Indicators of Delegation

Measurement
Nominal

Description

What

type of secretariat did the agreement

establish (if any)?

SECINDEP

Ordinal
(0-4)

How

independent

member

is

the secretariat

from

states?

ADMNFUND

Nominal

How

are administrative functions funded?

PROGFUND

Nominal

How

are

ENFORCE

Ordinal

To what

(0-2)

programmatic

activities

funded?

extent does the agreement adopt an

‘enforcement’ approach to rule compliance?
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to

Table 3.4

Indicator

AGRSCOPE

Indicators of Delegation (Cont’d)

Measurement
Ordinal

0-5)

AGRDEPTH

Ordinal

0-5)

PROGRAMS

Nominal

Description
Is

the agreement narrow in terms of the scope

of issues

Is

it

addresses?

the agreement deep in terms of the substance

of its rules and obligations?

What

types of programmatic activities (if any)

does the agreement

MONPROB

Dichotomous
(0-1)

RESEARCH

Dichotomous
(0-1)

EXPERTAD

Dichotomous
(0-1)

CMPLYMON

Dichotomous
(0-1)

RVWIMPLM

Dichotomous
(0-1)

VERIFY

Dichotomous
(0-1)

FTXFER

Dichotomous
(0-1)

REVWADEQ

Dichotomous
(0-1)

CLRNGHSE

Dichotomous
(0-1)

set forth?

Does the agreement centralize monitoring of
problem causes and effects? (yes/no)
Does

the agreement centralize research into a

problem’s causes and effects? (yes/no)

Does

the

advice to

Does

agreement provide expert policy

member

states? (yes/no)

the agreement centralize compliance

monitoring? (yes/no)

Does

the

agreement centralize implementation

review? (yes/no)

Does

the agreement centralize verification of

compliance? (yes/no)

Does

the agreement centralize the

management

of financial/technological transfers? (yes/no)

Does the agreement centralize review of
adequacy of commitments? (yes/no)
Does

the agreement centralize problem-related

information? (yes/no)
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Flexibility

The explosive growth
over the past

of multilateral environmental agreements

in the creation

thirty years suggests that states,

to institutionalizing

and

their agents, perceive definite benefits

cooperation in formal international agreements. Analysts of

and law typically point

international cooperation

to credibility as a

primary benefit of

formal agreements (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Lipson 1991). However, while credibility

of commitments helps sustain international cooperation by reducing
concerning other

states’ behavior,

consequences or the

it

does not mitigate uncertainty about policy

of the world.

state

states’ uncertainty

It

is

possible that treaty-governed behavior

produce outcomes different than those originally anticipated.
Therefore,

a party to reassess policy preferences.

in

New

addition to

may

knowledge might lead

making commitments

credible, negotiators of multilateral environmental agreements also have a fundamental

interest in preserving sufficient flexibility to deal with future contingencies.

This section

discusses different theoretical explanations for the selection of flexibility provisions in

multilateral environmental agreements.

Contemporary
concerns

in a

multilateral environmental agreements respond to flexibility

number of ways. Following Duffield (2003) and Koremenos

flexibility provisions

may

et al

(2001a),

be conceptualized as falling into one of three categories:

adaptive transformative and interpretive. Table 3.5, below, summarizes the three
,

,

categories of flexibility provisions.

Adaptive

flexibility provisions

suspending participation
are the

in

allow states to respond to future contingencies by

treaty-governed cooperative arrangements. Escape clauses

most significant form of adaptive

flexibility.
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These mechanisms are used by

individual states. Transformative flexibility, in contrast, encompasses provisions for

amending an agreement, periodic renegotiation of an agreement, and
duration) provisions. These

mechanisms

‘sunset’ (limited-

are exercised multilaterally.

Finally,

negotiators can allow for interpretive flexibility. Interpretive flexibility encompasses

formal provisions, such as reservations and statements of interpretation. However,
negotiators

may

also provide flexibility indirectly,

- or even vague -

general

level,

by specifying rules only

and granting individual

states

leeway

in

at a

very

implementing

those rules.

Table 3.5

Categories

&

Mechanisms of

Adaptive Flexibility
•

Institutional Flexibility

Transformative Flexibility

Escape clauses

•

Amendment

•

Sunset Provisions

Interpretive Flexibility

Rules

•

Reservations

•

Rule precision

/

specificity

Different theoretical approaches to international cooperation ascribe different

significance to each of the three forms of institutional flexibility. Additionally, within

theoretical

is

frameworks, the different forms of flexibility serve different ends. Following

a very brief

overview highlighting testable hypotheses

that will

be examined in the

following sections of the paper.
Rational Institutionalist Hypotheses on Flexibility

Flexibility provisions

studies of institutional design

adaptive flexibility

(i.e.,,

have figured prominently

in recent rational institutionalist

Rosendorff and Milner (2001

)

examine the power of

escape clauses) to make agreements easier to reach, by

mitigating distributional conflicts

Their argument builds on James Fearon's

claim that lengthening states’ shadow of the future can actually
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make

(

1998)

international

cooperation more difficult, not

international

over

agreement

terms,

initial

will

less.

Specifically, if states

know

in

advance

that an

be both lasting and enforceable, they will bargain harder

making an agreement more

difficult to conclude.

Flexibility

provisions, such as escape clauses, can mitigate the effect of such distributional concerns

by allowing

states to

escape negative enforcement under certain circumstances. This

yields the first rational institutionalist hypothesis on flexibility.

•

IF1.

Adaptive

flexibility will increase

with the use of enforcement mechanisms.

Second, rational institutionalism focuses attention on the use of flexibility
provisions to address uncertainty. In this view, the combined effect of uncertainty and

risk-aversion leads negotiators to favor flexible agreements.

Koremenos (2005a, 553)

develops a formal model of agreement duration, from which she derives the comparative
statics that “as uncertainty increases, the probability that the parties will

choose

finite,

renegotiable agreements to adjust for shocks increases,” and “as the risk aversion of the

parties increases, the parties will

In the

model, uncertainty

is

choose

to

make each agreement

represented as a random adjustment,

in the series shorter.”

i.e.

a

shock

,

to the utility

each states derives from being a party to the agreement. The greater the uncertainty
surrounding an agreement, the greater the potential change to a parties'

Assuming

that states tend to be risk-averse

when

utility

over time

negotiating multilateral agreements, this

yields the second rational institutionalist hypothesis on flexibility.

•

IF2.

The

Flexibility (particularly transformative) will increase with uncertainty.

third rational institutionalist hypothesis

on

flexibility builds

on the second by

accounting for the transaction costs surrounding the negotiation of multilateral
agreements. Essentially, the argument

is

that (re)negotiation costs are. to a large degree.
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a function of the

number of parties

participating in the negotiations.

Increasing

renegotiation costs cut into negotiators' expected utility of choosing limited-duration,

renegotiable agreements. Using the

same model described above, Koremenos (2005a,

553) derives the expectation that “as renegotiation costs increase, the probability that

choose

parties will

finite,

renegotiable agreements decreases,” and “if the parties

conclude a series of renegotiated agreements, as renegotiation costs increase, parties will

choose

to

make each agreement

in the series longer.”

This yields the third rational

institutionalist hypothesis:

•

Realist

1F3. Transformative flexibility will decrease as the

number of parties

increases.

Hypotheses on Flexibility
Previous studies of institutional design generally have not derived specific

hypotheses concerning flexibility

in institutional design.

Doubtless, this

is

due

skepticism toward the significance of international institutions more generally

Mearsheimer 1995) which encourages
flexibility provisions into the

the belief that states

do not need

realist

to realist

(e.g.,

to negotiate

agreements they make. State sovereignty provides the

ultimate form of flexibility; in international anarchy, states are free to ignore international

agreements
Realism

is

at

any time

Thus, one recent study of institutional flexibility concludes that

ultimately unsuited to explaining institutional flexibility because

it

cannot

explain variation in flexibility provisions (Koremenos 2005a).

Although many

power

politics,

it

is

realists

consider international institutions to be epiphenomenal to

nevertheless possible to formulate realist claims concerning the

design of institutional flexibility in light of the framework described above. In a
discussion of the 1987 Montreal Protocol negotiations, Elizabeth
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DeSombre

(2000. 94)

argues that the U.S. used unilateral threats and multilateral diplomacy in tandem in an
attempt to “internationalize” existing U.S. policy. Thus, the U.S.

that the alternative to

unilateral action

made

clear at Montreal

concluding a protocol would not be ‘no agreement’ but, rather,

by the U.S.

to prohibit the import

of ozone-depleting substances. By

implication, to the extent that international agreements serve coercive diplomacy, one

would expect

flexibility

mechanisms

to

be designed

to serve the

needs of the coercing

state (or

hegemon). Transformative

interests

of a hegemonic negotiators. To the extent that modification of the terms of

cooperation

realist to

is

flexibility, in particular,

necessary, perhaps for technical reasons,

it

appears contrary to the

would be reasonable

for a

expect that a hegemon would retain veto power over the adoption of potentially

undesirable amendments. Thus,

we

can state the following

realist

hypothesis concerning

flexibility:

•

RF1 Negotiations driven by
.

little

a

hegemonic actor

will

produce agreements with

(or sharply circumscribed) transformative flexibility.

In contrast, realists

have quite different expectations for

flexibility in international

agreements negotiated among relative equals. In these cases, realism expects
sovereignty concerns will have a

much more

decisive influence over the design of

international agreements (Abbott and Snidal 2000, 51). Specifically, realism

expect that agreements negotiated

among

the provision of, for example, escape

to parties to interpret

second
•

realist

that

relative equals will

would

guard sovereignty through

mechanisms, and by delegating significant leeway

and implement agreement-related obligations. This yields the

hypothesis concerning flexibility.

RF2. Agreements negotiated among relative equals will feature high levels of
adaptive and interpretive flexibility
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Constructivist Hypotheses on Flexibility

Similar to the

first

two

rational institutionalist hypotheses, the first constructivist

hypothesis views flexibility as a response to uncertainty. Unlike rational institutionalism,

however, constructivism sees institutional

flexibility not as

an adaptive response to

uncertainty but, rather, as a potential solution to uncertainty. Constructivist explanations

of flexibility

in institutional

Haas 2000).

In this

design are thus driven by a process of social learning

model, states renegotiate agreements not

(e.g.,

to adjust for inevitable,

stochastic shocks to their utility from participating in the agreement but, rather, to use

new knowledge

to better understand, pursue,

and possibly change,

their interests.

Thus,

analysts have suggested including regular renegotiation in the design of multilateral

agreements. Although questions of the effectiveness of different institutional pathways

to

cooperation have recently gained prominence in the literature on international
cooperation

theoretical

(e.g..

the

argument for separating specific regulations from general objectives and

making them
(

Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1998; Abbott and Smdal 2004),

flexible dates at least to the early 1970s.

Paolo Contini and Peter Sand

1972, 38) argued that:

[i]t

may

be doubted, however, whether traditional treaty techniques will prove to

be suitable for meeting the technical requirements of effective “ecomanagement”
on the global or regional scale, once international action passes from the
declaratory to the operational stage. Environmental problems characteristically

and flexible solutions, subject to current up-dating and
meet rapidly changing situations and scientific-technological

require expeditious

amendments

to

progress.

Another strand of constructivist thought has also emphasized the benefits of
transformative flexibility in treaty design. Similar to

Ku and

Diehl's (2003, 3)

characterization of the “dual character of international law” as both “an operating system

and

a

normative system,” some constructivists have argued
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that

normative agreement

is

necessary to support adequate international environmental policies. As Brunnee and

Toope

( 1

997, 30-3

1 )

explain:

Because there

no global community

is

any meaningful sense, but only

in

associations of states and other actors for practical purposes, in any given issuearea normative communities must
typically

emerge when

coordination to

it

is

first

be imagined and nurtured. Binding nonns

regime has moved along the continuum from mere

at least a partial

Therefore, in this view,

secure nonnative

a

convergence of interests and values.

important for multilateral environmental agreements to

commitment before attempting

consequence of this

is

to set

binding policies.

that provisions for renegotiation will

need

to

A

practical

be designed into

agreements.

Though

these

two constructivist arguments are driven by

are quite similar observationally.

among

Both expect

different logics, they

flexibility provisions to

be

common

multilateral environmental agreements, and both understand transformative

flexibility to

be the most appropriate strategy for reaching deep cooperation. They differ

insofar as they prescribe similar solutions to different design problems: one responds to

uncertainty, the other to lack of normative consensus.

•

CF1. Transformative

flexibility will increase

•

CF2. Transformative

flexibility will increase with policy dissensus.

with policy uncertainty.

Constructivists have also identified a third potential source of flexibility in

multilateral environmental agreements.

searched for isomorphism

among

Previous studies on institutional design have

institutional

agreements due

to the socializing influence

of international legal culture (Finnemore 1996). Koremenos (2005a)
(that

tests this

agreements emulate one another) by examining whether variation

duration decreased over time.

artifact

The negative

result

of that study, however,

of the way in which the hypothesis was specified
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in

hypothesis

agreement

may

be a

Though Koremeons’s (2005a)

results

do not support the ‘homogenizing global culture’

more

the possibility that emulation occurs in smaller,

communities.

A

internally

would be

possibility for future research

thesis, they

do not account

for

homogenous

to consider

isomorphism,

perhaps resulting from the influence of specific legal or epistenuc communities, within
specific policy domains.

1

Such

a test, while interesting, lies outside the scope of the

present study.

Table 3.6 summarizes the several hypotheses concerning institutional
used

flexibility

in this study.

Table 3.6

Hypotheses Concerning

Source Theory’

Label

Rational

IF1

Hypothesis

Adaptive

1F2

increase with uncertainty.

Transformative flexibility will decrease with

IF3

Institutionalism

Realism

the

number of parties.

Negotiations driven by a hegemonic actor will

RF1

produce agreements with

Realism

with the use

Flexibility (particularly transformative) will

Institutionalism

Rational

flexibility will increase

of enforcement mechanisms.

Institutionalism

Rational

Flexibility

RF2

little

(or sharply

circumscribed) transformative

flexibility.

Agreements negotiated among

relative equals

will feature high levels of adaptive and

interpretive flexibility

Constructivism

CF1

Transformative

flexibility will increase

with

policy uncertainty.

Constructivism

CD2

Transformative

flexibility will increase

with

policy dissensus.

1

Existing sources such as Mitchell (2003-2007) and the

http://www.ecolex.org

may prove

to

FAO-IUCN-UNDP

database

at

be promising resources for identifying agreements within specific

policy spheres.
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Operationalizing Flexibili ty

As described

study examines three different types of institutional

earlier, this

flexibility: adaptive, interpretive,

and transformational.

Adaptive

flexibility provisions

are those that can be exercised by individual states without requiring further negotiations

or international agreement, provided that certain qualifying criteria obtain. Adaptive

mechanisms thus can be used

whether

suspend or even cease operation of an agreement among

They cannot be used

certain parties.

common

to

to

amend cooperative arrangements. The two most

such provisions are escape clauses and withdrawal clauses.

a multilateral

agreement includes

a formal escape

ESCAPE

captures

WITHDRAW

mechanism.

captures whether an agreement includes a formal withdrawal clause.

Interpretive flexibility provisions grant individual states leeway in the

interpretation

provisions are

effect

and domestic implementation of agreement

mechanisms

for

rules.

formal reservation. Negotiators

by specifying rules broadly enough

individual parties. Conversely, they

may

to permit, or

The most common such

may

achieve a similar

even necessitate, interpretation by
by specifying

restrict interpretive flexibility

rules with a high degree of precision (Goldstein et al 2000; Duffield 2003).

captures whether an agreement permits formal reservations.

PRECISE

RESERVE

captures the

precision of an agreement’s rules in an ordinal measure.

Finally, transformative flexibility provisions permit states to adjust, refine, or

replace an agreement’s rules through renegotiation.

most

inflexible

Though

states

may

adjust even the

agreement by negotiating a replacement accord de novo renegotiation of

multilateral agreements has

,

become

increasingly institutionalized through the use of such

devices as the ‘framework convention-protocol’ approach to international cooperation
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AMEND captures whether an agreement provides for future amendment and the decision
rules governing adoption of

make an agreement

amendments.

A

second option available

to negotiators is to

expire after a certain duration, requiring states to renegotiate

wish to continue cooperation.

SUNSET

if

they

captures whether an agreement incorporates

such a ‘sunset’ provision.

Table 3.7 presents the indicators of institutional

Table 3.7

flexibility

used

in this study.

Indicators of Flexibility

Indicator

Measurement

Description

ESCAPE

Nominal

Does the agreement include a formal escape
mechanism?

WITHDRAW

Nominal

Does the agreement include

a formal

withdrawal

clause?

RESERVE

Nominal

Does the agreement permit reservations?

PRECISE

Ordinal

How

AMEND

Nominal

Does the agreement include formal
amendment/adjustment provisions?

SUNSET

Nominal

precise are the agreement’s rules?

Does the agreement expire? Does

it

include a sunset

clause?

Independent variables

Based on the review of the
Chapter

2, this

literature

on international cooperation summarized

section identifies five major explanatory variables that will serve as the

starting point for this study: distribution, enforcement,

uncertainty.

While other variables also influence

agreements (MEAs)
in international

in

in

some way,

hegemony, number, and

the design of multilateral environmental

these five account for

agreements, and are key variables
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in the

much of the

important variation

explanations developed here.

Distribution Problems

This variable refers to the degree to which negotiating parties’ preferences

concerning institutional arrangements differ from each other, when more than one

arrangement

is

is

possible

(Koremenos

et al

2001a, 775).

possible, or if all negotiating parties prefer the

problems are nonexistent or
be severe
the

on

in

in

only one institutional outcome

institutional

which

better arrangements for

institutional design,

emphasized by

realists like

make

distribution

Joseph Gneco

more symmetrical by increasing

Although distribution problems are easy
is

some come

likely to

directly at

expense of worse outcomes for others. One implication of asymmetrical distribution

increasing likelihood of states choosing open or expansive

to

outcome, distribution

At the other extreme, such problems are

irrelevant.

zero-sum situations

same

If

difficult to observe.

Accordingly,

this

the

(

198Kb),

membership

is

an

rules, in

an effort

number of shares.

to represent in

formal terms, their depth

study uses multiple indicators of distribution

problems. These are summarized in Table 3.8. The indicators include the salience of
distributional conflict in negotiations, the extent of overlap

interests,

is

were

COMONINT

a qualitative indicator that captures the

salient in the negotiation

distributed symmetrically

Similarly,

DISTBEN

among

DISTC'OST

degree to which distributional

of an multilateral environmental agreement.

captures the extent of overlap

issue area under negotiation

states.

negotiating states’

and the distribution of the costs and benefits associated with an agreement.

D1STCONF
conflicts

among

among

negotiating states’ interests in the

captures whether an agreement’s benefits are

participating states, or concentrated primarily in a

few

captures whether the costs entailed by an agreement are
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distributed symmetrically

among

participating states, or whether they are concentrated in

a few.

Table 3.8

Indicator

Indicators of Distribution Problems

Measurement

DISTCONF

Ordinal
(0-4)

COMONINT

Ordinal
(1-6)

D1STBEN

Ordinal

0-4)

DISTCOST

Ordinal
(1-4)

Description

How

salient

were distributional conflicts

to the

negotiation of the agreement?

How

compatible were the interests of the negotiating

parties concerning the primary issue area?

How

evenly were the agreement’s benefits divided

among

How

negotiating parties?

evenly were the agreement’s costs divided

among

negotiating parties?

Enforcement Problems
Problems of enforcement are related
al

to distributional problems.

As Koremenos

(2001a, 16-17) note, “separating enforcement problems from distribution problems

et

is

enforcement and distribution problems

an analytic choice, not a substantive claim

often occur simultaneously.” This study follows the ‘Rational Design' approach in
separating questions of distribution from those of enforcement to facilitate the evaluation

of specific hypotheses concerning institutional design.

Although

it

is

tempting to construe many of the indicators of distribution

problems as useful proxies for enforcement problems, there are drawbacks

move. Although enforcement problems may
structure as distribution problems, they

may
i.e.,

arise

to

such a

from the same generic incentive

do not necessarily go together

In

some

cases,

be possible (through logrolling or side payments) to reach an equilibrium point -

to

make an agreement

self-enforcing in the game-theoretic sense - despite the
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it

presence of distributional problems concerning which specific equilibrium should be
used. Accordingly, this study avoids stretching indicators of distributional problems to

cover enforcement problems as well. Instead,
directly captures the degree of enforcement

ENFORCEM

is

a five-point ordinal

uses a single indicator from the

problems relevant

measure

parties to disobey an agreement’s rules,

it

even

to a

it

that

given negotiation:

that captures the strength

after

IRD

of incentives for

has entered into legal force

Hegemony
Although a single indicator may be sufficient

to capture the extent to

which an

agreement

is

hegemony

present during the negotiation of an agreement. Classical realism defined

self-enforcing, multiple indicators help capture the extent and kind of

power primarily

in

material

/

military terms

(Morgenthau 1948). However,

in addition to

questioning the material basis of power, critics of realism have long noted that power

is

not always fungible. Overall military might does not necessarily translate into ability to

exert influence

on

a particular issue

(Keohane and Nye 1977). Accordingly,

this

study

accounts for the possibility of 'issue-specific’ power.
Issue-specific

states

may be

power notwithstanding,

is

the additional possibility that

some

able to translate general economic advantages into negotiating power.

Conference diplomacy
increase in the

years.

there

is

costly to begin with, and this has been exacerbated

number of multilateral environmental negotiations over

Indeed, during the waning hours of the

by the sharp

the past thirty

December 1997 Kyoto Conference, some

smaller delegations complained that the U.S. strategy had

become one of “negotiation by

exhaustion’’ (Depledge 2005, 190). Therefore, this study uses multiple indicators to
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capture the multiple dimensions of

hegemony and power

that

shape multilateral

negotiations.

Table 3.9 presents the main indicators of hegemony used

Hegemony can be analyzed
political control

in this study.

as a function of issue-specific power, as a function of

over the negotiating agenda, and as the ability of a hegemon

to

dominate

the substance and content of negotiations.

Table 3.9

Indicators of Hegemony

Indicator

ISSUEHEG

Measurement

How

Ordinal

To what

Ordinal

Each of these indicators uses
which negotiating

states

was

Similarly,

was

there

the negotiating agenda driven by a

state?

a five-point ordinal scale.

ISSUEHEG

HEGEMON

a

captures the degree

possessed roughly equal issue-specific power.

captures the degree to which the negotiating agenda

state.

states;

To what extent were negotiations dominated by
hegemonic state?

Ordinal
(0-4)

to

extent

hegemonic

(0-4)

HEGEMON

symmetrical were the negotiating

an issue-specific hegemon?

0-5)

HEGAGEND

Description

HEGAGEND

was driven primarily by

a

hegemonic

captures the extent to which negotiations and decisions

were dominated primarily by a hegemonic

state.

Number
Number

refers, simply, to the

number of states

that negotiators perceive as

relevant to addressing the problem at hand. This variable

realist theories that stress the influence

is

especially significant for

of relative gains concerns and for

theories that stress the difficulties of collective action.

88

It is

institutionalist

distinguished from

“membership,” which
of relevant

is

considered as endogenous

states is a function

affected by

it.

may

to interpret the

is

number

relevance of states to a particular

be relevant because they cause the problem and/or because they are

NCAUSERS

is

an ordinal measure of the number of states considered to

be relevant to a problem because they play a significant role

NAFFECT

In contrast, the

of external, problem-specific issues.

There are two primary ways
problem. They

in this study.

in

causing

it.

Similarly,

an ordinal measure of the number of states considered to be relevant to a

negotiation because they are significantly affected by the specific problem(s) addressed

by an agreement.

NSTNEGOT captures the total

number of states

that actively

participated in the negotiation of a given environmental agreement. Table 3.10 presents

the

two

indicators of number used in this study.

Table 3.10

Indicators of Number

Indicator

Measurement

Description

NCAUSERS

Ordinal

Flow many

states

NAFFECT

Ordinal

How many

states

were regarded as important
the problem(s) addressed by the agreement?

in

causing

were significantly affected by the

problem(s) addressed by the agreement?

NSTNEGOT

Ratio

How many

states actively participated in negotiations?

Knowledge and Uncertainty
Uncertainty plays a key role in

realist, institutionalist,

explanations of international cooperation

and constructivist

For example, uncertainty and fear concerning

other parties’ motives and behavior underlie the realist security

From

a rational institutionalist perspective, Oliver

for uncertainty,

dilemma (Herz

1950).

Williamson (1985, 30) writes

that,

“but

problems of economic organization are relatively uninteresting.” Finally,
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from a constructivist perspective, a number of writers have emphasized the importance of

knowledge and uncertainty
Uncertainty

is

the

in international cooperation (see, e.g.,

Haas 2001

most complex explanatory variable used

).

in this study.

Taken

together, rational institutionalist, realist, and constructivist theories suggest that

uncertainty can exist in a

institutional design.

number of forms, each of which has

Since

it

is

a different

consequence

for

an open question whether the different aspects of

uncertainty emphasized by different theoretical approaches to international cooperation

refer to a single underlying construct, or

makes use of a number of indicators
uncertainty.

particularly

indicators

It

whether they are alike

to capture various aspects

in

name

only, this study

of knowledge and

also uses indicators of other processes that have been emphasized

by constructivist accounts of international environmental cooperation. These

may

be grouped into five general categories, reflecting:

(

1 )

complexity and

technological intensity of a problem; (2) scientific knowledge concerning problem
causes, policy options, and policy effects; (3) scientific consensus; (4) presence of a

shared perception of crisis or shock; and (5) participation by scientific organizations
the negotiation of an agreement.

Table

3.1

1

summarizes the indicators

for these elements of

uncertainty.
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knowledge and

in

Table 3.11

Indicator

COMPLEX

Indicators of Knowledge/Uncertainty

Measurement
Ordinal
(0-4)

Description

How

complex

issue linkage)

terms of number of issues and

(in
is

the

problem addressed by the

agreement?

IMPLEMEN

Ordinal
(1-5)

How

difficult (in

terms of financial and

technological requirements) are solutions to

implement?

SCIENTIF

Ordinal

0-5)

How

well established

is

scientific

knowledge

concerning the extent and causes of the

problem?

OPTIONS

Ordinal
(0-4)

EFFECTS

Ordinal
(0-4)

How

well established

is

scientific

knowledge

concerning possible policy solutions?

How

well established

is

scientific

knowledge

concerning the range of consequences of
different policy solutions?

OPTAGREE

Dichotomous
(0-1)

EFFAGREE

Dichotomous
(0-1)

Is

concerning the

Is

among negotiators
menu of policy options?

there consensus

there consensus

among

negotiators

concerning the consequences of different policy
options?

SHOCKNEG

Ordinal
(0-4)

To what

extent

was

the negotiating

agenda

driven by external factors such as a shared

perception of crisis?

EPICOM

Dichotomous
(0-1)

NONSTATE

Nominal

Were

transnational scientific expert network! s)

present and active during negotiations?

What

types of nonstate actors participated in

negotiations?
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The

first

two measures

COMPLEX

(Underdal 2000).

relate to

is

problem

characteristics, or

problem “malignity”

an ordinal measure of the number of issues that must be

addressed to solve a particular problem, as well as the number of related problems
affected by agreement rules.

IMPLEMEN

is

an ordinal measure of the financial and

technological intensiveness of an agreement’s policies.

The next

three measures relate to the state of scientific

problems and policies under negotiation. SCIENTIF

is

knowledge concerning

the

an ordinal measure of the extent

of scientific knowledge concerning the causes and extent of a specific problem.

OPTIONS
the

is

an ordinal measure capturing the extent of scientific knowledge concerning

menu of available

EFFECTS

refers to

policy options for addressing a given problem. Similarly,

how

well established scientific knowledge

consequences of different policy options.

OPT AGREE

and

EFFAGREE

capture whether

effects.

The next
crisis

concerning the likely

knowledge of policy options

negotiators are substantially in agreement concerning the

and policy

is

indicator captures whether the existence of a shared sense of shock or

was an important

qualitative, ordinal

factor leading states to negotiate an agreement.

measure of the extent

to

which

a shared sense

SHOCKNEG

is

a

of crisis or shock drove

multilateral negotiations on a specific issue.

The

final

two indicators capture

a different aspect

whether science- or knowledge-based actors were active
a given

agreement

EPICOM

of knowledge and uncertainty:

in the negotiation

and design of

indicates whether or not a transnational expert network

participated in the negotiation and design of the agreement.
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NONSTATE

is

a

nominal

indicator of the type(s) of nonstate actors (e.g., activist groups, multinational

corporations, scientific organizations) that were active during negotiations.

Data

One of the
relative scarcity

challenges facing analysts of international institutional design

is

the

of high-quality, public data on the subject. Although several promising

sources currently are in development (see,

e.g.,

Koremenos 2005a; Mitchell 2003-2007),

these do not yet incorporate sufficient information to evaluate the range of hypotheses

identified for this project.

The

creation of new datasets on an ad hoc basis has the

practical

consequence of limiting the scope of analysis. Most such datasets are

to easily

observable

traits.

Qualitative data concerning the actual negotiation and design

of international agreements
necessary to arrive

at

restricted

is

scarce.

Yet

this is precisely the sort

of information

that

is

confident conclusions concerning the prevailing practice of

institutional design.

With these considerations
design hypotheses against a

International

new

in

mind,

this

study will evaluate the aforementioned

dataset that builds from the recently published

Regimes Database (1RD) (Breitmeier

a wealth of qualitative data

et al

2006). Briefly, the

1RD

contains

on the constituent elements of twenty-three international

environmental regimes. These data are organized into four sections, related

to stages in

regime development, each of which contains several variables (often with multiple
indicators) that are of broad theoretical interest. This study focuses on the

first

groups of information: “regime formation” and “regime attributes” (Breitmeier

two
et al

2006, 25-29). The former category contains background information that corresponds to
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the independent variables used in this study.

that

is

relevant to the dependent variables used in this study.

Although the database
unit

-

The second category contains information

i.e.,

fundamentally concerned with regime analysis, the basic

is

the “regime element”

- corresponds with

specific events in regime

development, including the negotiation of international agreements. For example, the

IRD team
et al

“ultimately

.

.

.

dated each regime to the signing of an agreement” (Breitmeier

2006, 40). The majority of the regimes in the

international agreements.

IRD

are constituted by several specific

For example, the Antarctic regime encompasses the 1959

Antarctic Treaty, the 1964 Convention on the Conservation of Flora and Fauna, the 1972

Convention on the Conservation of Seals, the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources, and the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection.

Appendix 2

lists

the specific regimes covered in the

The most obvious drawback of using
it

contains

may

the

IRD and

IRD

is

in this study.

that the international

not accurately represent the larger population of multilateral

environmental agreements. Accordingly, the results of this study

may

be of limited

generalizability. Nevertheless, there are at least three significant benefits of

IRD

agreements

data for analysis.

First,

study and contained in the

drawing on

although the set of international agreements used

IRD

is

not especially large, the

variation on several variables of theoretical interest.

The

IRD

in this

includes substantial

dataset

encompasses

(

1

)

global

agreements as well as regional agreements, (2) resource management agreements as well
as pollution abatement agreements, (3)

and symmetric environmental problems as well as

highly asymmetric ‘upstream-downstream’ problems.

included in the

IRD

differ

from the universe of MEAs
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It

in

is

unlikely that the cases

any meaningful way. Second,

the

IRD

contains information on

highest-profile multilateral environmental

As Koremenos (2005a, 563ff35)

agreements.

that

many of the

way because

points out, “High-profile agreements get

make

they have big effects; thus,

it

is

IRD

is

unique among datasets of multilateral

about their characteristics.” Finally, the

environmental agreements because

it

important to be able to

statements

contains information on the negotiation processes

within which agreements were designed, as well as their eventual, formal institutional

features.

For these reasons, the

databases of

A

IRD

represents an important advance on previous

MEAs.

second potential drawback of using IRD data derives from the modest number

of multilateral agreements that

it

surveys (fifty-four). Although the

IRD

contains over

three hundred data points, the majority of these correspond to different segments, or

“watersheds” within regimes. Consistent with

its

focus on the contractual design of

multilateral environmental agreements, this study focuses exclusively on those data

points that correspond to the negotiation and conclusion of specific

clearly theoretically interesting, the subsequent

lies

MEAs. Although

development of individual agreements

outside this study’s focus on contractual design.

The IRD served

as a starting point for the dataset used in this study, but a

of additions and modifications were necessary.

First, this

study examines only those

’regime elements' that correspond to the negotiation of

new

Other regime elements, including what Breitmeier

(2006, 43) refer to as

et al

“watersheds” within existing structures - simply do not
this study.

scientists to

Second, the coding procedure used by the

code each regime independently

-
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fit

number

international agreements.

within the research design of

IRD team -

assigning two political

raises questions of reliability

and

validity.

1RD

Intercoder reliability in the

each indicator that

I

the

1RD

1

generally high, but

I

added an additional coding for

used, and either recoded or discarded indicators where there

significant disagreement.

measures -

is

Where coders disagreed only

slightly

-

particularly

was

on ordinal

substituted a coding that took account of both responses. Further,

some of

variables were recoded for use in this study to maintain consistent ‘direction’.

was necessary

in

some cases

to reverse the direction

of an IRD variable

to

consistency with the multiple indicators used in this study. Although the

information on dozens of variables,

it

It

ensure

IRD

provides

does not contain complete information on every

variable of interest in this study. Several indicators (including

all

those corresponding to

formal provisions for institutional flexibility) were constructed and coded by the author,

examining agreement

texts.

Appendix

1

explains the construction and coding of the

indicators used in this study, including their coding source.

Methods
This study incorporates a range of quantitative and qualitative methods
evaluate hypotheses on institutional design. For each

test,

the specific

follows from the hypothesized relation and the nature of the data.

to

method used

Many

hypotheses can

be illuminated by the construction of simple crosstabulations, accompanied by measures

of association

Where

crosstabulation tables were ‘square’, Kendall's tau-b

is

used as

a

measure of association between variables. Where tables are non-square, and where there
is a

hypothesized direction of influence between the variables, Somers’ d

is

calculated.

This study uses two-tailed significance consistently.

Due

to the ordinal,

non-normal nature of much of the data, comparisons between

groups are generally done using nonparametric techniques
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(e.g.,

Mann- Whitney U

tests

for

two independent groups and Kruskal-Wallis

Mann- Whitney
groups

.

“a test of the statistical significance of differences between two

2005, 184). The Kruskal-Wallis

test “is

more independent samples.

three or

order data and

is

It is

an extension of the
a nonparametric,

(ANOVA)

Hypotheses

that predict the choice

dependent variable of interest
certain explanatory variables

/-test

is

is

(EFA)

is

When

66).

used.

is

When

relative precision

When

used

the

to test

When

whether

explanatory

the dependent variable of

of agreement obligations,

used.

and structural equation modeling
test

to test the

hypothesized causal relationships

(unobserved) variables, such as uncertainty. Exploratory factor analysis

more

descriptive than theoretical, and

group of indicators

that

underlying construct (see,

knowledge).

is

have been hypothesized

do represent a single construct, or whether,

scientific

is

and indicators are specific predictors.

dimensionality of theoretical constructs and to

latent

for rank-

comparison of means and analysis of

dichotomous, logistic regression

Finally, this study uses factor analysis

among

1

and ordinal regression, as appropriate.

measured ordinally, such as the

ordinal regression

ANOVA

... to

of alternate, specific institutional designs are

variables are also dichotomous, logit analysis

is

one-way

U test

are preferred to these nonparametric tests.

tested using logistic regression

interest

Mann- Whitney

based on medians rather than means” (Vogt 2005,

appropriate data are available, conventional

variance

more groups). The

used when the data for two samples are measured on an ordinal scale” (Vogt

.

.

test is

tests for three or

e.g.,

When

used in

this

study to

to represent a

in fact, they reflect

test

whether a

given theoretical construct

more than

a single

Dimitrov’s (2003) discussion of different aspects of

theory expects a particular relation between manifest
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indicators and latent constructs,

measurement models

how

(CFA) can be used

to

structural equation

modeling (SEM) can be used

between two or more

evaluate

well data

latent variables,

fit

more

specific agreement(s).

confirmatory factor analysis

the hypothesized structure. Finally,

to test

hypothesized causal relationships

such as uncertainty and delegation.

Finally, each empirical chapter concludes

or

/

by examining hypotheses

These case studies allow

this

While these discussions do not

are, in fact, absent

of one

study to examine whether

positive results actually reflect the hypothesized causal processes, and to

whether hypothesized causal processes

in light

when

examine

findings are negative.

offer separate Tests' of the hypotheses under

consideration, they nevertheless play an important part in evaluating hypotheses, and in

identifying areas for future research.
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CHAPTER

4

ELEMENTS OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: MEMBERSHIP

The

strategic design of

institutional design.

On

membership

rules represents an important aspect of

18 June 2006, a majority of members of the International

Whaling Commission (1WC) voted

thirty-three to thirty-two (with

one abstention)

in

support of a resolution calling for an end to that body’s 1986 moratorium on commercial

whaling

(IWC

coalition led

Resolution 2006-1). This vote marked the

first

by Japan had achieved majority support for ending the ban on

commercial whaling. Japan’s

failure to

win the change

the significance of

membership

Although few

member

in the

states

IWC

states (and
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is

in

activity being regulated.

for this large

to

a

any interested

June 2007), a number

A

moratorium demonstrates

domestic commercial whaling industry,
state.

far

In

June 2006 the

thirty states

IWC

exceeding participation

closer look at the vote begins to reveal

membership. The

fell

rules for multilateral diplomacy.

have (or have had)

open

all

desires because the vote

it

short of the three-fourths supermajority needed to reverse the

membership

time that the pro-whaling

had 70

in the actual

some of the reasons

sponsoring the resolution included

St. Kitts

and Nevis, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominica, Gabon, Gambia, Kiribati, Mali, Mauritania,
Nauru, Nicaragua, Palau,

St.

Lucia, Suriname, Togo, and Tuvalu, along with Iceland,

Japan, Norway, and the Russian Federation. This coalition

consensus

UK

in favor

of commercial whaling than

it

is

is

less indicative

of a growing

of old-fashioned log-rolling. As the

newspaper. The Independent, reported the day after the vote:
In

a

stunning diplomatic coup, Japan and

Iceland,

won

a voting majority in the

IWC
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its

allies,

including

Norway and

for the first time, as a result

of

a

remorseless 10-year Japanese campaign to secure the votes of small African and

Caribbean countries

in

exchange

for multimillion-dollar foreign aid

packages

(McNeill 2006).

As

it

turned out, the coalition’s narrow majority rested on the support of three

members of the IWC: Cambodia, Guatemala, and
Clearly, then, the

membership

rules of the

new

the Marshall Islands (McNeill 2006).

IWC

played a significant role in the

June 2006 vote. Had the IWC’s original contracting states decided to limit membership
exclusively to ‘relevant’ states (by almost any definition), neither the anti-whaling nor the

pro-whaling coalition would have been able
votes. Thus, procedural rules can

to stack the organization with

have substantive consequences for international policy.

This chapter explores the design of membership rules in

two broad dimensions of membership

MEAs.

Next,

it

describes a

membership
light

First,

it

explains

can manipulate in designing

that negotiators

membership design among agreements

Regimes Database (IRD). Third,
rules set forth in Chapter 3.

it

in the

evaluates the hypotheses concerning

Finally, the chapter discusses these findings in

of two specific cases.

Membership and

One of the most fundamental
environmental agreement

first

MEAs.

number of indicators of membership design and provides

descriptive statistics concerning

International

sympathetic

place.

The decision

is

to

Multilateral

Agreements

decisions in designing an international

whether or not the agreement should be multilateral

make an agreement

multilateral

is

in the

only the beginning of the

process, however. Negotiators are then faced with questions concerning whether or not

to restrict

membership

to those states that

meet certain

criteria.

Geography provides one

such criterion: international environmental agreements can be specific to
(e.g., the

Rhine River Convention and agreements), regional
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a local

resource

(e.g. the several Baltic

Sea

agreements), or global

Other

(e.g.,

criteria include

NATO’s

(e.g., the

Conventions on Biodiversity and Climate Change).

commitment

to particular

domestic

political or

economic policies

requirement of civilian control of the military) or expertise

in a relevant

issue area.

The simplest explanation of membership would be
area to

that the

map

perfectly onto institutional membership. Yet

agreements are open

From
membership

at

a

in

an issue

mistake to assume

are available to negotiators

must participate

in

First,

who may

-

-

i.e.,

referred to in the literature

e.g.. Barrett

Membership

membership

what

some

nor victims

of, the

strategies concerning

MEA can be reduced to two

Is

who

the participation of one or

of a cooperative arrangement? This

is

commonly

on international cooperation as the minimum participation
2003).

criteria in multilateral

all states

in

clear,

participate in a cooperative arrangement? Second,

along a number of dimensions. The

some agreements,

example makes

participation in a

order for cooperation to be successful?

states critical to the success

threshold (see,

IWC

hand.

the perspective of institutional design

related questions.

restrict

would be

to states that are neither directly responsible for,

environmental problem

In

it

involvement

scope of membership in multilateral environmental agreements follows directly

from the scope of the issue being addressed. As the

more

for

fist

environmental agreements vary significantly

major category of differentiation

are eligible for

-

who can join.

membership, while other agreements

some way. When membership

restricted to “relevant” states

is

is

restricted,

those causing the problem and

/

sometimes

it is

or those affected by

it.

Other times, however, potentially relevant states are either excluded from membership.
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In addition to restricting

membership on

issue relevance,

membership based on geographic, economic, or

some agreements

political criteria.

restrict

Some agreements

allow only originally contracting states to participate, while others allow states that were
not part of the original negotiations to accede to the agreement.

This brings us to a second dimension of differentiation

agreements

members

treat

some members

in

membership. Some

differently than others. Negotiators

may

treat original

differently than subsequently admitted ones (as in the 1959 Antarctic Treaty).

Negotiators also

agreement

may

(as in the

establish

in a particular

1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change). These

differentiations can involve

some members enjoying
Finally,

more than one category of membership

some members having

different

commitments than others or

different benefits than others.

agreements

may

some informal agreements do

vary in terms of their criteria for entry into force. While

not require any special action by participating states,

formal treaties generally acquire legal force following ratification by state parties. While

the

Vienna Convention on the

Law

of Treaties establishes a fallback threshold of

universal ratification for entry into force, most international environmental agreements

explicitly specify conditions for their entry into force.

certain

number of parties, some

Some

require ratification by a

require ratification by specific states, and others specify a

substantive threshold for entry into force, e.g., ratification by a group of states accounting

for

some predefined percentage of treaty-governed

behavior.

This chapter evaluates several hypotheses concerning the design of membership
rules governing

which

states

may - and which must -

participate in

the literature on international cooperation reviewed in Chapter 2
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MEAs, drawn from

However, before

,

evaluating these propositions,

it

will be helpful to review the indicators

of membership

rules discussed in Chapter 3.

Dimensions of Membership

in

MEAs

Before evaluating specific propositions concerning the design of membership
rules in

MEAs,

this chapter

examining descriptive
Chapter

Table

3.

analyzes the dimensions of membership in

statistics for the several indicators

These are summarized below

4.1

Indicator

Indicators of

4.

of membership

by

set forth in

1

Membership

Measurement

MEMCR1T

Nominal

RESTRICT

Dichotomous

NSTNEGOT

Table

in

MEAs

Ratio

Description

What
Is

criteria

govern

membership

How many

in

eligibility for

membership?

an agreement restricted?

states actively participated in the negotiation

of the agreement?

ELIGIBLE

Ratio

NRATIFY

Ratio

How many

states are eligible for

How many

states

must

ratify

membership?

an agreement for

it

to enter

into legal force?

PCTRATIF

Ratio

What percentage of negotiating
agreement for

EIFCOND

Dichotomous

it

In addition to a

states

must

ratify

an

to enter into legal force?

minimum number of ratifications, does

agreement include substantive conditions for entry

the

into force 9

ACTEARLY

Dichotomous

Did
its

PUBLGOOD

Dichotomous

states

promise

Ratio

comply with an agreement

prior to

entry into legal force?

Does

the

agreement provide a public good (as opposed

to a potentially

NSTNEGOT

to

How many

excludable good)?

states actively participated in the negotiation

of the agreement?
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One of the

agreement

multilateral

examined

possible choices in designing the

first

in

whether or not

first

indicator

agreements.

Many agreements do

membership

economic

membership. The

captures which criteria, if any, govern eligibility for

have a broad range of reasons for doing
are:

to restrict

rules of a

MEMCRIT,

here,

membership

is

membership

in

so.

not restrict membership; those that do

Among

the possible criteria for restriction

another agreement, commitment to particular domestic political or

institutions,

geography, use of the environmental good

in question, role in

causing an environmental problem, capacity to help solve a given problem, and expertise

in

Some agreements

an issue area.
Figure 4

among

1

shows

restrict

membership by more than one condition.

the relative frequency of each of these (nonexclusive) criteria

the multilateral agreements surveyed in this study.

membership

criterion

among

the multilateral agreements surveyed

another agreement. This result

is

convention - protocol approach
conventions
protocols

is

is

among MEAs. While

‘problem-solving capacity' and ‘role

(as

opposed

framework

amendments and

to procedural) criteria are

in

agreements did not

restrict

geographic

‘Issue-specific expertise’,

causing the problem’ were used less frequently.

agreements were restricted on the basis of domestic
fifteen

in

restricted to convention parties.

location and status as a user of an environmental good.

and

membership

participation in

usually unrestricted, participation in subsequent

commonly

is

not surprising given the prevalence of the framework

The most frequent substantive

No

The most common

membership.
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political

system

(e.g.

communist),

Figure

Membership

4.1

Criteria of Surveyed Agreements

Meivdbei’dup Geographic

another
agieement
ill

m

User of a
good

Role
causing

problem

(MEMCRIT)

Potential to Expertise in
help
issue aiea

Domestic

economy

Domestic
No
government

criteria

problem
solving

To
useful to

For

this

evaluate

some propositions concerning

know simply whether

the design of membership rules,

purpose, agreements are considered to have unrestricted membership

pre-existing (unrestricted)

framework agreement

captures this aspect of membership.

fifty-four)

the

The

indicator,

is

when

either

membership

RESTRICT,

Half of the surveyed agreements (twenty-seven of

have unrestricted membership.

Another important element
is

is

or not negotiators strategically restricted membership.

they have no membership conditions or their only membership condition

in a

it

number of states

in explaining negotiators’

choice of membership rules

participating in negotiations. Figure 4.2
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shows

the histogram for

indicator

NSTNEGOT,

number of states

number of states

of States Active in

The mean

participating in negotiations.

active in negotiating the surveyed agreements

Number

Figure 4.2

the

was roughly

thirty-six.

Agreement Negotiation (NSTNEGOT)

Mean =36 19
Std Dev =37.946

N

However, the modal

size

of negotiations was twelve or fewer, and half of the agreements

were negotiated by twenty-five or fewer
small

by

number of truly global

itself,

it

is

eligible for

states.

The average

is

skewed upwards by

negotiations. Although this information cannot

tell

us

a

much

necessary for interpreting other design choices, such as the number of states

membership and

the

Another variable useful

number of ratifications needed
in interpreting

of states that qualify for membership
information

=52

is

in a

captured by the indicator,

for entry into force.

membership design choices

given agreement

ELIGIBLE. Figure
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is

the

number

In this study, that

4.3

shows

a

histogram of the

number of states meeting
number of states

membership

in an agreement.

Although the mean

eligible

Number

Figure 4.3

criteria for

of States Eligible for

Membership (ELIGIBLE)

Mean =95 66
Std.

Dev. =S3 325

N

for

membership

in the

strongly bimodal.

interested state.

was open

to

=47

surveyed agreements was roughly ninety-six, the distribution

Most

frequently,

However,

membership

as Figure 4.3

roughly twelve (or fewer)

in

agreements was available

to

is

any

shows, the second largest group of agreements

states.

Together, these two groups account for

three-fourths of surveyed agreements.

The next question facing
participate?”

Almost

all

negotiators designing

membership

surveyed agreements (96 percent) require

ratifications to enter into legal force.

NRATIFY
107

represents the

rules

a

is,

“Who must

minimal number of

number of states

that

must

ratify

an agreement for

for entry into force ranged

fifty

The number of ratifications necessary

to enter into force.

from

five to sixty-two, with a

mean of twenty. The middle

percent (twenty-fifth to seventy-fifth percentile) of surveyed agreements required

between

ten

and twenty-one

proportion of the

from

it

1.0 for

ratifications.

number of states

PCTRATIF

expresses this

participating in negotiations. This

agreements requiring ratification by

all

number

measure ranges

eligible states (e.g., the

Convention on the Protection of the Rhine against Chemical Pollution)
for agreements

open

to

any interested

into force (e.g., the 1971

As Figure

to less than 0.04,

International Importance).

4.4 shows, most surveyed agreements requiring ratification for entry

proportion of eligible states

common

1976

very few ratifications for entry

Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of

by

into force only require ratification

most

state that require

as a

whose

provisions are

participation; those requiring

-

in

a small proportion

participation

order

-

of eligible

states.

In

terms of the

required for entry into force, the three

is

those requiring less than ten percent

between ten and twenty percent participation; and those

requiring between twenty and thirty percent participation. However, a substantial

minority of agreements do require universal participation to enter into force.

Although the general
interesting, a

that not

all

good

states

full

level

of participation necessary for entry into force

survey of membership

count equally

in the

EIFCOND, which

To account

addressing the possibility

minds of negotiators designing MEAs. For

whatever reason, participation by some
participation by others.

criteria requires

is

states

may

be substantially more important than

for this possibility, this study incorporates

captures whether negotiators stipulated substantive conditions for

entry into force, in addition to a simple

minimum
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level

of participation. For example,

in

addition to requiring ratification by fifty-five parties to the

Kyoto Protocol requires

ratification

less than fifty-five percent

by Annex

1

Framework Convention,

the

(industrialized) states accounting for

no

of that group’s 1990 carbon dioxide emissions. One quarter

(25%) of surveyed agreements requiring

ratification include additional, substantive

conditions.

Level of Participation Required for Entry into Force

Figure 4.4
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Different theories of international cooperation place different importance on the

use of entry into force conditions. For

conditions represent a viable

way

some (mainly

rational institutionalists), these

for negotiators to mitigate concerns

of free

riding.

For

other approaches (mainly constructivists), entry into legal force plays a meaningful role

in international

norm

diffusion.

Still

other approaches (mainly realists) consider these
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conditions to be

little

into force conditions

is

its

helpful to

more than diplomatic
/

minimum

know whether
The

entry into force.

promised

to

comply

role entry

participation thresholds have in the design of

state parties are willing to

indicator,

promises were relatively rare

To understand what

boilerplate.

ACTEARLY,

among

MEAs,

comply with an agreement

it

prior to

captures this information. Such

the negotiation of surveyed agreements.

prior to entry into force in only nine of fifty-four cases

States

(18% of

cases).

Finally,

some

theories of international cooperation expect restrictive

when agreements provide

potentially excludable benefits, that

withheld from states not participating

PUBLGOOD

to capture

in the

benefits that

may be

agreement. This study uses the indicator

whether an agreement provides a nonexcludable public good

rather than a potentially excludable good.

three of fifty four)

is,

membership

The majority of surveyed agreements

(thirty-

do not govern excludable goods.
Evaluating Hypotheses on Membership

The next
them

in

hand

it

step

is

to

apply what

we know

about membership options by analyzing

terms of the hypotheses outlined in Chapter

is

now

3.

With

member

rules,

which are summarized

Rational Institutionalist Hypotheses on

first

rational institutionalist hypothesis

membership when agreements provide excludable

(1M1

)

in

Table

4.2.

Membership
is

that negotiators will restrict

benefits, especially

by enforcement problems. Three indicators are particularly relevant

ENFORCEM

ship data in

possible to undertake an empirical analysis of the several hypotheses

concerning the design of membership

The

this

when

confronted

to this hypothesis.

captures the severity of enforcement problems surrounding an agreement.

PUBLGOOD

captures whether or not an agreement provides an essentially public good,

or a potentially excludable one.

captures whether or not

It is

membership

scored dichotomously (yes/no). Finally,

in

an agreement

is

open or

restricted.

RESTRICT
too, is

It,

measured dichotomously (open/restricted).

Table

Hypotheses Concerning Membership

4.2

Source Theory

Label

Hypothesis

Rational

IM

Negotiators facing enforcement problems will restrict

1

membership when providing excludable

Institutionalism

When

IM2

Rational

benefits.

confronted with enforcement problems,

negotiators will set specific conditions for entry into

Institutionalism

force,

and

will not require states to

with an agreement prior to

RM1

Realism

RM2

to distributional

Agreements concluded
concerns will use very

CM

Constructivism

entry into legal force.

Negotiators will design inclusive membership rules in

response

Realism

its

promise to comply

concerns.

in spite
strict

of relative gains

entry into force conditions.

Negotiators responding to perceived crises will be less

1

membership or use

likely to restrict

strict

entry into

force conditions.

CM2

Constructivism

Negotiators will choose inclusive membership initially
(over depth of cooperation,

Testing

that,

IM

I

is

difficult

Accordingly, Table 4.3 presents

a multi-level

number of observed cases

association

Among

necessary).

because there are too many relevant variables, and, given

too few cases under consideration to support

listing the

if

in

each

more robust

statistical

procedures.

cross tabulation of the three indicators,

cell but

not calculating measures of

the nineteen agreements that confront strong or very strong

enforcement problems, only

five provide essentially public goods.

Among

these five.

1

On

only one restricts membership.

the other hand,

provide potentially excludable benefits, ten
therefore, that there

Table 4.3

is

restrict

among

membership. This study concludes,

reasonably strong support for

Crosstabulation of

IM

as

1

Restricted

Public

Good

Public

No

Total

0

2

Yes

0

1

1

2

1

3

2

1

3

1

4

5

3

5

8
13

Total

Public

Good

No

5

8

Yes

5

5

10

10

13

23

Total

Public

Strong

Good

No

9

Yes

0

1

9

2

No

1

3

4

Yes

1

3

4

2

6

8

Total

Very Strong

Public

Good

Total

One
restrict

Membership

2

Yes

Medium

specified above.

Yes

No

Good

is

No

Total

Low

it

ENFORCEM x PUBLGOOD x RESTRICT

Enforcement
Problems

None

the fourteen agreements that

possible explanation for this pattern

is

membership whenever agreements provide

10

1

that negotiators are

1

1

more

potentially excludable benefits,

regardless of their perception of other states’ incentives to “cheat.”

The IRD does not

include enough cases to calculate a reliable measure of association between

and

RESTRICT

Crosstabulation:
Restricted

PUBLGOOD x RESTRI CT

Membership?

No

Yes

Total

Public

No

13

20

33

Good?

Yes

14

7

21

27

27

54

Total

PUBLGOOD

Table 4.4 provides a cross tabulation of these two indicators, with

measures of association.
Table 4.4

likely to

Measure of Association
Value

RESTRICT

Lambda

Though

dependent

these results are consistent with

agreements surveyed
restrict

that the

MEAs

=

.118

IM

.259),

and

is

Among

they are not conclusive.

1 ,

that provide potentially

membership (twenty) than do not

strong (lambda

Sig.

.259

the 33

excludable benefits to members, more

(thirteen).

However,

the relationship

is

not very

not statistically significant. Accordingly, this study finds

surveyed are consistent with the expectations of IM1, but that

statistical

support remains only modest.

The

theoretical significance of this finding

is

that the desire to exclude non-

many

participants from enjoying agreement benefits, hypothesized by

institutionalists,

rules

among

hypothesis

the

IM 1,

does not appear to be a major influence on the design of membership

MEAs

surveyed

the relationship

in this study.

is

While these agreements do not contradict

not statistically significant and, in any event, the

association between potentially excludable goods and restrictive

to sustain

rational

membership

is

too slight

any strong conclusions.

The second

rational institutionalist hypothesis

that negotiators will

respond

to

(IM2) concerning membership

enforcement problems by choosing specific entry into

A

force conditions expected to mitigate enforcement concerns.

states will not

promise

to

is

comply with such agreements

corollary of this

is

that

prior to their entry into force.

Testing the rational institutionalist hypothesis that entry into force conditions
serve as “tipping points” (for wider participation)

number of factors

(Barrett 2003).

First, the

is difficult

because the claim involves a

tipping effect of entry into force conditions

applies only to agreements that are not already self-enforcing.

If states

have no incentive

under an agreement, then entry into force

to “cheat”

will

have no reason

provisions.

criteria

When

to wait for entry into force before

mere formality.

Interested states

complying with an agreement’s

there are enforcement problems, the strategic use of entry into force

can permit states to approve agreements formally without the risk of assuming

More

unreciprocated obligations.
conditional commitments.

of cooperation for other

states will

The more

be comfortable ratifying an agreement with

states that ratify, the greater the perceived benefits

states considering ratification.

states increases until a tipping point is reached, at

initial

a

is

The number of participating

which the agreement has overcome

the

enforcement problem and has become self-enforcing.
Therefore, an empirical test of this hypothesis should be confined to agreements

associated with at least moderate enforcement problems. That translates

values of at least ‘medium’ (0.5) on the indicator,

determine the extent

based on

minimum

to

which negotiators have

participation levels, and

capture these variables.

minimum

The

ENFORCEM.

The next

step

study to

is

to

set specific criteria for entry into force

Indicators

third step focuses

in this

EIFCOND

and

on agreements using

NRATIFY

relatively high

participation conditions and asks whether or not parties to these agreements

have agreed

to

comply with
comply

commitments

to

ACTEARTY,

would

their provisions prior to entry into force.

Public

prior to entry into force, captured in this study by the indicator,

falsify the rational institutionalist

claim that

minimum

participation

thresholds serve as tipping points for participation in multilateral agreements.

The

constraints on empirical testing of the

are relevant again here. Testing hypothesis

the three indicators mentioned above:

1M2

first rational institutionalist

hypothesis

requires a two-level cross tabulation of

ENFORCEM, EIFCOND,

and

ACTEARLY

Since the number of multilateral agreements surveyed

in this

reliable regression or logit analysis, the analysis at this point

study

is

is

too low to permit

restricted largely to

descriptive inference.

In fact, the results

in

Table

from

a cross tabulation

of these three indicators, shown below

4.5, are highly consistent with hypothesis

that, as the severity

First, this

hypothesis predicts

of enforcement problems increases, negotiators will increasingly use

substantive criteria for entry into force.

consistent with this expectation.

problems, only one of nine

Table 4.5

1M2.

(

1

Crosstabulation:

The

actual distribution of cases in Table 4.5

Among agreements

is

facing low (or no) enforcement

1.1%) used such conditions.

ENEORCEM x EIFCOND x ACTEARLY
Agree

to

comply before

entry into force?

No

Enforcement Problem

None

Substantive conditions

No

Yes

Total

1

I

2

1

1

2

3

3

6

1

0

1

4

3

7

14

2

16

2

0

2

16

2

18

for entry into force?

Total

Low

Substantive conditions

No

for entry into force?

Yes

Total

Medium

Substantive conditions

No

for entry into force?

Yes

Total

Strong

Substantive conditions

No

for entry into force?

Yes

Total

Very Strong

Substantive conditions

No

for entry into force?

Yes

Total

Among

3

1

4

3

0

3

6

1

7

1

1

2

4

0

4

5

1

6

agreements facing moderate enforcement problems, two of eighteen (11.1%)

used such conditions. However, three of seven (42.9%) agreements facing strong

enforcement problems made entry into force contingent on substantive
six

criteria.

(66.7%) agreements facing very strong enforcement problems did so

Four of

Hypothesis

1M2

also predicts that as the severity of enforcement problems

increases, states will not agree to

force.

It

comply with an agreement

prior to

further expects that states will be even less likely to

agreements

consistent with each of these expectations. States agreed to

comply “early” with

The data

that use substantive entry into force conditions.

comply

force in four of the nine (44.4%) cases involving agreements with

problems. However, states agreed to such “early” compliance

(

1

entry into legal

its

in

Table 4.5 are

in

prior to entry into

little

to

no enforcement

only two of thirteen

5.4%) cases involving strong or very strong enforcement problems. The evidence

the second prediction

is

for

even stronger; there were no cases of states promising “early”

compliance with agreements

that

used substantively conditional entry into force. The

surveyed cases thus provide strong prima facie evidence
further testing on a larger

number of cases

in

support of 1M2. However,

will be necessary to establish

whether the

relationships identified above are statistically significant.

The

theoretical significance of these findings

would require

a very different research design:

sequencing of

states’ ratification

individual state interests.

The

one

is

rather modest.

that considers the

A

true test of

timing and

of an agreement, as well as an ex ante specification of

logic behind the hypothesis

is

that

while states

concerned about free riding upon concluding an agreement, they may be able
threshold of participation above

which

inaction by remaining laggard states.

common
states

can

threshold, and to use

ratify, free

cooperation.

it

IM2

may

be

to identify a

participation looks attractive, regardless of

The

trick for negotiators, then, is to identify a

as the basis for entry into force conditions. That

from significant worries about free riding or unreciprocated

way

Since

it

was not possible

to specify states’ participation thresholds

ex ante or

consider the timing and sequence of ratifications here, this study attempted to

hypothesis further by examining

how

often ratifying states promised to

agreements prior to entry into force. Such a promise would

view entry

minimum

into force requirements as

to

test the

comply with

falsify the claim that states

participation thresholds that will

safeguard them from unreciprocated cooperation.

As mentioned above, none of the

surveyed agreements incorporating substantive entry into force conditions secured such
promises of ‘early’ compliance. Thus, the balance of evidence
rational institutionalist theory underlying hypothesis

necessary to evaluate this hypothesis

first

relative gains

1M2. Nevertheless, more research

Realist hypothesis on

membership (RM

concerns will drive states

to

1

distributional concerns.

Three of the indicators described

criteria will

eligible for

that distributional

is

and

governing

covary directly with the salience of
earlier provide leverage

eligibility for

(whether or not an agreement in open to any interested

number of states

)

use inclusive membership rules. Thus

membership

MEMCR1T (conditions

membership),

state),

and

on

this

RESTRICT

ELIGIBLE

(the

membership). The primary indicator of distributional

concerns in the negotiation of multilateral environmental agreements

is

DISTCONF

(relevance of distributional conflict in negotiations).

This study

tests this

between agreements
did.

This

hypothesis by comparing

that contained

latter distinction is

made

is

Membership

inclusive or unrestricted

hypothesis:

consistent with the

fully.

Realist Hypotheses on

The

is

no fonnal
using

mean

restrictions

RESTRICT As
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scores on

DISTCONF

on membership and those that
Figure 4.5 shows, the

difference in distributional conflict scores between restricted and unrestricted agreements

is

consistent with the realist hypothesis.

Figure 4.5

Distribution of

The middle

fifty

DISTCONF. By

DISTCONF

scores for restricted and open agreements

percent of restricted agreements score between

comparison, the middle

fifty

Tow' and ‘medium' on

percent of open agreements rank between

‘medium’ and ‘very strong' on DISTCONF.
Since

compared
conducted

DISTCONF

(restricted

to

is

measured ordinally, and since there are two groups being

and unrestricted membership), a Mann- Whitney

U

test

was

evaluate the hypothesis that open agreements are associated with greater

distributional conflict than are restrictive ones.
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The

results

of the

test

were

statistically

1

significant (z

higher

=

-3.601

mean rank

.001).

restricted

As expected, open agreements had

DISTCONF

(34.29) on

Although the

open and

,P<

results of the

a substantially

than did restrictive agreements

Mann-Whitney U

test

(

1

9.98).

provide strong evidence that

agreements are associated with differing levels of distributional

conflict, this information

does not by

itself suffice to establish a causal relationship.

Since the independent variable in this relationship (the decision to restrict membership)

dichotomous, the appropriate

statistical

procedure to

is

test for relation is logistic

regression.

Table 4.6 presents the results for a

DISTCONF.

Consistent with

RM1,

logistic regression

distributional conflict

is

of

RESTRICT

a statistically significant

predictor of negotiators’ decision to use unrestricted membership.

agreement using unrestricted membership

criteria increases

on

The odds

ratio

of an

by a factor of nearly three

(2.88) for each ordinal increase in the salience of distributional conflict in negotiations.

The

constant, 0.081, reflects the odds ratio of an agreement restricting

distributional conflicts

were not relevant

in negotiations; that

is,

membership when

when DISTCONF =

0.

This ratio corresponds to a probability of 7.5%.

Table 4.6

Logistic regression results:

B

DISTCONF
Constant

When

Wald

S.E.

1.059
-2.51

distributional conflict

RESTRICT

on

DISTCONF

Df

Sig.

Odds Ratio

.322

10.796

1

.001

2.882

.834

9.056

1

.003

.081

is

“low,” for example, the odds ratio then equals 0.081

2.882 = 0.233. This corresponds to a probability of roughly 18.9%. The
distribution

is

represented graphically in Figure 4.6.

Though

full

simplistic, the

*

probability

model

performs quite well, correctly predicting over seventy-two percent of multilateral

agreements

in the

Figure 4.6

IRD.

Probability of unrestricted

According

to

RM

1,

membership

the ultimate distribution of an agreement’s costs and benefits

should be fairly symmetrical.

RM

1

rests

on expectations

irresolvable distribution problems are not

However,

it

also suggests that

distributional

it

may be

amenable

that issues presenting

to multilateral

governance.

possible on occasion for negotiators to mitigate

problems by deliberately expanding membership. The obvious obstacle

incorporating these indicators in the present evaluation

RM1, endogenous.

Accordingly, the only

cost/benefit distributions

is

to

way

is

to falsify

that they are,

RM1

according

to

using indicators of actual

demonstrate the presence of restricted agreements with

asymmetrical costs and benefits. To accomplish
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this,

to

cost-benefit distributional

indicators

DISTBEN

and

DISTCOST

RESTRICT. Tables

can be cross tabulated with

4.7 and 4.8 present the results.

No

RM

correlation statistics are provided because

1

does not imply a linear

relationship between cost-benefit distribution and membership; here

we

concerned with the two leftmost columns

asymmetric

Table 4.7

Crosstabulation:

DISTBEN

in

each

table, representing

RESTRICT

x

Distribution of benefits

Unrestricted

Highly

Moderately

Asymmetric

Asymmetric

No

4

membership

Yes

|

Total

Table 4.8

5

Crosstabulation:

DISTCOST

Fairly

Highly

Symmetric

Symmetric
7

26

7

4

4

12

3

4

6

26

19

7

8

13

52

Highly

Moderately

Asymmetric

Asymmetric

[DISTCOST]

Mixed

yes

Fairly

Highly

Symmetric

O

O
1

O

7/

26

l

18

1

4

2

26

5

24

2

12

9

52

Among

distributions of costs and benefits.

benefits, thirteen

surveyed agreements that provide asymmetric

of twenty-four (54.2%) do not

that entail

asymmetric

restrict

costs, nineteen

membership.

RM1,

Among

negotiated

of twenty-nine (65.5%) do not

membership. Again, these cross tabulations do not constitute
because, according to

Total

Symmetric

no

Total

Total

RESTRICT

x

membership

agreements

[DISTBEN]

Mixed

Distribution of Costs

Unrestricted

are mostly

restrict

a true hypothesis test

the ultimate distribution of costs and benefits

may

be

influenced by membership criteria. However, these results do suggest that the
distribution of benefits

influencing

from

membership

MEAs

criteria.

is

less salient than the distribution

As with

of costs

in

the logistic model, these cross tabulations are
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largely consistent with

RM

1

,

but suggest that there are

criteria than just distributional conflict

In

realist

summary,

more influences on membership

during negotiations.

the theoretical significance of these findings

strong support for the

claim that negotiators will favor open or expansionary membership

distributional

A

problems or relative gains concerns.

variety of tests

the strongest empirical support so far for any of the hypotheses.

shows

is

that distributional

to restricted

membership

tabulations involving

that hypothesis

RM

1

problems are

a significant predictor

in a multilateral

RESTRICT
may even

and the indicators

be refined further.

of agreement-governed benefits in driving
realist

hypothesis

problem of free riding by setting

combine

to

provide

Logistic regression

of negotiators’ decision not

D1STBEN

Among

and

D1STCOST

suggest

surveyed agreements, the

more important than

the distribution

this relationship.

(RM2)

strict

response to

agreement. Moreover, the two cross

distribution of agreement-related costs appear to be

The second

in

is

that states will seek to mitigate the

conditions for entry into force.

From

a realist

perspective, this strategy does not obviate the need for compliance monitoring but does

offer

way

some

protection against states incurring unreciprocal obligations.

to test this

hypothesis

is

to

The most

direct

compare the mean number of ratifications necessary

for

an agreement to enter into force across different groups of agreements ordered by the
relevance of distributional costs

in negotiations.

number of ratifications necessary

Figure 4.7 shows the distribution of

for entry into force for each ordinal category of

DISTCONF.
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Figure 4.7

Distribution of

NRATIF

by

DISTCONF

Salience of Distributional Conflict in Negotiations

A

Kruskal-Wallis

test

was then conducted

between these distributions. The

These

results

agreements

shown

in

in the five

test

was

Table 4.9 support

groups

is

to further scrutinize the difference

significant, x‘ (4,

RM2. The

able 4.9

N RATIFY

x

DISTCONF

N

Mean Rank

Number of

None

2

4 .00

ratifications necessary

Low

7

15.50

1

18.50

1

for entry into force

Medium

1

Strong

Very Strong
Total

13

19.19

9

28.83

42

123

.123,

p=

numbers of signatures.

Salience of Distributional
Conflict in Negotiations

1

.025.

with agreements characterized by

statistically significant,

Kruskal-Wallis Test of Ranks:

1

mean ranks among

difference in

greater distributional conflict requiring relatively greater

I

N=42) =

1

However, two cautions are

in order.

With the exception of

distributions, although statistically significant, are very modest.

agreements negotiated against very strong distributional
substantially similar. Second,

relatively larger

is

it

control for the

numbers of ratifications also

this, a

for

new

number of states

variable,

membership by

number, with a
negotiators

Table

computed

is

agreements requiring

numbers of states

strongly supported,

in

value of one, provides one

=

membership, there

is

necessary to

To accomplish

number of states

for entry into force.

way

to

to join.

eligible

The

gauge the extent

to

resulting

which

presents results from a Kruskal- Wallis test conducted with this new,

.928.

is

distributional conflict

way

When

for the

no basis

number of states

test is

no longer

eligible to join an

significant,

to

conclude that any systematic relationship exists between

and number of ratifications necessary for entry into

PCTRATIF

x

DISTCONF

Salience of Distributional

N

Conflict in Negotiations

Percentage of

None

ratifications

Low
Medium

(4,

accounting for the number of states eligible for

kruskal-VVallis Test of Ranks:

necessary for entry

it

an agreement.

created by dividing the

variable. Controlling in this

Table 4.10

that

entry into force contingent on broad participation.

4. 10

.877, p

-

to larger

membership

agreement changes the results considerably. The

N=38) =

open

number of ratifications required

maximum

made

are

RM2

eligible for

PCTRATIF, was

the

conflict, the distributions are

possible - if not probable

Therefore, before concluding that

between the

First, the differences

Mean Rank
1

16.00

6

2

9

21.1

1

.00

into force

Strong

Very Strong
Total

13

17.46

9

20.22

38
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force.

By
strict

the logic of hypothesis

it

is

reasonable to expect negotiators to choose

entry into force conditions in response to enforcement concerns as well as

distributional conflict. Therefore,

using

RM2,

ENFORCEM

in place

of

DISTCONF: one comparing

number of ratifications necessary

ENFORCEM,

two additional Kruskal-Wallis

and one comparing distributions of the percentage of ratifications

shows any systematic relationship between

far,

of

for entry into force for each ordinal value

ENFORCEM.

the

IRD

data reveal very

little

Neither of

the severity of enforcement

problems and the number of ratifications necessary for entry into

So

were conducted

distributions of the total

necessary for entry into force, grouped by each ordinal value of
these tests

tests

force.

empirical support for hypothesis

RM2.

Although agreements negotiated against greater levels of distributional conflict appear
require a greater

numbers of ratifications

for entry into force, in fact this relationship

merely a by-product of a relationship between the number of states eligible

agreement and the

level

of distributional conflict

in negotiations.

enforcement problems facing agreements also does not appear
either the absolute

number of ratifications necessary

to

The

to join

to

is

an

severity of the

have any influence on

for entry into force or the percentage

of ratifications necessary for entry into force.

Generic

minimum

institutional design,

participation thresholds are relatively crude instruments of

however. Negotiators have other ways

conditional to mitigate concerns of free riding, particularly

into legal force contingent

on

ratification or approval

certain proportion of the activity being regulated

by a

to

make

entry into force

making an agreement’s
set

of states representing a

Negotiators sometimes go so far as to

require participation by specific state(s) for an agreement to enter into force.
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entry

Such

conditions offer

minimum

more precision than do minimum

participation thresholds

that negotiators are

is

participation thresholds.

RM2, one

incongruent with

If variation in

plausible explanation

is

achieving the same ends, perhaps even more effectively, by using

such substantive conditions.
This study uses a binary indicator,

The

criteria for entry into force.

DISTCONF, and ENFORCEM,
Once

first test

for the

again, the appropriate procedure

EIFCOND,

RM2

of

to reflect the use

compare mean ranks on

to

is

two values of EIFCOND.

is

Mann- Whitney U

the

DISTCONF

which do not use substantive entry

The

=

into force criteria.

Agreements using

test.

substantive entry into force conditions rank higher on

2.105, p

of substantive

was

test

than do agreements

significant (z

=

-

.035), so this study can reject the null hypothesis that the distributions for both

values are the same.
Table

4.1

Mann-Whitnev U

1

Test:

EIFCOND

x

DISTCONF
N

No

Salience of

Sum

Mean

Substantively conditional
entry into force?

Rank

of

Ranks

30

18.33

550.00

Yes

10

27.00

270.00

Total

40

distributional conflict

Similarly, the result for the

significant (z

=

-2.608, p

=

.009).

Mann- Whitney
As Table

4. 12

test

ENFORCEM

shows, the mean rank on

of agreements using substantively conditional entry
that

using

into force

is

is

statistically

ENFORCEM

significantly greater than

of agreements without such conditions.

Table 4.12

Mann-VYhitney

test:

EIFCOND

x

ENFORCEM

Substantively conditional

N

entry into force?

Enforcement Problems

No

Mean Rank

Sum of Ranks

30

17,80

534.00

Yes

10

28.60

286.00

Total

40
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Since this difference

is

highly significant, and since this study uses a dichotomous

indicator of substantive entry into force conditions, logistic regression

was used

to

determine whether or not the severity of enforcement problems associated with an

agreement

is

a significant predictor of the decision to use substantively conditional entry

Table

into force requirements.

predictor model.

It

shows

that

presents logistic regression results for the single

4. 12

ENFORCEM

in fact, a significant predictor

is,

of the use

of substantive conditions for entry into force.

Table 4.13

Logistic Regression of

EIFCOND

on

ENFORCEM
Odds

B
[101 G]

Constant

Wald

S.E.

df

Ratio

Sig.

1.106

.443

6.246

1

.012

3.023

-3.882

1.257

9.539

1

.002

.02)

This single predictor model (using

ENFORCEM)

also

was

statistically reliable

accurate in predicting whether or not an agreement used such conditions.

It

and

correctly

'y

classifies

As

over

80%

these results

of agreements in the IRD, with

make

clear, the severity

multilateral environmental

agreement

is

a

pseudo-R~ of .262.

of the enforcement problem surrounding

a

a significant predictor of negotiators’ decision to

design substantive criteria for the entry into force of an agreement. The results also
suggest that other, additional factors influence negotiators’ decisions to use such
conditions. Other factors not included in the current

model

likely are necessary to predict

correctly a higher percentage of agreements.

Figure 4.8 sheds light on

Table 4.13

(i.e.,

why

this is the case,

Based on the

the value of the constant and the odds ratio),
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it

is

results presented in

possible to plot the

model’s predicted probability of any new agreement using substantively contingent entry
into force conditions.

Figure 4.8

Predicted Probability of substantive entry into force conditions

In the single predictor

such conditions

is

model using

the probability of an agreement using

greater than 0.5 only for those agreements confronting very strong

enforcement problems. The

ENFORCEM

ENFORCEM,

fact that several

agreements with lower scores on

use such conditions implies, again, that while enforcement problems are a

significant predictor of substantively conditional entry into force, other influences factor

into the decision

This study finds strong support not only for the

can participate

(RM2). One

minimum

(RM

1

)

realist

hypothesis concerning

but also for the realist hypothesis concerning

theoretically significant finding

is

that negotiators

who must

who

participate

do not design general

participation thresholds in response to enforcement problems or relative gains
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concerns.

As shown above

demonstrates that general

in

Table 4.10, controlling for the number of eligible states

minimum

participation thresholds are actually fairly constant,

regardless of the severity of distribution or enforcement problems.

A

second theoretically significant finding

problems both are significantly related

is

enforcement and distributional

that

to negotiators' decision to

design specific,

substantive criteria for entry into force. Thus, the evidence suggests that negotiators

prefer attempting to mitigate concerns of free-riding by

legal force contingent

requirement that

making an

on the satisfaction of specific substantive

MARPOL

be ratified not only by a

twelve states which collectively account for

ME As’

criteria,

minimum of twelve

at least fifty

entry into

such as the
states, but

by

per cent of the world’s merchant

shipping.

Table 4.12 shows

that

agreements including such conditional entry into force

score significantly higher on

ENFORCEM

than those that do not. Furthermore, the

logistic regression described

by Table

shows

problems surrounding an agreement

make an agreement’s
criteria.

These

is

4. 13

that the severity

a significant predictor

results strongly support the realist

agreements. However, although

argument

this

that negotiators will

when designing

to

be

multilateral

study finds strong support for the realist hypothesis

that negotiators will use strict entry into force conditions in

it

of negotiators’ decision

entry into legal force contingent on the satisfaction of substantive

especially concerned to resolve problems of free-riding

problems,

of enforcement

response to enforcement

also finds that enforcement problems most likely are not the only significant

influences on negotiators’ decision to design substantive criteria for entry into force.

This

is

reinforced by the moderate explanatory
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power of the

single-variable regression

described in Table 4.13. Thus, although there

there

is

also

good reason

strong support for hypothesis

is

to explore this relationship further in future research.

Constructivist Hypotheses on

The

first

RM2,

Membership

constructivist hypothesis holds that the

way

in

which negotiators

perceive a problem shapes the choice of policy responses. In particular, the perception
that a given issue constitutes a crisis has specific implications for the range

of politically

acceptable policy options (Haas 2001; Kingdon 1984; Litfin 1994). While specific

programmatic responses vary from one individual case
expects that perceived crises will

make

to the next,

the use of restrictive

hypothesis

CM1

membership and entry

into

force criteria (important in realist and rational institutionalist explanations) politically

unacceptable.

A number of specific
claim.

The degree

agenda

to

to

which

an external shock

This indicator

is

indicators are relevant to conducting an empirical test of this

multilateral negotiations

/

perceived

relationship, however.

did not.

It

is

Hypothesis

on the international

captured by the indicator,

SHOCKNEG.

CM1

is

not specified as a linear

expressed as a dichotomous contingency; perceived shocks

/

shaped the negotiation and design of a given multilateral agreement, or they

For present purposes, then,

into a binary (yes/no) indicator.

was coded

their place

coded ordinally: no relevance, low relevance, medium relevance, strong

relevance, very strong relevance.

crises either

crisis is

owe

it

will be necessary to transform the ordinal values

Agreements

‘strong’ or ‘very strong’ are

coded

for

which the influence of external shocks

‘yes’;

agreements for which the influence

of external shocks was coded ‘medium’ or lower are coded ‘no’
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The

first

step in evaluating hypothesis

catalyzed by external shocks

in a

to

RESTRICT

and

simple cross tabulation. As Table

agreements with restricted membership

were driven by external shocks or
external shocks has

is

determine whether negotiations

crises are, in fact, associated with the choice not to restrict

SHOCKNEG

membership. Since both
can be expressed

/

CM1

is

no influence on

4.

14 shows, the proportion of

nearly identical whether or not negotiations

Thus

crises.

are dichotomous, the relationship

the null hypothesis that the presence of

the decision to restrict

membership, cannot be

rejected.

Table 4.14

Crosstabulation:

RESTRICT x SHOCKNEG
Agenda Driven by
External Shock

No

Yes

Total

Restricted

No

21

6

27

Membership

Yes

22

5

27

43

11

54

Total

There
agreements

may

(e.g.,

be a compelling explanation for

protocols) in which

membership

common

this

is

negative finding. After

restricted to parties to the relevant

framework convention,

the second

surveyed agreements

geographic. This reflects the basic fact that not

is

Likewise, not

issues are global in scope.

global

crisis.

Put simply,

pressure for unrestricted

A second

most

it

may

all

type of membership restriction

all

environmental

external shocks result in the perception of

be inappropriate

to

expect external shocks to create

membership

prediction of

CM

1

is that

negotiators responding to external shocks will

not choose strict conditions for agreements’ entry into legal force. Specifically,

accurate, one

among

would expect negotiators responding
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to external shocks:

(

1

)

if

CM

to require

1

is

ratification

by relatively fewer numbers of states, and (2)

to

be

less likely to

use

substantive criteria for entry into force.

For present purposes, the relative number of ratifications required for an

agreement

to enter into force,

ranging from 0 to

1

.

The

PCTRATIF,

Figure 4.9

crisis,

and those

Distribution of

The median value
(roughly 0,1

)

is

number of ratifications required

by the estimated number of states

Figure 4.9 shows the distributions of this

perceived

represented as a scale variable, with values

specific value represents the

for entry into force divided

to a

is

membership.

agreements negotiated

in

response

that are not.

PCTRATIF

for

statistic for

eligible for

by

SHOCKBIN

agreements negotiated

in response to a perceived crisis

only one-third of the median value for agreements not negotiated in

132

response to a

crisis

(roughly 0.3). Nevertheless, as Figure 4.9 shows, there

is

substantial

overlap between the two distributions.

Next, an independent-samples

t-test

was conducted

to evaluate the

negotiators will require a lower ratification threshold for entry into force

responding to a

crisis

the hypothesis.

On

ratification

than they

would

if

The means were

they were not.

agreements that were not negotiated in response to a

However, standard deviations
(t

when

they are

consistent with

average, agreements negotiated in response to a crisis required

by a lower percentage of eligible countries (mean = .288,

not significant

hypothesis that

(36)

=

.797, p

=

for both values

crisis

(mean =

were quite

SD =

.400,

large,

.350) than did

SD =

and the

.344).

test

was

.431). Therefore, this study cannot reject the null

hypothesis that population means are equal for both types of agreements. With respect to
hypothesis

CM

1,

these results indicate that there

claim that agreements negotiated

relatively

more

Finally,

will

be

states than

CM1

less likely to

in

is

very

response to external shocks require ratification by

do agreements not negotiated

in

response

to

such shocks.

use substantively conditional entry into force. Rather, negotiators

agreement will enter into force quickly. This proposition can

be evaluated by using a simple 2x2 cross tabulation of

Table 4.14 presents the results of

it

evidence to support the

expects that agreements negotiated in response to external shocks

will seek to ensure that the

association (since

little

SHOCKNEG

and

E1FCOND.

this cross tabulation, as well as a directional

makes no sense

to test

whether

external shocks).
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criteria for entry into force

measure of
causes

Table 4.15

Crosstabulation

EIFCOND

x

SHOCKNEG

External Shock

No

Substantive Condition
for Entry Into

Yes

Force

Total

No

Yes

Total

22

10

32

8

0

8

30

10

40

Measure of Association
Value
Uncertainty

EIFCOND

coefficient

Dependent

.1

Asymp.

Approx.

Approx.

Std. Error

T

Sig.

2.436

.042

16

.022

Notably, there are no cases of agreements responding to a perceived crisis and
using substantively conditional entry into force. Because no agreements

lower right
this

of Table 4.14, no lambda coefficient

cell

is

provided for

fall

into the

this table.

Instead,

study reports the uncertainty coefficient: another proportional reduction of error

(PRE) measure of association.
response to a perceived

improvement

crisis

in ability to

In this case,

knowing

provides a modest

(0.

1

that an

agreement was negotiated

16) but significant (p

=

.022)

predict whether negotiators will use substantive conditions for

entry into force. In essence, this statistic reveals that the presence of an external shock

not,

by

itself,

a

good predictor of the decision

to

make

In

is

not surprising, given that

of all agreements in Table 4.14 do not include such conditions.

summary,

shocks or crises

may

conditions. This

relationship

is

entry into force contingent on

ratifying states meeting substantive conditions. This result

the majority

in

is

the

above data support the interpretation

that the

absence of external

be a necessary condition for the use of substantive entry into force

consistent with hypothesis

CM1, which

However, the absence of a perceived
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does not predict a linear

crisis is not a sufficient

condition tor

must be other variables relevant

the use of such conditions. There

decision to

make an agreement’s

entry into force conditional.

Thus, the results of the preceding empirical
suggest that additional refinement

to suggest that external

restrict eligibility for

to

to negotiators’

is

possible.

support hypothesis

tests

For example, there

is

very

CM

little

1

,

evidence

shocks significantly influence the decision whether or not

membership

in

an agreement. Likewise, there

is

very

but

little

to

evidence

support the claim that negotiators require ratification by relatively fewer parties for

entry into force

when

they are responding to external shocks. Flowever, there

evidence that negotiators do not augment

minimum

strong

participation thresholds for entry into

force with restrictive substantive conditions (as does, for example, the

the

is

Kyoto Protocol

to

UNFCCC).
The

there

is

results

of these

no evidence

requiring a lower

to

tests are similar to those for

hypothesis

RM2.

In this case,

suggest that negotiators respond shared perceptions of crisis by

number of ratifications

for entry into force.

theoretical significance of these findings derives

Rather, the primary

from the evidence

that negotiators

driven by a shared perception of crisis do not appear to use substantive criteria for entry

into force.

As Table

4.

1

5 shows,

all

of the surveyed agreements incorporating such

conditions were negotiated under non-crisis? ‘normal’ (as opposed to crisis) conditions.

Likewise, no agreements negotiated primarily in response to a perceived crisis used such
conditions.

These

results support the constructivist

argument

that

perceived crises can

override rational institutionalist and realist concerns with free riding and enforcement

problems. Under such circumstances, negotiators will
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feel greater

pressure to “succeed”

in

designing agreements that

while there

may

be concluded and enter into force quickly. In short,

evidence to suggest that crises decisively influence negotiators

is little

response to the question of which states

may

participate in an agreement, there

is

strong

evidence that crises influence negotiators not to require substantial levels of participation

Of course,

for entry into force.

other

perceived crises

ways than membership and

may

participation rules.

influence the design of

These concerns

MEAs

in

up

will be taken

in

the following chapters.

The second

constructivist hypothesis

(CM2)

expects

that, at least initially,

negotiators will prioritize breadth of participation over depth of cooperation. This

hypothesis derives from a broader model of international cooperation, in which
negotiators seek to

support for action

maximize participation

in a

in a

regime

to build

normative and

political

given issue area before attempting to set specific, binding policies.

This model, generally referred to as the framework convention - protocol approach

to

international environmental law, can be contrasted with a rationalist “sequential”

approach

that

participation

emphasizes the

initial

depth of agreement over breadth of

(Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1998, 398). In

convention - protocol approach prioritizes

initial

short, the

initial

framework

participation over agreement depth,

with the goal of spreading norms and developing political support for deeper cooperation

in the future

prioritizes

by as

many

parties as possible.

In contrast, the sequential

approach

agreement depth over participation, with the goal of persuading new members

to join in the future.

Hypothesis

CM2

is

included in this study because the ideas that underlie

central to constructivist understandings

of multilateral cooperation. Developing
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it

are

satisfactory empirical tests of this hypothesis, however, requires a longitudinal research

design far beyond that required to

flexibility in

MEAs.

In part this

is

test

other hypotheses on membership, delegation, and

on the design and choice of multilateral
politics to questions

CM2

because hypothesis
institutional

forms

provides a bridge from focus

in international

environmental

of the consequences and relative effectiveness of different

institutional designs.

Although a comparative evaluation of the two pathways’ effectiveness
fostering “deep” cooperation lies

beyond

scrutinize the validity of the distinction.

Among

Consequently,

this

test

was not

significant,

test

possible to

between

was conducted

restricted

to

compare

and open agreements.

however

(z

One remaining

is

rules, regardless

that multilateralism, in general, entails

These norms

.782).

no difference

in

membership

of concern

for

consistent with the normative content of

multilateralism identified by Ruggie and described in Chapter

that

is

=

in

restrictive agreements.

choose open membership

depth of cooperation. This expectation

membership and

-.277, p

possibility concerning the constructivist design of

that negotiators will

impartiality

=

study cannot reject the null hypothesis that there

agreement depth between inclusive and

is

between

is

a tradeoff exist

Kruskal-Wallis

AGRDEPTH,

it

surveyed agreements, open and restricted agreements rank almost identically

depth of cooperation. The

rules

Namely, does

A

membership and depth of cooperation?
scores on the ordinal indicator,

the scope of this paper,

in

commitment

to
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This approach expects

norms of nonexclusion and

will be manifest in multilateral

do not provide unequal benefits

3.

to

agreements

members.

that

do not

restrict

possible to arrive at a general estimate of the openness of surveyed

It is

agreements by calculating the percentage of agreements

of the several
the

most

criteria

common

introduced

at the

basis for restricting

that restrict

membership by any

beginning of the chapter. As Table 4.15 shows,

membership among surveyed agreements was

participation in another pre-existing agreement (thirty-seven percent). Since

those pre-exsiting agreements are open, these agreements

effectively

open themselves. The only other

criteria

used

may be
in

considered to be

more than one-fourth of

surveyed agreements were geography and status as a user of the good

Commitment

to particular

economic system barely

none of the surveyed agreements were

most of

in question.

registers as a basis for restriction,

restricted according to

and

form of domestic

government.

Frequenc> of Membership Restrictions

Table 4.16

Membership

Criteria

Participation in

Frequency

Another Agreement

.37

Geographic

.28

Good

.26

Causing Problem

.11

Status as User of a

Role

in

Expertise in Issue Area

Potential to

.06

Help Problem Solving

.06

Domestic Economy

04

Domestic Government

.00

No Membership

.28

The

Criteria

theoretical significance of these findings

is

twofold. First, they support

recent research on that questions the validity of the participation - depth of cooperation
tradeoff in international cooperation (Gilligan 2004). Second,
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membership

restrictions ot

any type - and particularly those based on economic or

MEAs.
may be

This

is

political policy

-

are rare

among

broadly consistent with the view that multilateral environmental politics

characterized by general norms of non-exclusion and impartiality (Ruggie

1993b). While hypothesis

restricted

CM2

is silent

concerning the occasions when negotiators have

membership, the normative content of multilateralism may structure the

environment

in

which design choices are made.

Summary of Findings
The

results

of the empirical analyses of the rational

membership

constructivist hypotheses concerning

are

institutionalist, realist,

summarized

in

and

Table 4.17. To

recap, this study found strong support for both realist hypotheses concerning

membership. Logistic regression shows
predictor of negotiators’ choice of open

that distributional conflict is a significant

membership (RM

1

).

problems are a significant predictor of negotiators’ decision

Similarly, enforcement

to design specific,

substantive criteria for agreements’ entry into legal force (RM2).

This study found mixed support for both constructivist hypotheses concerning

membership.

In

no cases did negotiators respond

specific criteria for entry into force.

to a

perceived crisis by designing

However, unlike distribution or enforcement

problems, crises are not significant predictors of negotiators’ decision (not) to design

such conditions. Furthermore, there

is

no evidence

that negotiators

respond

to crises

by

requiring relatively fewer ratifications for entry into force (thus speeding the process).

With respect

to hypothesis

predictions. There

is

CM2,

this

study finds strong support, but only for half of the

no systematic evidence among surveyed agreements of a tradeoff

between inclusive membership and agreement depth
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However, there

is

evidence that the

overall frequency of membership restrictions

low.

is

divisive (e.g., political or economic) restrictions

Finally, this study

hypotheses.

The

first

is

The frequency of potentially

almost

found only modest support for the two rational

hypothesis (IM1), that membership

benefits are at stake, receives

receives strong support:

nil.

little

is

restricted

institutionalist

when excludable

support for the same reason that hypothesis

membership

restrictions simply are rare

among

agreements. The second hypothesis requires more information to
consider. Nevertheless, the available evidence

is

test

CM2

the surveyed

than this study can

consistent with hypothesis 1M2: states

did not promise to comply prior to entry into force in the face of enforcement problems

and conditional entry into force. This suggests
into force conditions are

governed more by

that the design

a logic

and interpretation of entry

of consequences than by a logic of

appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989). However, a diachronic research design and

information about state preferences are necessary to evaluate hypothesis

The next

I

M2

fully.

section examines these hypotheses in light of specific cases: the

Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution and the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer

These case analyses contributes

to this chapter

by demonstrating whether or not the causal mechanisms specified (or implied) by the
various hypotheses were present. In doing so, these studies

preceding empirical analysis. They

may

may confirm

results

also highlight false positives. That

is,

of the

they

may

help identify whether the positive relationships identified in the empirical analyses are

genuine or spurious. The examination of outliers and negative cases may further help
this

study to identify potential refinements to the hypotheses as well as the limits of the

hypotheses under consideration.
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Summary

Table 4.17

Hyp

of Hypotheses and Findings on

RM1

Membership

Support

Notes

Negotiators will choose inclusive

Strong

Nevertheless, other

membership

Distributional conflict

Description

criteria in

response to

relative gains concerns

is

a significant predictor

of the decision not

to

restrict

membership.

Negotiators will respond to

Strong

/

enforcement problems by choosing

The

factors also influence

the decision to restrict

membership.

s
C/5

QJ

strict criteria for

Mixed

There

severity of

enforcement problems

entry into force.

is

RM2

a significant predictor

of the decision

is

no evidence

that negotiators require

to

use

specific, substantive

number of

a greater

generic ratifications

in

response to

enforcement problems.

entry into force criteria.

When

distributional

Modest

problems are

present, negotiators will not provide

excludable benefits

£
C/5

I

Ml

restrictive

in the

membership

absence of

is

slightly

Not

membership
more

common among

criteria.

agreements

"S

c
o
3

statistically

significant;

would be

more cases

helpful in

analyzing multi-level

that provide

potentially excludable

hypotheses such as
this.

benefits.

C/5

When

S

Modest

confronted with enforcement

promise

IM2

(state) action prior to

/

Weak

Not

Cross tabulations show

problems, negotiators will not

«
C
c

Weak

/

Restricted

an

that negotiators

agreement's entry into legal force

have

not promised “early”

compliance

statistically

significant;

would be

more cases

helpful in

analyzing multi-level

hypotheses such as

QS
this.

Strong

Negotiators will be less likely to
restrict

force

membership or entry

when responding

shocks or perceived

CM

Mixed

/

There

Negotiators do not

into

to external

crises.

is

no evidence

that external shocks

appear to required

influence negotiators’

specific conditions for

decision not to restrict

entry into force
1

responding to

when

crises.

eligibility for

membership

in

MEAs.

£
C/5

>
CJ

When

3

S
O

of participation

over depth of cooperation;

u

approach

CM2

Modest

necessary, negotiators will

prioritize breadth

C/5

this

/

Mixed

Evaluating alternate

Some evidence of

pathways

general norms of

cooperation bridges

to

nonexclusion; no

institutional "design”

deeper cooperation than alternative,

evidence of breadth

and “effectiveness,”

“sequential admission” approaches.

depth tradeoff.

and

to multilateralism sustains

is

a promising area

for future research
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”

Exploring Membership Design: Case Studies
This section supplements the preceding analysis by comparing the negotiation

of entry into force conditions for two pairs of cases: acid rain and stratospheric ozone
depletion.

The object

is

not to choose a representative sample of

environmental agreements but, rather,
relevant differences

among

to illuminate certain

all

multilateral

hypotheses by searching for

similarly structured cases (Mitchell 2006).

The following

four agreements were selected because each involves regulation of air pollution

a large

number of potential (and

actual) participants.

The four agreements

among

that will

be

considered are the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution

(LRTAP) and

the 1985 Protocol on the Reduction of Sulfur Emissions, and the 1985

Vienna Convention

for the Protection of the

These four cases

membership

in

will be

used

to

Ozone Layer and 1987 Montreal

examine the same three

ME As considered in the statistical

negotiators will favor expansive

study.

sets

of hypotheses on

Realism expects

membership when confronted with

Protocol.

that

relative gains

concerns, and will respond to increasing enforcement problems by designing
increasingly strict criteria for entry into force. Rational institutionalism expects that

negotiators facing distributional conflicts will neither offer nor oblige state action prior

to entry into force

Finally, constructivism expects that negotiators will respond to

conflicts of interest with shallower agreements

to

maximize

and lenient

entry into force conditions,

participation and facilitate future consensus building.

Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
Negotiations for the 1979

LRTAP

auspices of the United Nations Economic

Convention were conducted under the

Commission
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for

Europe (ECE), on the heels

of the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation
Initially, at least,

a general desire

Union,

in

Europe (CSCE).

negotiations were driven not by environmental concern but, rather, by

among

in particular,

negotiating parties to further the process of detente.

The Soviet

perceived environmental issues as a more promising area of

opportunity for further diplomatic process than

deciding on the environmental, the

ECE

human

rights or

arms

After

control.

then chose air pollution as the most suitable

candidate for an East- West accord (Levy 1993, 81; Wettestad 2002, 197).

That

LRTAP

fact that states

and

negotiations were conducted under

their delegated representatives

ECE

auspices highlights the

seldom negotiate cooperative

agreements entirely de novo. Usually, negotiated agreements are nested within one or

more

existing institutional structures, the selection of which

Though much

controversy.

existing

is

plausible that such

phenomena

not always without

work on “forum shopping” focuses on

selection of venues for dispute resolution (see, for example,

it

is

the

Busch 1999 ^forthcoming),

are also significant in the negotiation of new

agreements. The negotiation and design of multilateral agreements

is

but one stage in

the larger process of international cooperation.

The
entities

LRTAP

when

it

convention enjoyed nearly universal participation

was concluded

in

November

(2) states

eligible

1979. According to Article 14,1 of the

convention, participation in the agreement was open to

ECE,

among

(

1

)

the

member

states

of the

having consultative status with the ECE, and (3) regional economic

organizations constituted by

Community. Thirty of the

member

states

thirty-three

of the ECE, namely the European

members of the ECE
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at that

time signed the

convention: only Albania, Malta, and Cyprus failed to do so. Additionally, the

convention was signed by Liechtenstein, the Holy See, and the European Community.

LRTAP

Article 16 of the

convention stipulated that

it

would enter

into force

ninety days following the deposit of the twenty-fourth instrument of ratification,

acceptance, approval, or accession. The convention did not specify any further
conditions

(e.g., ratification

for entry into force.

The

by parties accounting for a certain proportion of emissions)

LRTAP

convention entered into legal force on 16 March

1983.

The

LRTAP

convention

itself

denominator” compromise (Chasek

has been described as a “least

et al

2006, 102).

or schedules for emissions reductions. Rather,

reducing transboundary
sharing.

Specific policy

agreement

air pollution

it

It

common

did not contain binding targets

established a collective

norm of

and institutionalized international information-

commitments were deferred

to future protocols to the

in order to secure participation of then “laggard” states such as the United

Kingdom and
At the

the United States.

first

meeting of parties following the convention’s entry into force, the

Nordic countries proposed a protocol

to the

reduce their emission of sulfur dioxide to

was greater support

for such a

convention that would oblige parties

thirty percent

commitment than

to

of 1980 levels by 1993. There

there had been in 1979; the Federal

Republic of Germany, in particular, increasingly supported binding emissions
reductions following widely publicized reports of the acidification of the Black Forest.
Nevertheless, the original core group of “laggard” states led by the U.K. and the U.S

remained opposed

to a

binding protocol (McCormick 1998).
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Although the

first

meeting of parties did not yield agreement on the need for

substantive protocol, a smaller group of committed “pusher” states

coordinate emissions reductions outside of formal

LRTAP

was

institutions.

a

able to

As Chasek

et al

(2006, 103) report:
In an unusual departure from diplomatic tradition, some states
committed themselves formally to larger unilateral reductions,
thus setting the standard by which other states would be judged.
At a conference in Ottawa in March 1984, ten states pledged to
thus forming
reduce sulfur dioxide emissions by 30 percent
.

.

.

the “Thirty Percent Club.”

Although the Thirty Percent Club was not able

agenda on a sulfur protocol

to

gamer

to

LRTAP, and drew enough

universal support,

it

drove the

support to conclude a sulfur

protocol in 1985.

On

9 July 1985, twenty-one states signed the Protocol on the Reduction of

Sulfur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Percent. This protocol

required ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by sixteen parties before

would enter

into force.

Like the

LRTAP

convention, the

first

it

sulfur protocol did not

specify any further substantive, conditions for entry into force.

How

congruent are the

Realist hypotheses on

convention and 1985 sulfur protocol with the

membership? Hypothesis

choose inclusive membership

RM2

LRTAP

criteria in

holds that negotiators will choose

enforcement problems. The acid
hypothesis, and certainly

The negotiations

is

RM1

holds that negotiators will

response to relative gains concerns; hypothesis

strict

rain case

entry into force conditions in response to

probably

is

incongruent with the

first

incongruent with the second

for the original

LRTAP

convention are coded as having

“strongly relevant” conflicts about distributional costs, but “low relevance” of
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enforcement problems

LRTAP

in the

IRD. This

is

because, as previously mentioned, the

convention does not include binding commitments. There

is,

therefore,

incentive to “cheat” or “defect” from the convention. Distributional conflict

is

little

coded as

having been of “medium relevance” to the 1985 sulfur protocol. Likewise,

enforcement problems are coded as having had “medium relevance”
This

is

because there was

to the protocol.

concerning the need for binding commitments

less dispute

in

1985 than there had been in 1979. However, since the protocol entailed such

commitments, there was correspondingly greater incentive

for parties to “cheat”

-

creating relatively greater enforcement problems.

According

to the first Realist hypothesis, since the

LRTAP

negotiations were

characterized by strong distributional conflict, membership in the agreement should be

unrestricted. Thus, this hypothesis

is

unable to explain the decision to conduct

negotiations under the auspices of the

members and

consultative states.

The

ECE, and

to restrict participation to

selection of the

ECE

is

LRTAP

ECE

congruent both with a

problem-definition perspective, and with a “high politics”-detente perspective, but not

with hypothesis

RM

1.

The 1985 protocol used

the

same membership

original protocol, with the additional stipulation that

to the

LRTAP

membership be

criteria as the

restricted to parties

convention. Thus, the protocol's membership criteria are, essentially, an

extension of those established by the convention.

The second

Realist hypothesis expects that the 1985 protocol will contain

relatively strict entry into force conditions,

be an important element of the
entailing

LRTAP

and

that entry into force conditions will not

convention, since the former

“medium” enforcement problems, and
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the latter as entailing

is

characterized as

“low”

enforcement problems. In

1979

LRTAP

fact, the

exact opposite

seventy percent ratification

at

rate.

the time, this

hypothesis

To

57%

a

states.

ECE

equivalent to requiring roughly a

is

ratification rate.

it

required a relatively lower level of

parties

who were

then eligible for

This would not contradict the second Realist

protocol had been designed with a double-trigger

if the

Since the

enter into force, the 1985 sulfur protocol required

by sixteen of the twenty-eight

membership,

enter into force, the

Although the 1985 sulfur protocol presented greater

enforcement problems than did the convention,
participation to enter into force.

To

the case.

convention required ratification by twenty-four

had only thirty-three members

ratification

is

-

that

is,

if

it

specifically required participation by parties accounting for a specific proportion of

However,

sulfur emissions.

with any such

it

criteria.

like the

In fact,

when

1979 convention, the protocol was not designed
the

did so without the participation of the

highest

(UK) 1980

the 1979

second

LRTAP

level

first

sulfur protocol entered into force in 1987,

LRTAP

party with the highest (US) and fourth

of sulfur emissions. Thus there

is

no reason

to

conclude

that

convention and the 1985 sulfur protocol are congruent with the

realist hypothesis.

The

first

rational institutionalist hypothesis

(IM

1

)

expects that negotiators will

not provide excludable benefits without restricting membership.

institutionalist hypothesis

problems will not promise

(IM2) expects

The second

rational

that negotiators confronting distributional

state action prior to entry into force.

The

acid rain case does

not provide leverage on hypothesis IM1, and contradicts hypothesis IM2.

Neither the

benefits to

LRTAP

Convention nor the 1985 sulfur protocol provide excludable

members. Thus, hypothesis IM

simply

1
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is

not applicable here.

Hypothesis

I

M2

is

expects that negotiators will not promise action prior to entry into force. Yet this

precisely what the “Thirty Percent Club” did

became

the 1985 sulfur protocol.

Arguably,

when

trying to

this is mitigated

gamer support

by the

for

what

fact that the club

included leading “victim” states such as the Nordic countries. Yet the “Thirty Percent

Club” also included France, a large Western European
Canada, which had very
to the entry into force

states.

little to

state

by any definition, and

gain absent U.S. participation. Promising action prior

of a sulfur protocol was not a meaningless gesture for these

Rather than states using entry into force conditions as a “tipping point” for

participation with an agreement, this action reflects states using normative standards to

leverage advocacy groups to pressure laggards. Accordingly, the acid rain case

provides no support for the rational institutionalist expectation that negotiators
Finally, the first constructivist hypothesis

less likely to restrict

membership, or

responding primarily

to

choose

to external shocks, or to a

constructivist hypothesis expects that,

when

(CM1

)

may

expects that negotiators will be

entry into force,

strict criteria for

perceived

crisis.

when

The second

necessary, negotiators will prioritize

participation over agreement depth to build support for a greater level of cooperation at

a later date.

CM

1

,

The

acid rain case does not provide significant leverage on hypothesis

and provides

at

best

mixed support

for

CM2.

Although such concern may have been present
negotiations of the 1979

LRTAP

in

some

constituencies,

convention and the 1985 sulfur protocol were not

motivated primarily by an external shock or perceived

had been underway for several years prior

crisis.

to the negotiation

sustain the claim that the negotiation of the convention
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Since monitoring efforts

of

LRTAP,

it

is

hard to

was motivated primarily by

a

shared sense of urgency to respond to an external shock. Even by
significant uncertainty concerning the extent of transboundary

Hypothesis

pollutants.

Hypothesis
participation in the

CM1

CM2

thus offers

LRTAP

The

ratified,

more than

that purpose,

would

prioritize

by nearly every

In that case, the

it

persuaded other

of course, as committed

states

to

in setting

others could be judged. But this approach to cooperation

shows evidence of

It

which seeks

consensus internally. Thus, the evidence for

LRTAP

convention clearly

is

to

an example by which

- identifying

CM2

maximize

the “Thirty

ultimately served

a policy first

and then expanding participation through normative persuasion - stands
the framework-protocol approach,

eligible to

pursuing emissions

change policy.

succeeded

was

announcement by

commitment

states to

In fact, the

state that

negotiation of the 1985 sulfur protocol, however,

Percent Club” initially screened states for their

reductions

movement of airborne

convention over depth of cooperation.

the contrasting “sequential” approach.

979, there remained

help in explaining the acid rain case.

correctly expects that negotiators

convention was signed, and ultimately
participate.

little

1

in contrast to

participation and build

in this case is

mixed. The 1979

congruent with the framework-protocol approach to

cooperation emphasized by Constructivism, as

it

institutionalized the

transboundary pollution, maximized participation, and

norm of reducing

set the stage for future

agreements. The 1985 sulfur protocol does exhibit elements of a sequential approach to
cooperation. Taken together, these two agreements support the conclusion reached

earlier, that

it

is difficult

cooperation by looking

to

compare

at a limited

the implications of alternative

number of static data
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points.

pathways

to

The necessary

dynamic analysis simply
opportunity expand

it

lies

beyond the scope of this study, though

it

presents a great

in the future.

Ozone Depletion
The ozone depletion case focuses on

the regime’s

two founding agreements:

the

1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the 1987 Montreal
Protocol.

closely

The design of the

modeled on

the

international regime for the protection of the

example

set

by the

LRTAP

ozone layer was

Convention and subsequent protocols.

Unlike in the acid ram case, negotiations for an ozone convention and protocol restricting
the use of

CFCs proceeded

the Protection of the

Sweden

to a

simultaneously. The

first

Ozone Layer was submitted by

meeting of the

UNEP Ad Hoc

Draft International Convention for

the delegations

from Finland and

Working Group of Legal and Technical

Experts for the Elaboration of a Global Framework Convention for the Protection of the

Ozone

Layer, held in Stockholm from 20-29 January 1982. Although the

convention articulated a supermajority for the entry into force of amendments

convention (consent by two-thirds of parties),
requirements for the convention

itself.

it

Convention provides

that

it

until the

Meeting documents of the ad hoc working group

Vienna conference

shall enter into force ninety

itself.

Vienna Convention

Article 17 of the

Vienna

days following the deposit of the

twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession.

makes no

to the

bracketed the specific entry into force

for the convention reveal that the entry into force conditions of the

were not seriously considered

draft

first

The Convention

further, specific conditions for entry into force.

Similarly, debate on the Montreal Protocol’s entry into force conditions did not

take place “until near the end of the negotiating process,” (Benedick 1998, 88).
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Unlike

the proposed entry into force conditions of the

Vienna Convention, however, the

proposed Montreal Protocol entry into force conditions proved

The

initial

design of entry into force conditions appeared

in

be very contentious.

to

26 September 1986

publication of the Fifth Revised Draft Protocol on Chlorotluorocarbons

At

this early stage, the clause stipulated

ratification

(UNEP

1986a).

simply that entry into force required the

of nine parties:

This Protocol shall enter into force on the same date as the Convention enters
into

provided

force,

there

that

have been

deposited

nine

ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession to the Protocol

of

instruments

(UNEP

1986a).

The bulk of the negotiation of the Montreal Protocol took place between
December, 1986 and September, 1987. During much of this time,
as entry into force took a backseat to

around the

more substantive concerns,

scientific basis for the Protocol’s

final clause issues

such

as consensus developed

measures (Anderson and Sarma 2002;

Benedick 1998; Haas 1992). From the beginning of the Montreal Protocol negotiations
in

December 1986

April 1987, there

meeting of the ad hoc working group on the Protocol

to the third

was

virtually

no negotiation on the issue of entry into

force.

in

Entry

provisions continued to stipulate a simple conditions: ratification or accession by nine

parties.

At the April 1987 meeting of the working group, an additional clause was inserted
into Article 15 to qualify the

minimum

level

of participation. The revised Article 15

required that the nine ratifying parties account for

controlled substances

(UNEP

requirements significantly

Still, this

1987b). This

made

60%

of global production of the

the Protocol’s entry into force

stricter.

change was not sufficient

feared that an effective protocol

to placate

would require

a

some

negotiating delegations,

much broader

who

participation level than

The United

the stipulated sixty percent of global production.

that entry into force

requirements should be

much

stricter.

argued

States, in particular,

Responding

to

Tolba's informal request for feedback on the third working group meeting

Mostafa
April 1987,

in

the United States argued that:

It

is

important that substantially

the time

of entry

of the major producing nations participate

all

at

In Article 15, the percentage of global production

into force.

required to trigger entry into force should therefore be higher than the sixty

percent figure

We

in the

current text.

are concerned that if the requirement

wait before

will

moving ahead with

assured that other key nations will
process could be delayed.

is

ratify.

If entry

If

into

only sixty percent, key nations

set at

their

ratification

process until they are

each waits for the others, the entire
force will not occur until nations

representing a relatively high percentage of global production ratify, each can
ratify

without concern about being

left

out on a limb carrying

more than

its fair

share of the burden or being required to invoke trade restrictions against major
trading partners

Underlying

US

(UNEP

1987b, 7-8).

concern was the fact that a sixty percent participation threshold would

permit the protocol’s entry into force despite nonparticipation on the part of both the

and the

USSR The

EC

United States clearly was concerned that weak entry into force

requirements could result in the United States bearing a disproportionate share of the

burden of protecting stratospheric ozone.

The United

States

changed

its

negotiating position on entry into force

Montreal conference. According

to

domestic constituencies opposed

to the Protocol, the

Benedick (1998, 89),

in

at the

response to pressure from

United States proposed a ninety

percent participation threshold for entry into force. Significantly, this level was high

enough require participation by

“all four

major blocs:

the

the Soviet Union,

and the United States” (Benedick 1998,

realized that there

would be

trigger entry into force

a tradeoff

between the

level

and the strength of the controls
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to

European Communty, Japan,
89).

Most other countries

of participation required

which

all

to

parties could agree.

As Benedick (1998,

89) explains,

“Many

observers feared that such a requirement could

hold the treaty hostage to Japan or the Soviet Union, which might then weaken the
protocol by extracting other concessions as the price for adherence.”

was resolved through compromise,

ultimately

one

albeit

The disagreement

was much

that

closer to the 1987

provision than to the United States’ proposal of ninety percent. Article 16 of the

Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer stipulated that the
Protocol could enter into force on

1

January 1989

if

it

had been

ratified

economic organizations, collectively accounting

parties or regional

by

at least

eleven

for at least two-thirds

of 1986 estimated global consumption of controlled substances.

How
advanced

congruent

the

ozone case with the Realist hypotheses on membership

Again, hypothesis

earlier?

membership

is

criteria in

RM1

holds that negotiators will choose inclusive

response to relative gains concerns; hypothesis

RM2

holds that

negotiators will choose strict entry into force conditions in response to enforcement

problems. The negotiation of the 1985 Vienna Convention

is

coded as having “low”

relevance of distributional conflict, and “no” significant enforcement problems in the

IRD. This

is

because, from the beginning, negotiators anticipated that the convention

would not include
would be

left to a

specific or binding controls on the production of use of

is

Hypothesis

membership
would not

in the

restrict

this

subsequent protocol on CFCs. Accordingly, the negotiation of the

1987 Montreal Protocol

and the Protocol

CFCs;

is

coded as having “strong” relevance of distributional

conflict,

coded as entailing “medium” enforcement problems.

RM

I

makes no strong prediction about

Vienna Convention

membership

in the

itself,

though

it

the decision to restrict

does suggest

that negotiators

Montreal Protocol. Case evidence
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is

congruent with

these expectations; negotiators did not restrict eligibility for

Convention, and
to

eligibility for

members of the (otherwise
Hypothesis

RM2

membership

unrestricted)

makes no strong

of the Vienna Convention, but expects

in the

membership

Montreal Protocol was restricted only

Vienna Convention.

prediction about the entry into force provisions

that the

Montreal Protocol will contain

conditions for entry into force. Evidence from the ozone case

expectations. Forty-three states participated in the

more

specific conditions

beyond

is

congruent with these

to enter into force.

by parties accounting

Though higher minimum

to enter into legal force

suggested during negotiations

(at

ninety percent of signatories), the

negotiators

is

for at least two-thirds

congruent with

it

CFC

participation thresholds

one point the U.S. suggested requiring

this study’s

contained no

It

also required

of 1986 global

more moderate provision

the

of participation. Though

this generic level

the Montreal Protocol required ratification by only eleven parties,

ratification

fairly strict

March 1985 Vienna conference;

convention required ratification by only twenty parties
additional,

Vienna

in the

consumption

were

ratification

by

actually chosen by

coding of the Montreal Protocol as entailing

only moderately severe enforcement problems.

Once

again, the

first

rational institutionalist hypothesis

(IM1

negotiators will not provide excludable benefits without restricting

accordingly.

The second

rational institutionalist hypothesis

)

expects that

membership

(IM2) expects

that

negotiators confronting distributional problems will not promise state action prior to

entry into force.

The ozone case does not provide leverage on
multilateral environmental agreements,

it

the

first

hypothesis

-

like

many

does not provide excludable benefits - and
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is

.

The United

inconsistent with the second.

- banned

States

-

the leading global producer of CFCs

the use of CFCs in aerosol spray cans prior to the negotiation of the

Convention. This information

may

still

be consistent with a Realist conception of a

powerful state attempting to use multilateral diplomacy to internationalize

domestic policy. Likewise,

it

may

Vienna

its

own.

also be consistent with a constructivist account

emphasizing the development of consensual knowledge.

It is

not consistent, however,

with the utilitarian contracting models emphasized by rational institutionalism.

The significance of the ozone case

depends

for the first constructivist hypothesis

largely on one’s understanding of the significance of the 1985 discovery of the

“ozone

hole” over Antarctica. This study codes the salience of a shared perception of crisis for
the negotiation of the Montreal Protocol as “low,”

and “very low

/

none”

for the

negotiation of the Vienna Convention. This corresponds to the belief that the discovery

of the hole

in

negotiations.

1985 did not decisively drive the agenda for the Montreal Protocol

As Benedick (1998,

any clear signal for policy-makers

from certain
Since

CFCs were

that

this

19) points out, “the

at that time.

ozone hole did not

Scientists in

.

.
,

provide

1986 and 1987 were

far

involved in Antarctica.”

study finds that a shared perception of crisis was not decisive in

driving the negotiation of the Montreal Protocol, that agreement’s use of substantive

conditions for entry into force does not contradict hypothesis

CM

1

.

If,

on the other

hand, one interprets the discovery of the ozone hole as constituting such a shock or

crisis (e.g., Litfin 1994),

force conditions

then the Montreal Protocol's incorporation of

would contradict

CM1

155

strict

entry into

The ozone ease provides

mixed evidence

similarly

for hypothesis

CM2.

Although the 1985 Vienna Convention and the 1987 Montreal Protocol are examples of
the

framework convention - protocol approach

do not necessarily

implies a causal process whereby an

initial

which deeper cooperation

map

same

convention

is

terribly well

at the

possible.

onto

the choice of the

Negotiations for the Vienna

to cooperation.

Convention and Montreal Protocol proceeded

Montreal Protocol do not

environmental law, they

- depth tradeoff that underlies

reflect the breadth

framework convention - protocol path

diffusion, after

to international

is

time.

Hypothesis

struck to assist

CM2

norm

The Vienna Convention and

this template.

Conclusions
This chapter has argued that negotiators choose membership rules

two

related questions:

“Who may

cooperation to succeed.

To

participate?” and

“Who must

in

response to

participate?” for

find answers to these questions, this chapter has described

and examined hypotheses from three theoretical orientations: rational institutionalism,
realism, and constructivism.

Finally,

it

has discussed two specific cases that point to

The

the strengths, and limits, of those hypotheses.

in a

pre-existing institutional framework (the

LRTAP

UNECE)

Convention was negotiated

that strongly influenced the

design of membership rules. This case reminds us that cooperative arrangements need
not be created de novo, and that agreements are not always entirely self-contained.

Nevertheless,

discussion.

The

is

possible to

first is that

fared relatively well

hypothesis

it

RM2,

the

two

draw several conclusions from

realist

the foregoing

hypotheses concerning membership have

Both receive strong empirical support

in the aggregate,

although

that negotiators will design strict entry into force conditions in
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response to relative gains concerns,

may

usefully be restated. There

is little

evidence to

suggest that negotiators respond to enforcement problems by requiring a relatively

greater

number of ratifications

for entry into force.

On

the other hand, enforcement

problems are a significant predictor of negotiators' decision
substantive criteria concerning the

agreement

minimum

level

of participation necessary for an

to enter into force.

In contrast, the

two

rational institutionalist hypotheses receive only

empirical support in the aggregate.

The surveyed agreements

hypothesis IM1, that negotiators will restrict membership
potentially excludable benefits.

and

is

However,

in

modest

are consistent with

agreements providing

the strength of the association

is

fairly

weak,

not statistically significant. Similarly, the surveyed agreements are reasonably

consistent with IM2, that negotiators will use

create

to design specific,

bandwagonmg,

minimum

participation thresholds to

or “tipping” effects on participation. Specifically, the finding

that negotiating states did not

promise “early compliance” with agreements

incorporating substantive entry into force conditions

However, further research

is

consistent with hypothesis IM2.

will be necessary to establish

whether the timing and

sequence of ratifications of a given agreement reflects the creation of entry into force
“tipping” points.

Finally, the

two constructivist hypotheses concerning membership receive

modest support. With respect

to the question

only partial support for hypothesis
inclusive

CM2,

of who

may

participate, this study finds

that negotiators initially will prioritize

membership over depth of cooperation. There

is

no evidence of a tradeoff

between inclusiveness of membership and depth of cooperation. Thus,
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this

study

cannot find support for constructivist arguments that expect negotiators to maximize
participation at the expense of agreement depth,

possible platform for

among

restrictions

norm

diffusion.

necessary, to build the strongest

However, the low frequency of membership

the surveyed agreements

exclusion and impartiality that Ruggie

when

(

is

norms of non-

consistent with the

1993b) has characterized as constitutive of

multilateralism.

With respect
partial support for

conditions

hypothesis

when responding

CM1,

that negotiators will

to a perceived crisis.

that negotiators require ratification

this

of who must participate,

to the question

this

avoid

study found only

strict

entry into force

In such cases, there

is

no evidence

by a relatively lower number of states. However,

study does find that, in crisis situations, negotiators are significantly less likely to

design substantive conditions for entry into force (as

in the

Kyoto Protocol and

MARPOL).
Viewed

together,

it

is

not surprising that the realist and constructivist

hypotheses concerning membership appear to receive more support than do the rational
institutionalist hypotheses.

largely

work

in the

same

The

realist

and constructivist hypotheses examined here

direction; both provide reasons

why one

should expect

negotiators to avoid restricting membership. Constructivists expect negotiators to

choose open membership because of concerns for legitimacy. Realists expect
negotiators will

inclusive

dampen

membership

the severity of distributional conflict

rules.

predictions concerning

when

that

by adopting open or

Rational institutionalism, on the other hand, tends to offer

negotiators will restrict
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membership -

for

example, when

providing excludable benefits. In practice, the surveyed agreements are quite open

their

approach

to

in

membership.

Accordingly, the best interpretation of the evidence seems to be that negotiators
tend to follow multilateral norms of non-exclusion, unless they have compelling reason

to

do otherwise. Empirical support

inclusive

membership

for hypothesis

IRD

as

much

that negotiators

as

it

1

,

that negotiators design

rules in response to distribution problems,

generally low frequency of restrictive

the

RM

membership among

reflects strategic design.

design

strict

On

the

may

simply reflect the

agreements surveyed

the other hand, hypothesis

in

RM2,

entry into force rules in response to relative gains

concerns, provides the clearest explanation for negotiators’ decision to use substantive

criteria for entry into force.
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CHAPTER

5

ELEMENTS OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: DELEGATION

On

June

5,

1992, the Convention on Biological Diversity

(CBD) was opened

for

signature at the United Nations Conference of Environment and Development,

culminating a negotiating process that was initiated

1987 decision by the Governing

in a

Council of the United Nations Environment Programme

The

February, 1991

CBD

specifies a

(UNEP) and began

number of policy-oriented goals

to

in earnest in

promote

its

three goals of promoting “the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of

its

components and

(Art.

1

).

the fair

The Convention

and equitable sharing of benefits arising from

also created an institutional

[its]

framework within which the

contracting parties could delegate resources and functional responsibilities to

efficiently achieve the substantive ends

The
creating

1

)

CBD
a

more

of the agreement.

includes several different delegations of functional responsibilities,

Conference of Parties (COP)

to serve as the

Convention's governing

organization (Art. 23), 2) a standing body to provide scientific advice to

(Art. 25); 3) a

utilization”

permanent

secretariat to provide information to the

COP

member

and

states

to coordinate

with other international organizations (Art. 24); 4) a financial mechanism to provide
financial resources to developing state

clearinghouse (Art.

Not
example,

is

all

members

(Art. 2

1

);

and 5) an information

18).

delegations involve equal levels of resources or authority.

an institutionalized forum for bargaining
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among member

The COP,

states.

The

for

Secretariat

and the standing body for

degree of discretion from

member

scientific advice, in contrast, operate with

some

states.

This delegation raises several questions for the design of multilateral

environmental agreements (MEAs).

Why

do

states

sometimes look

implementing agreements? What factors encourage or discourage
authority to independent parties, and

specific functions

do

how much

states entrust to

for ‘outside' help in

states to delegate

authority do states delegate?

such parties? What difference does

chapter explores delegation in multilateral environmental agreements.

a

number of dimensions of delegation

in

MEAs.

Next,

it

it

What

make? This

First,

it

identifies

describes those dimensions and

provides descriptive statistics concerning delegation in the agreements surveyed in this
study. Third,

it

evaluates the hypotheses concerning delegation set forth in Chapter

Finally, the chapter discusses these findings in light

3.

of two specific cases.

Delegation and Multilateral Agreements
In this study delegation refers to the

multilateral environmental

degree to which states negotiating a

agreement formally confer functional responsibilities,

resources, and programmatic authority

on a

third parties (such as intergovernmental

organizations, expert committees, tribunals, and the like). This project adopts the

definition used in

Kenneth Abbott

have been granted authority
disputes; and (possibly) to

to

et al

(2000, 17), “delegation means that third parties

implement,

make

interpret,

further rules.”

and apply the

Among

rules; to resolve

these various aspects of

delegation, Abbott et al (2000, 32) identify two dimensions of significant variation:

dispute resolution and rule making.
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On

the first dimension, dispute resolution, the

most highly delegated forms of

dispute resolution are formal judicial bodies (e.g., courts, tribunals, or other arbitral

institutions) possessing general jurisdiction

binding decision making power. Abbott

over activities covered by an agreement, and

et al

(2000a, 32)

list

a

number of other

descending order of delegation:

institutional forms, in

Establishment of formal courts possessing general jurisdiction and binding decision-

making authority

(greatest delegation);

Establishment of formal courts with limited, or

strictly

consensual jurisdiction;

Use of binding ad hoc arbitration;
Use of nonbinding arbitration;
Provision of mediation services;

Providing a forum for institutionalized bargaining;
Pure political bargaining (least delegation)

Within the “legalization” framework delegation
(Abbott

et al

2000a, 3

1 ).

Vague and indeterminate

interpretation and application than

is

closely related to “precision”

rules permit greater discretion in

do specific and determinate ones. By

itself,

such

imprecision reflects low legalization; states remain free to interpret the very rules that

were meant

when

the

to

govern them

power

Imprecise agreements

to interpret rules

is

may

nevertheless be highly legalized

delegated to a third party. While this study does not

follow the legalization project in considering precision as a “top-level” variable of

institutional design,

it

accounts for precision as an aspect delegation.

The second dimension of delegation described by Abbott
making and implementation. While

how

authority

is

is

rule

where and

delegated in a multilateral agreement, the rule making and

summarize variation along
rules,

(2000a, 32)

the dispute resolution dimension captures

implementation dimension captures what authority

Binding

et al

this

dimension

in

is

delegated

Abbott

et al

descending order of delegation:

with centralized enforcement provisions;
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(2000a, 32)

Binding

rules,

with consensual enforcement and withdrawal provisions;

Binding rules with decentralized enforcement;
Coordination of standards;

Monitoring and publicity of compliance;
Confidential monitoring;

Normative or aspirational statements;

Forum

for negotiating

In this study, the variable, “delegation,” captures: (1

to a multilateral

agreement have granted authority

)

whether and how the parties

to a third party,

and

(2) the extent

and

character of the authority that they have transferred. These can be referred to as the

“structure” of delegation and the “substance” of delegation (the labels are Raustiala’s

(2005), although his usage

slightly different than the

is

directs attention to negotiators’ use

organizations to

manage

one used here). The

first

aspect

and creation of intergovernmental bodies and

the implementation of agreements.

The second aspect

directs

attention to the specific functions delegated to such organizations, as well as the authority

that

such organizations have

framework of delegation,
in

MEAs, drawn from

Chapter

the

in carrying out their

this

delegated functions. Using this

chapter evaluates several hypotheses concerning delegation

competing

literatures

on international cooperation reviewed

2.

Dimensions of Delegation

in

However, before evaluating these propositions,
indicators of delegation discussed in Chapter 3.

5.1
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MEAs
it

will

be helpful to review the

These are summarized below

in

Table

in

Table

5.1

Indicator

SECRETAR

Indicators of Delegation (continued on the next page)

Measurement
Nominal

Description

What

type of secretariat did the agreement

establish (if any)?

SECINDEP

Ordinal
(0-4)

How

independent

member

is

the secretariat

from

states?

ADMNFUND

Nominal

How

are administrative functions funded?

PROGFUND

Nominal

How

are

ENFORCE

Ordinal
(0-2)

AGRSCOPE

Ordinal

0-5)

AGRDEPTH

Ordinal
(1-5)

PROGRAMS

Nominal

To what

programmatic

Dichotomous
(0-1)

RESEARCH

Dichotomous
(0-1)

EXPERTAD

Dichotomous

‘enforcement’ approach to rule compliance?

Is

the agreement

of issues
Is

it

narrow

Dichotomous

in

terms of the scope

addresses 9

the agreement deep in terms of the substance

of its rules and obligations?

What

types of programmatic activities (if any)

Does the agreement
problem causes and
Does

the

set forth?

centralize monitoring of
effects? (yes/no)

agreement centralize research

into a

problem's causes and effects? (yes/no)

Does

the

advice to

CMPLYMON

funded?

extent does the agreement adopt an

does the agreement

MONPROB

activities

Does

agreement provide expert policy

member

states? (yes/no)

the agreement centralize compliance

monitoring? (yes/no)

RVWIMPLM

Dichotomous

Does

the agreement centralize implementation

review 9 (yes/no)

VERIFY

Dichotomous

Does

the agreement centralize verification of

compliance? (yes/no)
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Table

Indicators of Delegation (continued)

5.1

Indicator

Measurement

Description

FTXFER

Dichotomous

Does

management

the agreement centralize the

of financial/technological transfers? (yes/no)

REVWADEQ

Dichotomous

CLRNGHSE

Dichotomous

Does the agreement centralize review of
adequacy of commitments?
Does the agreement centralize problem-related
information?

Delegation in a multilateral environmental agreement
structure and substance.

With respect

is

to the former, negotiators

a function of

its

must decide how

a

cooperative arrangement will be administered. Usually this involves the creation of a
secretariat to oversee agreement-related activities.

of deciding

who

will serve as the secretarial

Negotiators have the further option

body of an agreement, and how much

discretion they will possess in administering an agreement’s rules. Finally, negotiators

must make the

(related) decision

of how

to

fund an agreement’s secretariat. This

choice has definite implications for the independence or discretion of the secretariat.

The second category of choices concerns

MEAs

Delegation in

influenced significantly by negotiators’ decisions concerning the scope, depth,

is

and substance of an agreement’s
In

new

the substance of the agreement.

rules.

choosing whether or not

to establish a secretariat, negotiators

can establish a

organization for the specific purpose of administering the agreement, or entrust

such responsibilities

member

states, or

cases, negotiators

to

even

may

an existing intergovernmental organization (IGO), one or more
to a

nongovernmental organization (NGO). Finally,

in

some

decide against delegating any administrative power. These

options are represented by the indicator

SECRET AR As
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Figure 5

1

shows, nearly half

of the

MEAs

surveyed

in this study establish a

new

organization for the specific

purpose of administering the agreement. The second largest category of agreements
assigns secretarial duties to an existing intergovernmental organization. This category

includes agreements such as protocols that delegate administrative duties to the

secretariat

of the convention or parent agreement. In very few cases did negotiators

delegate secretarial authority to states or nongovernmental organizations. Similarly,
negotiators failed to delegate such authority in only a few cases.

Figure

Delegation of Secretarial Duties

5.1

secretariat

(SECRETAR)

functions

functions

Type of Secretariat

Negotiators also must decide

the secretariat

SECINDEP,

how much

authority and discretion to entrust to

Figure 5.2 presents the distribution of surveyed agreements on

a qualitative

measure of how independent
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secretariats are

from the

member

states

of an agreement.

delegated secretarial duties give

A

clear majority of the surveyed agreements that

little

or no independence to the secretariat.

Nevertheless, a substantial minority of agreements delegated moderate to strong levels

of independence.

No

secretariats

were coded as completely independent from member

states.

Figure 5.2

Independence of Secretariat (SECINI)EP)

Mot

Weakly

Moderately

independent

independent

at all

independent

Independence

Another way

in

through their decision

activities.

to

more able

secretariats’

independence

is

fund secretariats’ administrative and programmatic

The more resources

those resources, the

Completely
independent

of Secretariat

which negotiators can influence

how

Strongly
independent

that a secretariat has,

and the more reliable the source of

a secretariat will be to exercise discretion in carrying out
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its

functions. Conversely, the smaller and

more unstable

the funding, the less capable a

secretariat will be of exercising discretion.

show

Figures 5.3 and 5.4

the (nonexclusive) frequency of different funding

sources for administrative and programmatic activities

The majority of secretariats

among

the surveyed agreements.

on nationally-funded and implemented programs, as

rely

well as on the use of national facilities, for both administrative and programmatic

activities.

member

Very few possess

states are relatively

for funding

programmatic

a distinct, independent source of revenue.

more prevalent

activities.

significant source of funding for

for funding administrative activities than

In-kind contributions are a relatively more

programmatic

Sources of Administrative

Figure 5.3

Nationally

Funded
Activities

Relies

on

Relies

National
Contributions

Contribute

Assessments on

on

Assessments
and
Voluntary

Relies

/

activities than for administrative ones.

Secretarial Funding

on

Relies

on In

Assessments

Kind

on Members

Contributions

Has Ovm
Distmct
Source of
Revenue

Relies

on

Voluntary
Contributions

Does Hot
Rely on
Distmct
Source of

Revenue

Funding

for Administrative Functions (Including Secretariat)
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Sources of Funding for Programmatic Activities

Figure 5.4

Nationally

Relies cat

Raided

National
Contributions

Activities
Cantribitte

an In
Kind
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Contributions

Relies oat
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and Wluntoty
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Relies cat

Assessments

cat

Members

Voluntary
Contributions

Contributions

Does Not Rely
Has Own
on Distinct
Distant Source
Source of
of Revenue
Revenue

Fmiding For Programmatic Activities

The second aspect of delegation

that negotiators

can control

an agreement. This study examines substance in three ways.

specific

programmatic

activities prescribed

or scope of an agreement’s rules.

Finally,

First,

by MEAs. Second,

it

it

is

it

the substance of

considers the

considers the breadth

considers the depth of an agreement’s

rules.

Figure 5.5 shows the frequency with which negotiators delegated several

programmatic functions among the surveyed multilateral environmental agreements.

Among

surveyed agreements, the most commonly delegated activity

expert advice by the secretariat back to the

member

of expert advice, four other tasks were delegated
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in

states

is

the provision

In addition to the

of

provision

more than half of the surveyed

agreements: monitoring causes and effects of the problem, conducting research into the
causes and effects of a problem, monitoring compliance, and implementation review.

Less frequently delegated tasks include: reviewing the adequacy of an agreement’s

commitments, information management, and verification of compliance. Only

a small

minority of surveyed agreements tasked administrative bodies with coordinating
financial and/or technological transfers.

Figure 5.5

Delegated Programs

Expert

Monitor

Advice

problem
causes and

Research
problem
causes and

effects

effects

Compliance

Review

monitoring

implementation

Programmatic

Review
Information
adequacy of management
commitments

Verify

compliance

Financial and
or technology

transfer

activities delegated

Next, this study considers the scope of multilateral agreements as part of their
substance. Specific, programmatic functions comprise one important aspect of an

agreement’s substance. However,

we can

get a fuller picture by considering also the
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scope of activity that negotiators address. This study uses a qualitative indicator,

AGRSCOPE,

to represent the

As Figure

5.6 shows,

more than half are coded

scope of

MEAs.

most of the surveyed agreements

either as “broad” or “very broad” in functional scope.

few agreements decompose problems, addressing them

Figure 5.6

are quite broad in scope;

in a

Only

narrow fashion.

Agreement Scope

Agreement Scope

Finally, this study addresses the depth

indicator,

AGRDEPTH,

of cooperation.

to represent the depth

It

uses the qualitative

of cooperation achieved in

MEAs. As

Figure 5.7 shows, the surveyed agreements are roughly normally distributed with
respect the depth of their rules. Surveyed agreements were most frequently coded as

having ‘medium' depth, and include substantial numbers of both shallow or very
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a

shallow and deep agreements. Only a few agreements, however, were coded as ‘very
deep’.

It is

worth noting

that this indicator

is

operationalized generously; ‘medium’

depth represents the qualitative judgment that an agreement’s rules are

somewhat adequate

for

managing

at least

the issue at hand. Also, depth of agreement does not

imply commitment to a particular approach

to

enforcement. Strategies for enforcement

are considered in Chapter 6.

Figure 5.7

Agreement Depth

Agreement Depth

The next

what we know about delegation options by analyzing

step

is

to apply

them

in

terms of the hypotheses outlined
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in

Chapter

3.

)

Evaluating* Hypotheses on Delegation

This section provides an empirical analysis of the several hypotheses concerning
delegation in

Table

MEAs, which

summarized below

in

Table

5.2.

Hypotheses Concerning Delegation

5.2

Theoretical

are

Approach

Rational

Label

Hypothesis

ID1

Delegation increases with the severity of the

enforcement problem.

Institutionalism

Rational

ID2

Institutionalism

Rational

ID3

ID4

Delegation increases with the number of

When

the salience of distributional conflict

is

low, delegation increases with complexity.

Institutionalism

Realism

of the world.

relevant parties.

Institutionalism

Rational

Delegation increases with uncertainty about the
state

RD1

Multilateral agreements will be characterized by

very low levels of delegation.

Realism

RD2

High

levels of delegation will be strongly

when
own

associated with high levels of precision

hegemon seeks

to internationalize its

a

domestic or foreign policy.
Constructivism

CD1

Multilateral agreements will be characterized by

generally high levels of delegation with respect
to rule interpretation

Constructivism

C'D2

and adjudication.

Delegation will increase

groups participate

when

(

1

)

in negotiations

expert

by (2)

supplying policy knowledge to state parties.

Rational Institutionalist Hypotheses on Delegation

Rational institutionalist theory yields a broad array of expectations concerning

the use of delegation in institutional design.

The
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first institutionalist

hypothesis (ID1

expects that negotiators will delegate more authority

when

enforcement problems because

in their interest to participate in

cooperative arrangements

states will not find

it

they are faced with

such situations unless enforcement problems are

in

adequately addressed. Those agreements that are successfully concluded

such problems will be those that delegate power as necessary
enforcement. This study evaluates

to

ease concerns about

hypothesis by determining whether there

this

of

in spite

is

a

(ENFORCEM)

positive relationship between the indicator of enforcement problems

and the several indicators of delegation.

The

first

step

is

to

compare

the severity of enforcement problems in

negotiations that created different types of secretariats. Since the distribution of

ENFORCEM

is

nonnormal,

analysis of variance

among

a

Kruskal-Wallis

(ANOVA). The

that

lowest

mean rank concerning

ENFORCEM

The second highest-ranking group consisted of

ENFORCEM

delegated secretarial duties to one

Since the

mean ranks on

were consistent with hypothesis 1D1. The

an existing 1GO. The group with the

that delegated secretarial duties to

statistically significant,

rather than an

ranked highest on enforcement problems were those that

established an independent secretariat.

agreements

was conducted

differences in

the different types of secretariats

surveyed agreements

test

(4,

member

consisted of agreements that simply

However, these

state.

N=53) = 4.901 p =
,

to

groups were aggregated and a Mann- Whitney
these agreements were associated with

for

an existing

U

were not

.298.

mean ranks on enforcement problems

independent secretariat and those delegating

results

test

agreements establishing an

IGO were

was conducted

very similar, these

to find

whether

more severe enforcement problems than were
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agreements that simply delegated secretarial duties to one member. Again the mean
ranks were consistent with hypothesis ID

1.537, p

=

though the

1 ,

test

was not

significant (z

=

-

.124).

As mentioned
whether and

how

earlier,

delegation cannot be explained solely by the decision

to create a secretariat.

independence entrusted

a function also of the degree of

It is

to a secretariat to

administer a cooperative arrangement.

Therefore, this study tests hypothesis ID1 in a second way. by examining the

relationship

between SECINDEP, a qualitative measure of how independent

secretariats are

from

their

member

states,

and

ENFORCEM.

Table 5.3 presents a cross tabulation of these two indicators. Contrary
hypothesis ID1

’s

expectations, there

is

essentially

to

no relationship between enforcement

problems and the independence of secretariats (Somers’ d

actually

is

weakly negative,

-042 while p = .746).

Table 5.3

Cross tabulation of

SECINDEP

ENFORCEM

x

Severity of Enforcement Problems

Very

none

Medium

low

strong

strong

Total

Independence

Not

0

4

1

3

9

of secretariat

Weakly independent

0

4

7

4

2

17

Moderately independent

1

0

2

4

2

9

\

0

4

2

0

7

3

4

17

11

7

42

at all

independent

Strongly Independent
Total

|

Directional Measures

Asymp
Value

Somers' d

SECINDEP Dependent

Finally, the third

way

-

Std Error

042

to test hypothesis

ID1

is

to

-.324

Approx. Sig

746

examine relationship between

enforcement problems and the delegation of specific tasks
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Approx. T
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To do

this,

Mann-Whitney

U

tests

were conducted

agreements
5.8.

that do/

Among

to

compare

the severity of enforcement problems for

do not delegate nine tasks

common among

ME As,

shown

in

Figure

these nine tasks, there were significant differences in the distribution of

enforcement problems for only three: monitoring, implementation review, and
verification of compliance.

Enforcement Problems and Monitoring

Figure 5.8

Figure 5.8 shows the difference distributions of

agreements

that delegated

clear difference

that delegate

ENFORCEM

compliance monitoring, and those

between surveyed

that did not.

There

is

a

between the distribution of enforcement problems between agreements

monitoring and those that do not;

in fact, there is

no overlap between the

middle

fifty

percent of each group.

these distributions

is

The

result

statistically significant (z

of the Mann- Whitney

=

-3.004, p

Figure 5.9 shows the difference distributions of

=

the

two

is

ENFORCEM

not as great; there

is

some overlap between

Nevertheless,

it

is

distributions.

test

of ranks for

.003).

agreements that delegated implementation review, and those that did
difference here

U

between surveyed
not.

The

the middle fifty percent of

clear that agreements that delegated

implementation review confronted generally more severe enforcement problems. The
result

(z

=

of the Mann-Whitney

-2.32

Figure 5.9

1

,

p

=

U

test for these distributions, also, is significant,

.02).

Enforcement Problems and Implementation Review
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Figure 5.10 shows the difference distributions of

ENFORCEM

between

surveyed agreements that delegated verification of compliance, and those

The

difference here

is

lower

still,

although

it

that did not.

appears that agreements delegating

compliance verification confronted somewhat more severe enforcement problems. The
result

(z

=

of the Mann- Whitney

U

test for

these distributions

is

only marginally significant,

-1.837, p - .066).

Figure 5.10

In

Enforcement Problems and Compliance Verification

summary, support

for hypothesis 1D1

significant differences in the distribution of

is

modest. The three indicators with

ENFORCEM

correspond to programmatic

functions that rational institutionalists would expect negotiators to choose to mitigate

enforcement problems. That

is,

there

is

evidence
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that, in

designing

MEAs,

negotiators

increasingly focus on monitoring, verification, and implementation review as

enforcement problems become more

Among

salient.

these three, the strongest relationship appears to be between

enforcement problems and monitoring. In contrast,

many agreements

that rank highly

with respect to enforcement problems do not incorporate provisions for verification,

and many agreements

that

rank low on do include provisions for verification.

In

other

words, these results are not entirely inconsistent with the reverse expectation, that
negotiators design verification programs

research on

more cases

when enforcement problems

will be necessary to resolve this

are low.

Further

dilemma with confidence.

Notwithstanding the evidence that enforcement problems lead negotiators to
delegate certain tasks targeted

at

enforcement problems,

this

study has found no

evidence that negotiators endow administrative bodies with greater resources, capacity,
or discretion to implement these programs in response to increasing enforcement

problems. Therefore, this study finds only modest support for hypothesis ID1

The

logic of hypothesis ID1

problems because

means

states

do not

trust

that either states did trust

is

that delegation increases

with enforcement

one another. The modest support found here

each other in negotiating the surveyed agreements, or

they neither trusted each other nor the organizations to which they delegated

administrative tasks. This hypothesis

the solution to the

is

either

wrong about

the

problem

(trust) or

about

problem (delegation).

The second

rational institutionalist hypothesis (ID2)

with uncertainty about the state of the world. Uncertainty

institutionalist theories

is

that delegation increases

may

be more central to

of international cooperation than any other explanatory variable.
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yet

it

is

not always clear exactly what

testing this claim

773) respond to

is

to specify

this

what

is

is

meant by the term. Therefore

the first step in

meant by ‘uncertainty’. Koremenos

et al

(2001a,

problem by drawing a distinction among “uncertainty about others’

behavior,” “uncertainty about preferences,” and “uncertainty about the state of the

world.” Although this distinction lends greater precision to the underlying concept of
uncertainty,

it

nonetheless

is

under-specified for the present task. This study

understands uncertainty about behavior and preferences primarily as constitutive

elements of enforcement problems; these types of uncertainty are significant primarily

because they affect incentives to cheat. Therefore,

this

study focuses on Koremenos,

Lipson. and SnidaTs third usage: uncertainty about the state of the world.

However, even

this restricted

usage

may be

about the state of the world can refer to any or

knowledge about

a specific

all

excessively vague. Uncertainty

of four things; descriptive

problem under consideration,

of that problem, knowledge of policy alternatives, or
choices (see,

e.g.,

Dimitrov 2003). Accordingly,

a cause-effect understanding

to likely

this

consequences of policy

study uses multiple indicators of

uncertainty to capture the several different possible dimensions that have been

identified in the literature

on international environmental

Hypothesis ID2 can be tested in a similar fashion
will

first test

3.5).

to create a secretariat,

and which specific functions

how

to delegate.

looks for differences in the distribution of the uncertainty indicators

between agreements
that create a

to entrust to a secretariat,

Table

to hypothesis ID1; this study

examine influences on the decision whether and how

much independence
The

politics (see

new

that delegate secretarial authority to a

secretariat or delegate to an existing
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IGO.

member

state

and agreements

As

before, this

Unlike hypothesis ID

summarizes the

1

is

,

done by conducting a Mann-Whitney

U

test

of mean ranks.

the results for uncertainty are statistically significant. Table 5.4

test results.

Mann-Whitney U Test of Secretariat Creation and Uncertainty
Mean
Asymp. Sig.

Table 5.4

Rank

Secretariat

COMPLEX

IMPLEMEN

SCIENTIF

OPTIONS

EFFECTS

Member State
IGO or New Secretariat

Member State
IGO or New Secretariat

z

(2-tailed)

11.80

27.54

-2.325

.020

-3.036

.002

-1.702

.089

-1.300

.194

-2.557

.01

8.40
27,91

Member State
IGO or New Secretariat

27.09

Member State
IGO or New Secretariat

26.77

Member State
IGO or New Secretariat

27.67

16.00

18.90

10.60
1

There are strongly significant differences between the two groups with respect
three indicators: complexity of the issue area

policy

(1MPLEMEN), and

options

(COMPLEX),

difficulty of

to

implementing

uncertainty concerning the consequences of different policy

(EFFECTS). There was

a marginally significant difference with respect to

uncertainty concerning the causes and extent of the problem (SCIENTIF). Finally, the
difference between the two types of agreements with respect to uncertainty about the

menu of possible

policy choices

(OPTIONS) was

not statistically significant.

together, these results are consistent with hypothesis ID2,

delegating administrative functions to an existing

reserving such duties to one or

more member

IGO

states,
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Creating a

new

Taken

secretariat or

reflect greater delegation than

and the surveyed agreements

reflecting this choice are associated with significantly greater levels of most dimensions

of uncertainty.

The second

step

is

to test

whether different indicators of uncertainty are

significantly associated with greater levels of delegated discretion, or independence

(SECINDEP). Table

5.5 presents

Somers’ d measures of association for the several

indicators of uncertainty and the dependent variable,

Table 5.5

SECINDEP.

Associations between Secretariat Independence and Uncertainty

Dependent

Independent

Asymp.

Approx.

Somers’ d

Std. Error

Sig.

COMPLEX

SECINDEP

-.046

118

.695

IMPLEMEN

SECINDEP

-.174

.145

.234

SCIENTIF

SECINDEP

-.017

141

.902

OPTION

SECINDEP

.173

.153

.261

EFFECTS

SECINDEP

.105

.134

.437

Three of the five indicators actually have a negative association with
five associations are

weak. None are close

significance. Accordingly, this study finds

to

SECINDEP, and

all

any reasonable threshold of statistical

no evidence

that increases in uncertainty are

associated with increased levels of discretion.

Finally, the third step in evaluating hypothesis

1D2

is

to

examine

uncertainty on negotiators’ decision of which specific tasks to delegate.

specific tasks being

effects

examined

(RESEARCH),

monitoring compliance
verification of

are:

monitoring

(MONPROB),

As

before, the

researching causes and

providing expert advice back to members

(CMPLYMON),

the influence of

(EXPERTAD),

reviewing implementation

(RVWIMPLM),

compliance (VERIFY), managing financial and/or technological transfers
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(FTXFER), reviewing

adequacy of agreement commitments

the

(REVWADEQ),

and

providing a clearinghouse for information about the problem (CLRNGF1SE). Each of
these task-specific indicators

is

coded dichotomously.

Since the literature on international environmental politics suggests that multiple
aspects of uncertainty

dichotomous,

this

may

influence policy, and the outcomes under consideration are

study uses logistic regression to identify whether any of the uncertainty

indicators are significant predictors of negotiators’ decision to delegate the specific tasks

listed

above. Significant predictors were found for five of the nine tasks identified above

(no significant predictors were found

for:

provision of expert advice, implementation

review, verification of compliance, and review of the adequacy of commitments). Table

5.6 presents logistic regression results for these five tasks.

Among

surveyed agreements, the decision

significantly predicted

to delegate

monitoring powers

is

by issue complexity, uncertainty concerning policy options, and

lack of consensus concerning policy options.

Among

these three, uncertainty about

possible policy options has the strongest effect; each unit increase on the five-point

ordinal scale corresponds to increasing odds of delegation by a factor of, roughly, three.

Each increase
corresponds

in issue

complexity (also measured on a five-point ordinal scale)

to increasing

odds of delegation by

a factor

of two. Lack of consensus

concerning the adequacy of policy knowledge (measured dichotomously)
associated with the decision to delegate problem monitoring
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is

also strongly

Table 5.6

Logistic Regression Results for Delegation

Dependent

MONPROB

Independent

B

(a)

Constant

CMPLYMON

Sig.

Odds Ratio

8.112

1

.004

.002

5.107

1

.024

2.039

OPTIONS

1.097

5.652

1

.017

2.996

OPTAGREE

1.480

3.418

1

.064

4.394

Constant

-4.160

6.103

1

.013

.016

COMPLEX

.742

6.099

1

.014

2.101

OPTIONS

.617

2.660

1

.100

1.853

-1.262

.899

1

.343

.571

3.578

1

.059

SCIENTIF

-.840

3.166

1

.075

.432

EFFECTS

.575

2.747

1

.097

1.778

Constant

Constant

COMPLEX
SCIENTIF

EFFAGREE

CLRNGHSE

Df

.712

IMPLEMEN

FTXFER

Wald

-.6111

COMPLEX

RESEARCH

and Uncertainty

Constant

.283
1

.770

-6.106

7.902

1

.005

.002

1.586

10.735

1

.001

4.885

-1.079

3.612

1

.057

.340

.722

4.943

1

.026

2.058

2.775

6.102

1

.014

16.035

OPTAGREE
-1.935
4.796
.029
.144
EFFAGREE
-.882
6.419
.414
.011
COMPLEX, 1MPLEMEN, SCIENTIF, OPTIONS, OPTAGREE, EFFECTS,
on step
1

1

a Variables entered

1:

EFFAGREE.

The decision

to delegate research into the

significantly predicted by issue complexity

causes and effects of problems

is

and uncertainty concerning possible policy

options. Increases in both of these indicators increase the odds of delegation roughly by a

factor of two.

Compliance monitoring

is

predicted by difficulty of implementation, uncertainty

concerning the causes and extent of a problem, and uncertainty concerning policy
consequences. Increasing difficulty of implementation and uncertainty concerning policy

consequences both correspond

to increasing

odds of delegation. Interestingly, though,

increasing uncertainty concerning the general causes and extent of a problem leads to

lower odds of delegation

This suggests either that as general scientific uncertainty about
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an issue increases, negotiators are

less

concerned

monitor compliance with the terms of

to

a specific arrangement or that agreements negotiated amidst great uncertainty include

fewer specific obligations that can be monitored..

among

Negotiators’ decision to establish financial and/or technological transfers

the parties

is

significantly predicted

by issue complexity, uncertainty about the causes or

extent of a problem, and lack of consensus about the consequences of policy options.

Once

again, uncertainty about the causes and extent of a problem leads to substantially

lower odds of negotiators establishing transfers.

among

Two

the parties leads to substantially higher

explanations

when some

may

In contrast, increasing

disagreement

odds of negotiators designing

be given for this combination of effects.

parties favor a particular policy, they

may

One

transfers.

possibility

is

that

attempt to broaden support by

providing financial or technological incentives to more reluctant parties.
Finally, the decision to establish an information clearinghouse

is

strongly

predicted by consensus concerning policy options and consequences. Lack of consensus

in either

area has a strong negative effect on the odds of delegation. Thus,

decisions to establish information clearinghouse are

made

to solidity

appears

it

that

consensus by

disseminating consensual knowledge. They are not created to resolve existing

disagreements

The

many ways

among members.

overall picture that

to that for

emerges from these

hypothesis 1D1

There

is

uncertainty increases in salience, negotiators are

tests

of hypothesis 1D2

strong evidence

more

is

similar in

that, as scientific

likely to create a

new

secretariat or

delegate to an existing 1GO, rather than delegate administrative duties to one or

member

states.

more

Since the assignment of duties to an international body represents greater
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delegation than does assigning tasks directly to

member

study finds

states, this

preliminary support for hypothesis ID2. However, as before, there
negotiators delegate

The

uncertainty.

level

more

is

no evidence

that

discretion to these bodies in response to increasing levels of

strongest evidence of the influence of uncertainty on delegation

of specific, functional tasks. This study found

that different aspects

is at

the

of scientific

uncertainty/knowledge are significant predictors of negotiators’ decision to delegate
several specific tasks.

However,

this

study also found that uncertainty

delegation of some important functions

must be considered

Two

causal

(e.g.,

fails to predict the

provision of expert advice). Other variables

to explain these decisions.

mechanisms underlie hypothesis 1D2.

First, rational institutionalists

expect that negotiators will delegate specific informational functions in response to

scientific uncertainty.

will be

more

in

cases of high uncertainty, negotiators

likely to delegate general guidelines, providing administrators with

discretion to act on

support the

Second, they expect that

first

new

information as

it

becomes

available.

The

test results strongly

causal mechanism. Issue complexity, uncertainty about the causes and

extent of a problem, and uncertainty about possible policy options

predictors of the decision to delegate informational functions.

all

are significant

However,

the results

provide very weak support for the second causal mechanism. Although negotiators are

more

likely to delegate administrative duties to an

conditions of uncertainty, there

is

no evidence

independent organization under

to suggest that they entrust those

organizations with greater levels of discretion and independence.

The

third rational institutionalist hypothesis

delegation will increase with the

number of parties
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on delegation (ID3) expects
to a negotiation.

Two

causal

that

1

mechanisms underlie

this expectation.

First, as the

number of relevant

parties increases,

so do the costs of ad hoc bilateral negotiation. Centralization of negotiations in a

multilateral

forum reduces transaction

costs.

Second, as the number of relevant parties

increases, so, too, does the potential for conflicts of interest

creates incentives for exchange.

Issues are

added

to the

among

Such

parties.

agenda as necessary

to

conflict

permit

such logrolling and gams from exchange.

The

first test

here

is

to

examine the relationship between number and delegation

through the mechanism of exchange. Does the breadth of an agreement’s scope increase
with the

number of relevant

capture these concepts:

parties? This study uses ordinal indicators that directly

NCAUSERS,

contribute to the problem at hand;

the

number of parties

NAFFECT,

the

that are relevant

number of parties

relevant because

AGRSCOPE,

they are significantly affected by the problem at hand; and

because they

the functional

scope of an agreement. Table 5.7 presents a cross tabulation of NAFFECT and

AGRSCOPE.

Table 5.7

Crosstabulation:

AGRSCOPE \ NCAUSERS
NCAUSERS

AGRSCOPE

1-5

6-15

61-120

120+

Total

2

0

1

1

0

0

4

1

2

2

0

0

0

5

3

6

7

0

0

2

18

5

2

0

0

19

1

0

1

1

1

3

Very Narrow

Narrow

Medium
Broad
Very Broad
Total

There

is

16-30

1

1

0

4

7

23

no significant relationship between the

AGRSCOPE

dependent, Somers’ d

=

.08,

31-60

16

NCAUSERS

and

AGRSCOPE

p = .546). This offers no support

hypothesis that agreement scope will increase with the

187

number of relevant

7

53

(with

to the

parties.

Before dismissing

mechanism, however,

Since the mechanism being evaluated

alternative.

be more appropriate
problem.

this causal

It is

to

is

it

is

necessary to consider an

one of ‘gains from exchange’,

may

it

focus on demandeur states than on states responsible for causing a

demandeur

states that drive the

expansion of an agreement’s scope, when

they offer concessions or side payments to the parties responsible for causing the

environmental harm (Mitchell and Keilbach 2001).

The next

NCAUSERS.

step, therefore, is to repeat the analysis, using

N AFFECT

in place

of

Table 5.8 presents the cross tabulation of these indicators. The results are

markedly more consistent with hypothesis ID3. Almost

all

of the agreements coded as

“very narrow” or “narrow” involved fifteen or fewer significantly affected parties. At the
other extreme, most of the agreements coded as “very broad" in scope have high

membership
between

(greater than sixty states).

NAFFECT

and

AGRSCOPE

In fact, there is a significant, positive association

(Somers’ d = .345, p < .001 with

AGRSCOPE

dependent).

Table 5.8

Crosstabulation:

AGRSCOPE x INAFFECT

Very Narrow

Agreement
Scope

31-60

61- 120

120+

Total

4

1

2

0

0

1

0

2

3

0

0

0

0

5

Medium

3

10

1

0

1

3

18

Broad

2

7

2

2

3

3

19

Very Broad

0

1

1

0

4

1

4

2

9

7

23

8

logic behind hypothesis

increase as the

Affected

16-30

Narrow

Total

The

Number
6-15

1-5

number of parties

centralize negotiations in a single

ID3

is

that transaction costs

to a negotiation increases.

forum

As

increases, the heterogeneity of state interests

the

is
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7
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of bilateral diplomacy

This leads states to

number of participating

states

also likely to increase, creating potential

One primary consequence of this

gains from exchange on different issues.

agreements will be broadened

institutionalists

problem

number of parties responsible

not significantly related to the scope of an agreement.

is

should not expect states to have an interest

positively associated with agreement scope

mechanism

The

is

significantly,

perfectly consistent with the causal

fourth rational institutionalist hypothesis (1D4)

when

belief that especially

expects

in negotiating a solution to a

specified above.

with complexity

It

is

for causing a

Rational

does not affect them. That the number of affected states

that

that

accommodate such exchanges.

not surprising, then, that the

It is

problem

to

is

that, in the

simply will find

it

distributional

complex

is that

delegation increases

problems are low. This hypothesis

rests

on the

issues entail particularly high transaction costs for states.

absence of significant distributional conflict, negotiating states

more

efficient to delegate rule

making or standard

setting authority

body, rather than acquire the expertise necessary to accomplish those

to an outside

tasks themselves.

The
ranks on

scoring

first test

of this hypothesis was to conduct a Rruskal-Wallis

COMPLEX, among different

“medium”

creating

when

new

COMPLEX
member

SECRETAR. Only

If

test, in

high complexity leads negotiators to favor greater

distributional conflict

secretariats

of mean

agreements

or lower on distributional conflict were selected for the

keeping with hypothesis 1D4.
delegation

categories of

test

is

low,

and those delegating

we would
to

expect to find that agreements

IGOs would

score higher on

than agreements that simply assigned administrative duties to one or

states.

Table 5.9 presents the mean ranks

189

more

kruskal-Wallis Test of Ranks: Type of Secretariat and Complexity

Table 5.9

SECRETAR

COMPLEX

N

None

Member

state

19.00

2

3.5

9

15.17

12

13.96

performs

secretariat's functions

IGO performs

secretariat's

functions

Agreement

establishes

independent secretariat
Total

The

Mean Rank
5

28

test results are

strongly consistent with hypothesis 1D4. Twenty-eight

agreements rank “medium” or lower on distributional
with the highest average rank on

COMPLEX

conflict.

Among

all.

The next highest-ranking groups delegated

existing

IGO

or created a new, independent secretariat to

secretarial functions to an

manage implementation of the

agreement. The lowest-ranking group on

COMPLEX

member

statistically significant,

p

=

Further testing on

.132.

that the various

A

However, the

more cases

assigned secretarial duties to a

(3,

N=28) =

5.607,

will be necessary to reject the null hypothesis

groups have the same distribution of COMPLEX.

second

secretariat

was not

test

group

delegated no administrative or secretarial

duties at

state.

these, the

test

of hypothesis ID4

independence and the

level

is

to

measure the association between the

level

of

of complexity of the problem addressed by the

agreement. Again, only cases scoring “medium” or lower on distributional conflict will

be selected for the

test.

If the

hypothesis

between problem complexity and
observed association

is

level

correct, there should be a positive association

is

of independence entrusted

negative, Somers' d

However, the association

is

=

-.321 with

not statistically significant (p

190

to the secretariat.

SECINDEP
=

.106).

dependent.

The

In

summary,

the support these tests offer hypothesis !D4

is

Among

very modest.

surveyed agreements ranking low on distributional conflict, negotiators only assigned
administrative duties to a

member

state in

agreements governing relatively simple

problems. Surveyed agreements governing more complex problems assigned secretarial
duties to an

IGO

or created a

new

secretariat.

The surveyed agreements governing

most complex problems did not delegate any administrative
while hypothesis ID4

is

these results

is

There

may be

a ceiling of complexity

above which negotiators are

any administrative functions or power

weak due

is

This suggests that

correct to expect that increasing complexity generally leads to

greater delegation, there

reluctant to delegate

tasks.

to the

no evidence

Moreover, confidence

low significance of the Kruskal-Wallis

that greater

complexity

is

test (p

=

was negative, suggesting

substantial authority over

complex

that negotiators

issues.

associated with delegation of

The

logic behind hypothesis

1D4

is

may be

=

two

reluctant to delegate

Again, confidence

given the low significance of the association (p

in

.132).

greater discretion or independence. In fact, the observed association between the

variables

the

in this result

must be weak,

.106).

that states will find

it

more

efficient to

delegate highly complex tasks to third parties, rather than incur the cost of acquiring

sufficient expertise to

this relationship to

consequences

perform those tasks themselves. Rational

institutionalists expect

hold unless the activity in question has significant distributional

that implicate national interests.

The

theoretical significance of the

weak

empirical results in this area suggests one of two explanations. Either states do not find
as costly to develop expertise as hypothesis

ID4 suggests, or
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states generally

do not

it

accompany

the delegation of highly

complex tasks with delegation of significant

independence or discretion.
Realist Hypotheses on Delegation

The

MEAs

first realist

will be low.

hypothesis on delegation (RD1)

States should retain most, if not

policy making. Independent secretariats should be

serve minor operational needs in

some

all,

is

states

occurs

may

when

of delegation

in

authority over decisions and

uncommon. They may be

created to

cases, but even in these, control over

consequential decision making should remain with states.

to this

that levels

The one expected exception

negotiations are driven by a hegemon. In these cases, dominant

trade on the perceived legitimacy of international organizations; they

may

delegate authority (at least symbolically) to a secretariat, so long as that authority

precisely circumscribed,

hegemon. Controlling

making

for

is

the secretariat’s actions are predictable for the

hegemonic influence over negotiations,

then,

we would

expect to find a strong positive correlation between the delegation of decision making
authority and the specificity of precision of agreements.

The
with

descriptive statistics reviewed earlier in this Chapter accord fairly well

realist expectations.

Although

of the agreements considered

in this

realists

would be surprised

study created an independent secretariat, they

correctly anticipate that secretariat independence

secretariat

was coded

to find that nearly half

as being fully independent

is

generally quite low. Not a single

from

its

member

states.

Realist

expectations find further support from the type of functional activities delegated in

MEAs. The two

least frequently

transfers and verification

delegated activities, managing financial/technological

of compliance, are also the most potentially intrusive
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activities.

may

The

third least frequent activity,

be a threat to sovereignty

if

it

reviewing adequacy of commitments, also

questions states’ policy preferences (especially those

of a hegemon).
After reviewing the descriptive data,

dampening influence on delegation

seems plausible

it

in international

that sovereignty exerts a

agreements. However,

RD1

has no

explanation for those agreements that do feature significant levels of delegation, and

these exceptions are sufficiently

explanatory forces

may

concerns will dampen

be

at

common

that

work. Realists

one

may

is

forced to

wonder what other

correctly expect that sovereignty

states’ willingness to delegate

resources or power. But

sovereignty concerns do not preclude delegation. The task for realists, then,

develop a more precise account of the conditions under which delegation

The second

realist

hypothesis concerning delegation (RD2)

expects that delegation will be highly precise

hegemonic negotiators may choose
to

in

more

to

likely.

precise;

hegemonic multilateralism. That

to delegate functions to

reap the benefits of legitimacy that these organizations

actors will limit the discretion and

is

is

is

it

is,

independent organizations,

may

possess.

autonomy of these organizations by

But hegemonic
precisely

defining the boundaries of delegation

A

linear regression analysis

was conducted

to further evaluate

hypothesis RD2.

Several stepwise regressions in search of causes of precisely defined boundaries of
delegation demonstrated both a high collinearity between indicators of

Table 3.3) and the continued salience of one indicator,
captures whether control over multilateral outcomes

a small

group of states.

HEGEMON

is

HEGEMON,

hegemony

(see

an indicator that

was dominated by

a single state or

a strong indicator of precision, as the regression
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results

below show. There

hegemon and
the variable

is

between the

the precision of delegation, with an R~ of .234. This

a significant predictor

The

variation in rule precision.

Table 5.10

a significant relationship

is

of precision,

results are

Linear Regression of

it

in

Standardized

Coefficients

Coefficients

Std. Error

.622

.038

HEGEMON

.216

.057

while

HEGEMON

on

B

that,

Table 5.10.

Unstandardized

(Constant)

means

of such a

only explains a modest part of the

summarized

PRECISE

activity

Beta

.484

l

Sig-

16.230

.000

3.830

.000

Dependent Variable: PRECISE

Another way

to test

from an ordinal measure

hypothesis

to a

RD2

is

to transform the indicator

dichotomous one. The original coding of

HEGEMON

HEGEMON

uses an ordinal scale to capture varying degrees of hegemonic control over negotiation
processes. However, the hypothesis

measurement. Rather,
precision.

it

is

not specified to take advantage of ordinal

simply predicts

For present purposes, then,

dichotomous indicator by

that

hegemony

HEGEMON

will

make

a difference in rule

can be transformed into a

treating the original values of “strongly

dominated” and

“very strongly dominated” as indicating hegemonic control over negotiations, and

lower values as corresponding

to lack

all

of hegemonic control.

Figure 5 .11 presents the distribution of rule precision for agreements that were,

and were

not, driven

by hegemonic control, Rule precision

hegemonic agreements than

in

=

clearly higher in

non-hegemonic agreements; there

the middle fifty percent of each distribution

test the statistical significance

is

A Mann- Whitney U

of the difference. The

.001
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test

was

is

no overlap between

test

was conducted

significant, z

=

to

-3.470, p

1

Figure

Distribution of

5.1

These

PRECISE

by

HEGEMON

results provide significant support for hypothesis

RD2. Nearly

half of

surveyed agreements were the product of a multilateral process dominated by a

hegemonic

actor.

those negotiated

negotiations

show

that

it

is

These agreements were, on average, significantly more precise than

among

relative equals.

a significant predictor

does not by

itself

However, while hegemonic control over

of increased rule precision, regression results

determine whether rules will be vague or precise. Other

explanatory variables would need to be added to build a model with such predictive

power.
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Constructivist Hypotheses on Delegation

The

first

delegation in

a

constructivist hypothesis

MEAs will

on delegation (CD1

)

expects that levels of

be generally high because multilateralism,

nonnative commitment to principled behavior. Ruggie

(

in general, in entails

1993b) specifically points

to

principles of non-exclusion and impartiality. Thus, the institution of multilateralism

favors cooperative arrangements designed to promote shared notions of legitimacy

more

than individual gain. Cooperative arrangements thus should favor delegation of

administrative duties to disinterested inter-governmental bodies, rather than to self-

interested

member

states.

Furthermore, hypothesis

CD1

expects that negotiators will

entrust administrative and secretarial bodies with discretion in carrying out their

activities.

Lower

to impartiality

As

this

levels

of independence, in contrast, would reflect a lower commitment

and legitimacy by negotiators.
study showed earlier, the great majority of surveyed agreements delegate

administrative/secretarial duties to an existing

IGO

or create a new, independent

organization. Very few assign such responsibilities to a

is

consistent with hypothesis

independence entrusted
the funding patterns

CD1, CD1

is

to secretariats, as

shown

in

member

state.

While

undermined by the generally low

shown

in Figure 5.2.

This

is

this pattern

levels

of

underscored by

Figures 5.3 and 5.4. Negotiators generally do not delegate

sufficient resources for secretariats to carry out independently their assigned

administrative duties and programmatic activities.

Rather, they are to a significant extent

kept dependent on the use of national resources and infrastructure. In summary, evidence

in support

of hypothesis

CD1 may

be characterized as broad, but

thin.

Although

negotiators generally delegate administrative responsibilities to an international
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organization, rather than a

member

state,

they do not generally delegate significant

resources or discretion to those organizations.

While hypothesis CD1

directs attention to the influence

the second constructivist hypothesis

and knowledge

on delegation focuses on the power of uncertainty

to influence multilateral delegation.

Constructivist

influence of epistemic communities and social learning yields a

precise causal

mechanisms

(e.g.,

when

work on

the

number of fairly

Haas 1993; Haas and Haas 1995, 2002). Specifically,

the second constructivist hypothesis

increase

of norms of legitimacy,

on delegation (CD2) expects

that delegation will

expert groups participate in the design of agreements by providing

policy relevant knowledge to states.

This study has already shown that the cognitive setting within which
institutional design takes place

can influence design choices. Agreements concerning

issues perceived by negotiators as especially

complex are more

relatively

more

likely to

involve delegation. In explaining this phenomenon, rational institutionalists point to
the efficiency of delegation as a response to transaction costs. This relationship

is

also

expected by some constructivists, although for a slightly different reason. States require
causal knowledge to connect preferences to policy choices. Uncertainty disrupts this

process. States thus have a motivation to seek

knowledge

Delegation to external bodies, especially those recognized

is

one way for

states to

The discovery

reduce uncertainty (see,

that

e.g.,

to reduce uncertainty.

to

have

scientific expertise,

Haas 1993).

complexity interacts with (the absence of) distributional

conflict in influencing greater delegation, then,

is

equally consistent with constructivist

explanations of multilateral environmental cooperation
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One way

to

)udge whether the

constructivist explanation

is

more persuasive than

favored by rational institutionalists
the specific causal

is to

the transaction costs explanation

search for the presence of factors necessary for

mechanisms emphasized by

constructivists.

In this case, that

means

controlling for the active role of international science-based groups in the negotiation

and design of an agreement.

In this study, such participation

INTSCI. Additionally, the

indicator

is

represented by the

constructivist explanation directs attention not to

the presence of complexity or uncertainty in general, but, rather, to the extent of policy-

relevant

knowledge available

examined

to states.

earlier, the constructivist

distributional conflict.

Like the rational institutionalist hypothesis

explanation highlights the importance of low

In the constructivist account, significant distributional conflict

can short-circuit the influence of uncertainty; even when states are uncertain about the
nature and complexity of an issue, the knowledge that certain policies impose

substantially greater costs than others

may

provide policy makers with sufficient

information to form policy preferences.
Finally, in testing the constructivist account described above,

it

is

important to

use an indicator of delegation that accords with constructivist usage. Constructivist

accounts emphasizing the role of epistemic communities and learning expect generally
expect that these factors combine to produce agreements with relatively greater

delegation.

For example, Haas and Haas

problem solving, as opposed

complex

issues.

to

(

1995) stress that learning promotes holistic

maximizing ‘easy' gains through the de-coupling of

Thus, for constructivists, scope follows from learning, not logrolling.

Therefore, the indicator

AGRDEPTH

is

measures the range of rules adopted explicitly
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preferable to

AGRSCOPE

in reference to the

problem

because

at

hand

it

Higher values on
solving.

a

Lower

this indicator

correspond to more holistic approaches to problem

scores correspond to partial approaches that

may

leave

some

aspects of

problem unaddressed.
Measuring the correlation between expert

scientific groups' influence

and

agreement depth, while controlling for distributional concerns and policy-relevant

knowledge, could be done by creating a multi-layered cross-tabulation. At
however, there simply are not enough cases

in the

Instead, ordinal logistic regression will be used to

depth.

Indicators will be

removed

via

backward

will include all theoretically relevant indicators.

this stage,

database to justify such an approach

model

.

the determinants of agreement

selection.

That

At subsequent

is,

the initial

model

iterations, the least

significant indicator will be dropped, until only significant ones remain.

The

initial

model

DISTCONF
SCIENTIF

for

AGRDEPTH

includes:

(distributional conflict during negotiations);

(uncertainty concerning the causes and extent of a problem);

OPTIONS (uncertainty concerning possible policy options)
EFFECTS (uncertainty concerning the full consequences of different
NATSCI (participation by national-level scientific associations)
INTSCI

policy options)

(participation by international scientific organizations)

EXPERTAD (provision of expert advice to states)
SHOCKNEG (relevance of perceived shock or crisis
Through

five iterations, five indicators

significant predictors of

(p=0.831),

NATSCI

The most

agreement depth:

in

driving negotiating agenda)

were eliminated as not being

DISTCONF

(p=0.874),

statistically

EFFECTS

(p=0 ,793), INTSCI (p=0.400), and SCIENTIF (p=0. 140)

significant influence

on agreement depth

is

OPTIONS,

uncertainty

concerning policy options. Increasing uncertainty of options has a strong negative
effect

on agreement depth

positive influence

Two

other factors mitigate this effect

on agreement depth

is

EXPERTAD,
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The most

significant

provision of expert advice

This

1

predictor also has the largest effect, nearly 2

SHOCKNEG,

SHOCKNEG
Table

7%

greater odds of agreement depth.

negotiating agenda driven perceived shocks or crises, also has a positive

on agreement depth, though

effect

1

correspond

5.1

1

it

is

roughly a

to

substantially smaller, unit increases in

61%

increase odds.

presents the final ordinal logistic regression model of agreement

depth.

Table

Ordered

5.1

AGRDEPTH

Odds Ratio

EXPERTAD
SHOCKNEG

Std.

3.1695

1.9272

1.90

.6095

.4417

1.73

0.083

.4418

.1402

-2.57

0.010

1

OPTIONS

Model of Agreement Depth
Error
z
P> z|

Logistic Regression

While the above model of agreement depth
constructivist hypothesis,

qualification

does not, by

is

that the

itself,

it

0.058

offers substantial support to the

presence of scientific

INGOs

lead to deeper agreements. This

participation can be selected

when

The explanatory power

may

be because expert group

negotiating parties hold well-defined preferences. In

earliest to be

attributed to these indicators,

qualification

is

that policy uncertainty

may

dropped from

however, seems

captured by the relatively more precise indicator of expert advice,

The second

first

and/or transnational networks

any event, indicators of such participation were among the
the model.

The

also offers a couple of qualifications.

to

be

EXPERT AD

not always function as a

necessary condition for the positive association between expert advice and agreement

depth.

The data here show

that, in

some

cases, expert advice has a mitigating effect

on

the overall negative effect of policy uncertainty.

It is

necessary to note one final caution in interpreting these results. Although

distributional conflict did not have a statistically significant influence
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on agreement

depth, one should be careful before excluding

it

The

as a relevant influence.

conventional view in rational institutionalist literature on international cooperation
that unresolved distributional

The

problems can have

on policy windows

literature

(e.g.,

a negative effect

on agreement depth.

Kingdon 1984) has similar expectations

concerning distributional conflict, as does the constructivist literature on learning

Haas 2001).

However, as Fearon (1998) suggests,

agreement depth can lead

is

it

may

(e.g.,

also be possible that greater

to greater distributional conflict, as the increased stakes give

parties a greater interest in securing favorable terms of cooperation

A

priority for

future research should be to refine the concept of distribution problems to facilitate

careful specification of these different causal mechanisms.

Summary of Findings
The

results

of the empirical analyses of rational

constructivist hypotheses concerning delegation are

To

recap, this study found generally

modest support

institutionalist, realist,

summarized below

in

and

Table 5.12,

for the rational institutionalist

hypotheses. Empirical analysis shows that negotiators responded to enforcement

problems by delegating tasks consistent with an ‘enforcement’ approach

However, they

still

to

compliance

favored less intrusive measures, such as monitoring, over more

intrusive verification policies.

Moreover, there

is little

evidence that negotiators

delegated significantly more discretion to third parties to administer or enforce rules.

Likewise, under conditions of uncertainty, negotiators were more likely to delegate
informational tasks than otherwise.

Once

again, however, there

is

negotiators delegated greater discretion in response to uncertainty.

which expects

that the

no evidence

that

Hypothesis ID3,

scope of an agreement will increase with the number of relevant
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parties, received the strongest empirical support

of the four rational

hypotheses. Additionally, this study found evidence that that the
affected by a problem

is

more appropriate

countries responsible for causing

it.

institutionalist

number of countries

definition of ‘relevance’ than the

Finally, hypothesis

ID4 received very

number of
little

support. This study found no systematic evidence that states delegated certain activities

that they

realism,

found too costly to do themselves. Another explanation, more consistent with

is

that states

may

be reluctant to delegate complex tasks to third parties that

they do not have the capacity or knowledge to control.

This study found somewhat stronger support for the two

realist

hypotheses.

The

surveyed agreements are characterized by generally low levels of delegation. There are
several exceptions, however,

which hypothesis RD1

is

ill-equipped to explain. This

study also found substantial support for hypothesis RD2, which expects that agreements
created through hegemonic negotiations

delegate

little, if

may

feature nominal delegation, but will

any, discretion to interpret agreement rules. States’ unexpected

reluctance to delegate rule making/interpreting authority in highly complex issue areas,

described above in relation to hypothesis 1D4,

is

entirely consistent with the second

realist hypothesis.

Finally, this study found

mixed support

for the constructivist hypotheses.

found broad, but very shallow empirical support for hypothesis

CD1

.

It

Negotiators

frequently created new, independent organizations to administer multilateral agreements,
or delegated such functions to existing IGOs. However, they generally did not delegate

substantial resources of discretion in applying agreement rules.

In contrast, this

found strong support for the second constructivist hypothesis, CD2,
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that expert

study

group

participation can lead to greater levels of delegation.

Specifically, this study found that

the provision of expert advice and, to a lesser extent, the existence

of a shared perception

of crisis both are significant predictors of increased depth of cooperation. However,
participation

by national and international

significantly predict greater depth

states

may

select such groups

may

scientific

groups does not, by

of cooperation. This suggests
to participate

that, in

itself,

some

cases,

on the basis of their expected

contributions.

The next

section examines these hypotheses in light of specific cases: the 1979

Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (C’LRTAP) and the 1989 Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal.

As mentioned previously

in

Chapter

4, this analysis contributes to the

chapter

by demonstrating whether or not the causal mechanisms specified (or implied) by various
hypotheses were present. In doing so, these studies

may

strengthen the results of the

preceding empirical analysis. The two cases both deal with regulation and management

of environmental externalities. They complement each other

in that

one governs an area

characterized at the time by relatively high levels of scientific uncertainty while the other

governs an activity characterized by

little

scientific uncertainty.
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Summary

Table 5.12

Hyp
101

1D2

of Hypotheses and Findings on Delegation

Description

Support

Notes

Delegation increases with

Modest

There

the severity of the

Negotiators are more likely

that negotiators

enforcement problem.

to delegate specific

delegate greater

functions related to

resources or

Delegation increases with

Moderate.

There

uncertainty about the state

Negotiators are more likely

that negotiators

of the world.

is

is

no evidence

no evidence

to delegate administrative

delegate greater

duties to an international

resources or

body. Uncertainty

discretion in response

a

is

significant predictor of

to uncertainty.

several programmatic
activities.

ID3

Delegation increases with
the

number of relevant

Fairly Strong.

The number of

There

affected parties

is

a significant,

positive relationship

parties.

between number of parties
and agreement scope.

ID4

causing the problem.

Delegation increases with

Weak.

Beyond

complexity when

Negotiators appear more

point, greater

likely to delegate

complexity appears to

administrative powers, but

dampen

distributional conflict

is

low.

tests

KOI

is

more important than
the number of parties

were not

a certain

delegation.

significant.

Multilateral agreements

Moderate.

Unable

generally will be

Negotiators do not generally

contradictory cases.

characterized by low levels

delegate a significant

of delegation.

amount of resources

account for

to

or

discretion.

R02

Under hegemony, high

Strong.

levels of delegation will be

Hegemony

hegemony

leaves

accompanied by high

predictor of greater rule

substantial

amount of

levels of rule precision.

precision.

variance in precision

Nevertheless,
is

a significant

unexplained.

CD1

Multilateral agreements

Weak

Empirical support

will feature generally high

Although negotiators often

broad but shallow.

levels

of delegation.

delegate administrative

Many

duties to an international

cases exist.

is

contradictory

body, they generally
delegate

CD2

little

discretion.

Delegation will increase

Strong

Participation by

when

Provision of expert advice

scientific

has the largest positive

not by itself a reliable

expert groups

by supplying
policy knowledge to states.

participate

effect

on agreement depth

groups

is

predictor of

Shared perceptions of crisis

increasing agreement

also have a positive effect

depth.
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Exploring Delegation: Case Studies

Before drawing

MEAs,
a

it

is

final

conclusions about these hypotheses concerning delegation in

useful to consider

how

they perform in specific cases. This section examines

number of hypotheses on delegation

as they relate to the 1979 Convention on

Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) and
Control of Transboundary
the preceding analysis,

section

is

the 1989 Basel

Convention on the

Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their

which privileged generalizability and external

primarily concerned with internal validity.

It

multilateral agreements are representative of

all

Disposal.

it

Unlike

validity, this

does not address

hypotheses mentioned throughout the chapter. Nor does

Long-

all

the

claim that these two

MEAs. To

the contrary, these

two were

chosen specifically because they address similar issues: problems resulting from the
transboundary movement of environmentally harmful substances. Controlling for general

problem-type

in this

variation along

more

way allows

the case studies to focus

more

directly on the effects of

precise dimensions (Mitchell 2006).

Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
Negotiations for the 1979

LRTAP

Convention were conducted under the

auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), on the heels of
the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security

at least,

desire

and Cooperation

in

Europe (CSCE).

Initially,

negotiations were driven not by environmental concern but, rather, by a general

among

negotiating parties to further the process of detente.

particular, perceived

The Soviet Union,

in

environmental issues as presenting more favorable opportunities for

furthering detente than

human

rights or

arms control. After deciding on the
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environmental, the
East- West accord

ECE

then chose air pollution as the most suitable candidate for an

(Levy 1993, 81; Wettestad 2002,

197).

Realists attach special importance to the presence of hegemony in the negotiation

of multilateral agreements. Although the Soviet Union and the United States participated
in

LRTAP

spheres of power,

described

powers

hegemonic influence within

negotiations, and both possessed

in the

LRTAP

second

was not

realist

significantly influenced

diplomacy. Although

specific

hegemony),

it

in the

manner

hypothesis (RD2). That hypothesis expects hegemonic

to select multilateral negotiations

bilateral

by hegemony

their respective

this

scores only

when

they offer a

more

agreement scores “high” on

“medium” on

hegemon). As Levy and Wettestad suggest,

HEGEMON

this is likely

due

efficient alternative to

ISSUEHEG

(issue-

(negotiations dominated by

to the

presence of

incentives to reach agreement beyond those that existed specifically with respect to air

pollution.

Since

realists

LRTAP was

not a process of unilateral statecraft with a multilateral veneer,

would expect sovereignty concerns

or at most

weak

delegation.

On

to prevent the

agreement from employing no

this count, they are correct.

Parties to the 1979

LRTAP

convention did not significantly delegate political authority. They did not create a
separate administrative secretariat (although they did create a quasi-secretarial Executive

Body). Instead, they delegated administrative power to the ECE’s Environment and

Human

Settlements division. For

its

part, this

body “has remained

creation, with five professional staff members”

ECE’s Air

(Levy 1993,

84).

rather small since

Not surprisingly,

its

the

Pollution Unit serves mostly to facilitate and coordinate further negotiations,

delegating programmatic tasks to the individual states themselves (Levy 1993, 84).
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LRTAP

Although the

convention employed consensual decision making rules,

it

did not delegate asymmetric control over policy decisions. Although consensual decision

of veto power among

rules entail decentralization

formal use of veto power moot (Levy 1993).

was

to coordinate national research (Art. 7)

When

the

LRTAP

parties, voluntary

What

and

the 1979

LRTAP

convention did do

information exchange (Art.

facilitate

Convention was negotiated,

compliance rendered

air pollution

was

a highly

8).

complex

problem, involving significant uncertainty with respect both to the extent of the problem

(how

far

does

implement measures

The

to

reduce emissions, and

salience of these uncertainties

Article 7 (Research and

a)

and the policy options

air pollution travel?)

is

how

(

stresses the

will

it

cost to

successful will they be?).

immediately apparent

Development)

how much

need

in the text

of the Convention.

for the parties to develop:

Existing and proposed technologies for reducing emissions of
sulfur

compounds and

technical and

other major air pollutants, including the

economic

feasibility,

and environmental

consequences;
b)

Instrumentation and other techniques for monitoring and

measuring emission

rates

and ambient concentrations of air

pollutants;

c)

Improved models for a

better understanding of the transmission

of long-range transboundary

However,

it

air pollutants;

difficult to interpret these

is

substantial delegation.

Agreeing

programmatic

to coordinate nationally

equivalent to delegating resources and responsibilities to

LRTAP’s

principal air pollution monitoring program,

was established
to say that

as an

EMEP

was

OECD program a

less effective than

it

a third party

if

is

not

Moreover,

predated the Convention;

LRTAP

could have been
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evidence of

conducted research

EMEP,

year prior to the

activities as

it

Convention. This

is

it

not

had been created de novo

by LRTAP. Rather, the point

merely descriptive.

is

national policy, not a delegation of

At

this point,

delegation and

it

is

LRTAP

represents a coordination of

it.

possible to evaluate several additional hypotheses concerning

LRTAP. Hypothesis

1D1 expects that delegation will increase with the

salience of enforcement problems; parties will create enforcement

free-riding.

LRTAP

scores only “low” on

ENFORCEM,

relevance enforcement problems for an agreement. This

Convention

itself

mechanisms

the primary indicator of the

largely because the

is

only committed parties to search for ways to reduce

specific emissions

programs and

targets

were reserved

Convention. Absent such requirements, there was
defect from the Convention

itself.

Thus, the

LRTAP

air pollution;

for subsequent protocols to the

little

LRTAP

to prevent

incentive for parties to renege or

framework agreement

is

consistent

with 1D1

Hypothesis 1D2 expects that specific forms of delegation will increase with

LRTAP

uncertainty.

provides modest support for this hypothesis. Although the

negotiating parties certainly recognized the importance of coordination, they did not

create a strong secretariat to facilitate or

support

chapter.

is

manage such

coordination.

for the dimensional understanding of uncertainty

Levy (1993) observes

air pollution

that

new knowledge about

advanced

a

1977

OECD

earlier in the

the nature of the

does travel significant distances) allowed states

For example,

The strongest

to

problem

begin to form preferences.

report on transboundary air pollution classified countries

according to whether they were primarily importers or exporters of

air pollution.

even though there remained substantial uncertainty concerning policy options and
there

(i.e.,

was no longer much uncertainty about

the distributive

208

consequences of

Thus,

effects,

transboundary

air pollution.

Although each

some were dramatically more vulnerable

UK,

for instance,

some

is less

Europe

from

its

own

Prevailing winds

more responsible than

make

the

than, say, the Soviet Union.

air pollution,

The

than others to transboundary pollution.

vulnerable to transboundary pollution than

states are substantially

pollution.

state suffered

UK

Thus,

a

more

is

Sweden. Likewise,

others for creating transboundary

significant source of such pollution in

LRTAP

is

even more consistent with

hypothesis ID4.

The

third rational institutional hypothesis, 1D3, holds that delegation will increase

with the number of relevant parties, as states create the policy linkages necessary to
support broad participation.

seems

to contradict

it.

delegation necessary to

LRTAP

LRTAP
manage

consequences of transboundary

payments

offers

little

support for this hypothesis and, in

fact,

exhibits neither a broad functional scope nor the level of

it.

Despite the presence of clear distributional

air pollution,

to secure the participation

LRTAP

of reluctant

nonparticipation problem by delegating very

did not need to use formal side

states.

little

Instead,

LRTAP

sidestepped the

power and by placing very few

demands on members.
Hypothesis C'D2 focuses on uncertainty and the significance of expert groups
the negotiation of multilateral agreements.

The Convention was negotiated
was meaningful

(RAINS)
87).

With LRTAP,

the conditions

11ASA contributed

of different policy interventions on

air pollution

Yet the Convention did not delegate substantial authority and did not

substantial

commitments.

It

were present

against a background of policy uncertainty, and there

participation by at least one expert group,

to simulate effects

all

in

a

model

(Levy 1993,

entail

appears that while policy uncertainty and expert group
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>

participation facilitate delegation, they should not be understood as sufficient causes of

delegation. In this case,

it

seems

likely that

policy uncertainty. Furthermore, although

scientific organization,

community

it

may

enough

IIASA

distributional

fits

consequences mitigated

the description of an expert

not possess the particular qualities that enable an epistemic

to exert policy influence.

specified well

known

to explain the

In

summary,

LRTAP

then, hypothesis

CD2 may

not be

case.

Basel Convention

Problems associated with the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes

became

a

prominent international concern

in the

1980s, following negative publicity

surrounding a number of cases. Developing countries,
such trade to curb the growing practice by firms

in

in particular,

wished

to regulate

developed countries of simply

exporting toxic wastes to avoid domestic environmental regulations.

The

origins of the international hazardous waste regime predate the Basel

Convention; The Organization of African Unity, the European Community, and the

OECD each

had adopted more limited measures earlier

in the

decade, as had a number of

individual countries. These measures were significant in keeping the transboundary

movement of hazardous waste on

the international agenda. Nevertheless, a truly global

regime was necessary to coordinate policies among

states.

In 1987,

UNEP

Executive

Director Mostafa Tolba started the negotiation process that culminated in the 1989 Basel

Convention. This section examines the extent of delegation in the Basel Convention

light

in

of the several hypotheses described above.

The

realist

hypothesis concerning hegemonic multilateralism (RD2)

applicable here. Hypothesis

RD2

is

not

expects that hegemonic actors will act multilaterally to
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internationalize their preferred policies.

However,

in this case, the

major

fault lines in

negotiations were not between a single hegemonic state or a handful of powerful states.

The Negotiations were conducted between two broad

coalitions:

developed

states that

preferred looser regulation of hazardous waste shipments, and developing states that

preferred stricter regulations.

The
hegemonic

Realist hypothesis that does apply here

is

the general expectation that, absent

(RD1

action, multilateral agreements will not entail substantial delegation

Evidence on

this

count

is

).

mixed. Developing states unsuccessfully advocated the

creation of a strong secretariat, with sufficient financial resources to implement financial

and technology
secretariat,

per

were unwilling
financial

Although developed

transfers.

states did not object to the creation

se, they did object to the creation

to

commit

and technology

of an independent

secretariat,

of a

and they

significant financial resources to funding a secretariat or

transfers.

existing international organization

programmatic responsibilities

is

Instead, they preferred to locate a secretariat in an

(Hampson

also mixed.

1995, 286). Likewise, delegation of

The 1989 Convention does not delegate

significant resources or authority toward centralized monitoring of international

shipments. Similarly,

it

does not delegate significant authority or resources

rules, leaving responsibility to individual

member

states.

The Convention

to

enforce

explicitly

recognizes the need for financial and technological transfers, but reserves implementation

of such programs

to future

amendment. However,

the

Convention does provide for

voluntary, binding arbitration of disputes. In cases where

all

parties to a dispute

submit to arbitration, the Convention delegates dispute resolution to the ICJ

summary,

if

do not

In

the Basel Convention’s delegation of resources and political authority

is

not

substantial, neither

is it trivial.

Although there was no relevant hegemon

Basel

in the

negotiations, the negotiating coalitions were strongly asymmetrical in resources.

Not

surprisingly, the enforcement problems surrounding the Basel

similarly moderate;

it

scores

specific financial obligations

factors

“medium” on

the indicator

Convention are

ENFORCEM. The

absence of

and the absence of specific penalties are strong mitigating

on the actual enforcement problem presented by the agreement. Nevertheless,

parties to the

industries,

Convention do commit

and they agree

to

developing legal provisions

to require that

to regulate

domestic

domestic actors obtain prior consent from

relevant importing states before shipping hazardous wastes.

Thus

Convention

the Basel

appears to be consistent with the rational institutionalist hypothesis that delegation
increases with the severity of enforcement problems (1D1

The hypothesis

that delegation increases with uncertainty

especially relevant here.

especially complex.

Likewise, there

relevance of uncertainty to this case

behavior

does not seem

The dangers associated with hazardous waste shipments
is little, if

Private actors

Developing countries with

little

is

movement of hazardous

wastes.

The

largely restricted to uncertainty concerning other

may smuggle

substances or

monitoring capacity

substances, exactly, they are importing.

informed consent between parties

are not

any, uncertainty concerning the proximate

causes of environmental harm in the transboundary

parties’

).

may

make

false declarations.

be uncertain about which

The Basel Convention’s provision

(Art. 6) directly

for prior

responds to such uncertainty.

In

addition, the Convention requires state parties to submit to the Secretariat annual reports

detailing hazardous waste shipments. In this respect, the Basel case

is

consistent with

hypothesis ID2. However, the limited relevance of uncertainty for the transboundary
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movement of hazardous waste

prevents one from drawing more than modest conclusions

on the basis of this case.

The

rational institutionalist hypothesis that delegation increases with the

of relevant parties (ID3) receives
affected by the transboundary

Convention

entails only

little

support. Although the

movement of hazardous wastes

moderate delegation. This suggests

number

number of countries
is

quite large, the Basel

a possible revision

of the

hypothesis. Rational institutionalists expect the scope of agreements, and the ensuing

need for centralized administration, to increase when large numbers of parties are
involved

more

m

a negotiation.

It

presumes

that parties

have individual

parties there are, the broader the range of interests.

interests,

In the case

and

that the

of the Basel

Convention, however, there were basically two coalitions of parties, each one composed

of a group of states possessing mostly shared interests. Therefore, the causal mechanism
underlying the expected relationship (between number and delegation) simply was absent

in this case.

The

final rational institutionalist hypothesis, that delegation increases

complexity when distributional conflict
previously mentioned, transboundary

especially

complex problem

is

low (ID4),

is

entirely irrelevant here.

movements of hazardous waste does

Thus, there

is little

with

As

not pose an

efficiency to be gained by delegating

consideration of the problem to an expert third party. Moreover, the regulation of

hazardous waste shipments presents acute distributional problems, given the polarized
preferences of developed and developing parties. Since parties in both coalitions have

little

difficulty understanding the distributional

even

less incentive to delegate policy

making

consequences of policy options, there

to third parties
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is

The Basel case supports hypothesis C'Dl

.

This hypothesis, again, expects that

agreements influenced by the norm of multilateralism will

Concern

for legitimacy leads parties to

interests,

and

to establish

worth pausing

mechanisms

to note that the

entail significant delegation.

emphasize general principles over specific
for the impartial adjudication of disputes.

two coalitions

in the

Basel negotiation did not disagree

about whether or not regulation was desirable. They disagreed about
regulation

was

that

developed

this

manner,

A

desirable.

why would

wastes - especially

a

were

developed

if that state

to

avoid regulation altogether. Reasoning in

state object to

domestic firms exporting hazardous

is

that

doing so would be inappropriate. Unlike

multilateral environmental agreements, the Basel

science-driven

(Hampson

show

were reasonably capable of preventing such wastes from

being imported? The simple answer

many

how much

purely economistic derivation of preferences would

states’ best interests

It is

1995).

The

Convention was norm-driven, not

issue of hazardous waste transport/dumping gained

prominence on the international agenda precisely because developing and developed
states shared the belief that

such practices were illegitimate. Even though the Convention

does not perfectly reflect the norm of multilateralism described by Ruggie (1993b),
difficult to explain in purely utilitarian

The second
case, for

terms (whether

constructivist hypothesis,

many of the same

it

is

realist or rational institutionalist).

CD2, seems poorly matched

to the Basel

reasons mentioned earlier. Parties to the agreement did not

require expert advice to form policy preferences. Developed and developing countries

alike felt a normative pull toward successfully concluding an agreement.

countries

knew understood

that they

would need

Developing

financial and technical assistance to

effectively assert sovereign control over the importation of hazardous wastes.

214

Developed

states sought to prevent the worst abuses, but without

resources, and without

committing significant financial

compromising international markets

for their comparatively

advanced recycling technologies. With such clear distributional consequences,
have been

difficult for uncertainty to

salient factor.

have significant influence even

However, unlike the more complex problems

loss or climate change, the international

of, for

if

it

would

it

had been a

example, biodiversity

shipment of hazardous wastes

is

conceptually

simple.

In

summary,

the Basel case

greater delegation than realists

is

interesting for a

would expect.

It

number of reasons.

seems

to involve clear

motivations. Uncertainty has limited relevance for the case.

institutionalist expectation that greater

numbers lead

delegation, suggesting a modification to the variable

to

It

It

entails

normative

contradicts the rational

broader agreements with greater

number

to

account for coalitions and

shared interests.

Conclusions
This chapter has argued that delegation in
structure and substance.

The

first

MEAs

can be understood in terms of

its

aspect of delegation, structure, refers to the

organizational forms created or chosen by negotiators to oversee the implementation of

agreement

rules.

The decision

to entrust administrative responsibilities

third party thus reflects delegation

of power

and capacity

The second aspect of delegation

in

in a

MEAs,

substance, refers both to the specific tasks delegated to third parties, and the leeway

provided

to

them by

Two

states to interpret

distinct patterns

and implement agreement

rules.

have emerged in the foregoing discussion.

First,

no

theoretical orientation can claim a convincing victory in explaining delegation in
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MEAs.

Each approach has strengths and weaknesses. Second, considered together, the
hypotheses concerning the substance of delegation receive

much

greater empirical

support than do the hypotheses concerning the structure of delegation.

The empirical
5.12

makes

were mixed

results

clear, this study finds

hypotheses on delegation in

for each theoretical approach.

First, as

Table

only mixed support for the rational institutionalist

MEAs.

This

true within hypotheses, as well as across

is

them. Hypothesis ID 1 which expects delegation to increase with the severity of
,

enforcement problems, received mixed support. There was no significant evidence
enforcement problems influenced the structure of delegation.
substantial evidence that negotiators

implementation review, and

were increasingly

to a lesser extent,

In contrast, there

that

was

likely to delegate monitoring,

compliance verification,

in

response to

enforcement problems. Hypothesis ID2 similarly does a better job of predicting the
substance of delegation

(e.g.,

negotiators’ decision to delegate specific informational

tasks) than the structure of delegation.

Although

it

correctly expects states to create

independent secretariats or delegate to an existing IGO,
since these are the modal responses

uncertainty.

in

response

more

Moreover, there
to uncertainty.

is

among

all

no evidence

this is not a strong statement,

surveyed agreements, regardless of

that negotiators delegate increased discretion

Hypothesis ID3 addresses the substance of delegation

directly than the structure of delegation.

Its

much

expectation that negotiators will design

broader agreements as the number of relevant parties increases also received significant
support.

In contrast, this study

found no support for hypothesis ID4 (delegation increases

with complexity), which addresses the structure of delegation
the substance of delegation.
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much more

directly than

The case discussion generally supports these conclusions, although
possible limitation of hypothesis ID3. Given the

participating in negotiations, hypothesis

Convention

to

be broader than

it

number of relevant countries

ID3 would expect the substance of the Basel

was. The hypothesis assumes that as the number of

among

parties to a negotiation increases, the degree of heterogeneity

parties also

The

increases which, in turn, increases the likelihood of conflicts of interest

degree of preference heterogeneity

in a

given negotiation

is,

circumvent entirely, the causal mechanism implied by
Basel case,

in the

in

actual

of course, an empirical

question. In theory, the formation of negotiating blocs or coalitions can

what happened

points to a

it

this hypothesis.

which countries’ position

dampen, or

This

is

likely

as a net exporter or

importer of hazardous waste led to the formation of straightforward coalitions with
respect to depth of regulation.

Concerning realism, the two hypotheses on delegation receive generally strong
support.

found

Hypothesis

RD1

that negotiators

expects delegation

were much more willing

third parties than this hypothesis

generally delegated

also found

in

little

some support

ME As generally

and few resources,

for hypothesis

RDI

This study

to delegate administrative functions to

would expect. However,

discretion,

will be low.

it

also found negotiators

to these organizations.

in that the least

This study

frequently delegated

functions were also the most intrusive. In short, both the observed structure and

substance of delegation
hypothesis

cases.

RD

1

.

among surveyed agreements were

However,

Hypothesis

RD2

the hypothesis

is

generally consistent with

ill-equipped to account for contradicting

does a better job predicting the structure of delegation than the

substance of delegation, about which

it

is

mute. This study found strong empirical
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support for the hypothesis that negotiations dominated by a hegemonic actor will produce

agreements with relatively precise

rules, permitting little discretion in their interpretation

or implementation.

Again, the case discussion generally supports these conclusions, although they
highlight a potential limitation of hypothesis

RD2. Although empirical

results strongly

support hypothesis RD2, neither case provides an example of hegemonic negotiation.

The chief limitation of hypothesis RD2,

then,

is

that

it

cannot explain with certainty

when

countries with the potential for hegemonic control over negotiations will choose to

exercise that power.

It

can only explain what the likely outcomes will be

if a

hegemon

does, in fact, dominate negotiations.

The

constructivist hypotheses on delegation also receive

rational institutionalism,

which clearly performs

mixed support. Unlike

better at explaining the substance of

delegation than the structure, or realism, which performs better at explaining the structure

of delegation than the substance of delegation, constructivism has a mixed record
aspects of delegation. Hypothesis

delegation,

is

CD1, which expects

both

generally high levels of

better suited to structural explanations than substantive ones. This study

found mixed support for hypothesis

CD1

administrative/secretanal bodies in

IGOs

with hypothesis

fails to

in

CDl’s on general

Negotiators' clear preference for locating

or independent secretariats clearly

principles of impartiality.

is

consistent

However, hypothesis CD1

explain the generally low levels of resources and discretion delegated to such

bodies, and

it

has no definite expectations concerning the specific substance of

delegation. Hypothesis

CD2, on

the other hand,

makes much more

specific predictions

about the substance of delegation than the structure of delegation. This study found that
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provision of expert advice to states and, to a lesser extent, the existence of a shared

perception of crisis, were significant predictors of increased depth of cooperation.

The case discussion

LRTAP

is

generally consistent with these results. However, the

case points to a potential limitation of hypothesis

conditions seemed to be in place. There

problem

that

needed

to

be addressed.

policy-relevant information (e.g., the

was

An

CD2.

In this case, the requisite

a shared perception that acid rain

expert scientific group

RAINS model)

to states.

may

be that

known

distributional

States did not need perfect scientific

idea whether they

to

were

a

provided

However, the negotiations

did not produce the extent of delegation expected by hypothesis

for this

(UASA)

was

CD2 One

explanation

problems inhibited the salience of expert advice.

knowledge of transboundary

a net importer or exporter

air pollution to

have an

of such environmental externalities or

form preferences concerning regulation of air pollution
In

evaluating the contributions of the three theoretical approaches,

consider them explicitly

in

is

terms of the structure and substance of delegation.

rational institutionalist hypotheses address the structure

Among

it

of delegation: ID

1

,

useful to

First, three

ID2, and

IDT

these three, only hypothesis ID2 performs even moderately well in predicting

negotiator’s decision

predicting the

how

to

handle secretarial duties.

amount of discretion

None of the

that negotiators delegate to

three perform well in

such bodies. There are

also three rational institutionalist hypotheses that address the substance of delegation:

1D1, ID2, and ID3. This study has found significant empirical support for

fair to say, then, that the rational institutionalist

at

three.

It

is

hypotheses on delegation perform better

explaining the substance of delegation than the structure of delegation.

219

all

Both

realist

hypotheses address the structure of delegation. Hypothesis

to explain the prevalence

RD1

of delegation of administrative functions to IGOs, or the

creation of independent secretariats for the purpose.

However, hypothesis RD1

better in expecting overall levels of delegated discretion to be low.

entirely concerned with the delegation of discretion;

it

Hypothesis

fares

RD2

performs well - better than any other hypothesis under consideration -

(i.e.,

hypothesis performs well

perform better
likely

because

RD2

in

explaining the

the precision of agreements). In contrast, neither realist

explaining agreement substance. That the realist hypotheses

in explaining the structure

realists tend to

that the substance

One

in

is

has no significant expectations

concerning the use of international organizations. This study finds that hypothesis

delegation of discretion

fails

of delegation than the substance of delegation

is

focus on structural impediments to cooperation, assuming

of cooperation will follow from the interests of a specific hegemon.

constructivist hypothesis

The other (CD2) mainly addresses

(GDI

)

mainly addresses the structure of delegation.

the substance of negotiation. Hypothesis

CD1

performs best when interpreted as a constraining, rather than determining influence on
delegation.

It

correctly expects that negotiators will delegate functions to impartial,

hence legitimate, third
discretion or resources.

parties.

However,

it

cannot explain

The observed prevalence of

‘thin’

why

states delegate so

delegation

may

little

reflect a

tension between a realist concern for sovereignty and a constructivist concern for

legitimacy.

Hypothesis CD2,

in contrast,

performs quite well, significantly predicting the

substantive depth of agreements.

To

recap, the structure of delegation appears to reflect a tension between a realist

concern for sovereignty and a constructivist concern for legitimacy. The presence of
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hegemonic influence (hypothesis RD2) appears

to

be the best predictor of discretion.

Both rational institutionalism and constructivism accurately describe the substance of
delegation. Hypotheses from both approaches performed well in predicting the

delegation of functions significant to the approach (compliance functions for rational

institutionalism, informational functions for constructivism).
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CHAPTER 6
ELEMENTS OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: FLEXIBILITY

The 1997 Kyoto Protocol
notable because

it

Framework Convention on Climate Change

5%

specified a binding target of

by developed (Annex

I)

become equally notable

members of the FCCC.
for the

Three features

included

to the

Implementation (Art.

6),

--

many

the Clean

is

reduction in greenhouse gas emissions

In addition, the

Kyoto Protocol has

features of institutional flexibility that negotiators

Development Mechanism

(Art. 12), Joint

and emissions trading - have received the most attention but

they only scratch the surface of the flexibility that negotiators designed into the

agreement. Nearly every rule

designed

to

respond

to

some

in the Protocol is

party’s concerns.

insistence, negotiators adopted a ‘basket’

accompanied by some form of flexibility
Primarily at the U.S. delegation’s

approach

carbon dioxide. This provides states with greater

commitments. Likewise, Article 3

to emissions, rather than focus

flexibility in

stipulates that parties can

choosing

meet

how

to

on

meet

their obligations

individually or jointly. Negotiators included this provision at the behest of European

states,

the

who

preferred the flexibility of meeting

commitments

either individually or within

framework of the European Union. Other forms of institutional

Kyoto Protocol include specifying emission reductions within
and requiring implementation review
agreement’s

to

flexibility in the

a limited

timeframe only,

inform subsequent modifications

to the

rules.

This Chapter examines the role that institutional flexibility plays in the design of

ME As.

It

proceeds by

first

defining institutional flexibility.
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Next,

it

describes the

institutional flexibility

found among surveyed agreements. Third,

hypotheses concerning institutional flexibility described

in

it

Chapter

evaluates the

3.

Finally,

it

discusses these findings in light of two specific cases.

Flexibility

and Multilateral Agreements

Institutional flexibility refers to various formal

which

states

can change the terms of cooperation

in

and informal mechanisms by

response to both specific concerns

and unanticipated developments. Contemporary multilateral environmental agreements
respond to

flexibility

Koremenos

et al

concerns

in a

number of ways. Following Duffield (2003) and

(2001a), flexibility provisions

may

be conceptualized as falling into one

of three categories: adaptive, interpretive, and transformative.

Adaptive

flexibility provisions

suspending participation

amending or modifying
multilateral

in

allow states to respond to future contingencies by

treaty-governed cooperative arrangements (as opposed to

the terms of the agreement).

The provision of escape clauses

agreements represents the most significant form of adaptive

institutional design.

in

flexibility in

Escape mechanisms typically can be exercised by individual

states

without the need for further negotiations or international agreement, provided that certain
qualifying criteria obtain. This study uses a dichotomous indicator,

whether or not negotiators provided an escape mechanism
Interpretive flexibility provisions grant individual

and

in

domestic implementation of agreement

takes one of two forms.

First,

it

may

rules.

in

ESCAPE,

to capture

a given agreement.

members leeway

in interpreting

Interpretive flexibility generally

be provided contractually upon parties’ signature of

an agreement through reservation. Article 2 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the

of Treaties defines reservations

as:
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Law

unilateral

signing,

statements], however phrased or named,
ratifying,

made by

a

when

State,

accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby

it

purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty
in their application to that State.

Reservations thus provide states with the flexibility to sign and ratify agreements with

which they are

on the whole, but include one or

satisfied

a

few specific provisions they

are unwilling to accept.

The

default rule in international law

Vienna Convention

A

State

is

to

permit reservations. As Article 19 of the

stipulates:

may, when signing,

ratifying, accepting, approving, or

acceding to a

treaty, formulate a reservation unless:
(a) the reservation

is

prohibited by the treaty;

(b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations,

reservation,
(c)

in

may

which do not include the

be made; or

cases not failing under subparagraphs (a) and (b), the reservation

incompatible with the object and purpose of the

is

treaty.

Therefore, unless a multilateral treaty explicitly provides otherwise, state parties are free

to

make

reservations. Occasionally, as specified

above

in

subparagraph (b) of Article

negotiators will permit formal reservations, but restrict reservations to one or

specific parts of an agreement.

Endangered Species (CITES) permits

concerning the

of specific species for protection (though

to

make

more

For example. Article 23 of the 1973 Convention on

International Trade in

listing

19,

parties to

it

make

reservations

does not permit parties

general reservations).

The second source of interpretive
precision of an agreement’s rules.

flexibility in

MEAs

derives from the relative

Unlike reservations, which are

made

at the

time of

contracting, ambiguity in the rules can be a lasting source of flexibility in an agreement.

Transformative

flexibility refers to the ability

of state parties

to alter their

originally contracted tenns of cooperation over time and in response to
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new

circumstances that
permissively.

may

States

arise.

In the first case, states

such that renegotiation
Alternately, states

may

provide transformative flexibility both actively and

may

limit the duration

of a multilateral agreement

necessary to sustain cooperation after the

is

initial

term expires.

provide transformative flexibility in a more permissive sense, by

designing provisions that allow the terms of cooperation to be amended. In
states are faced with the further choice

adopting amendments. States

amendments, such

may

set

this case,

of choosing rules to govern the process of

demanding requirements

as unanimity or consensus, or

more

for the adoption of

lenient conditions, such as simple

majority support.

Table

Table

6.1

summarizes the three categories of

Categories

6.1

Adaptive

&

Mechanisms of

Institutional Flexibility

Transformative

Flexibility

flexibility provisions.

Interpretive Flexibility

Flexibility

Amendment

Escape clauses

Reservations

Rule precision

Duration (sunset provisions)

/

specificity

Renegotiation provisions

Using

this

framework,

MEAs drawn

from the

this

chapter evaluates several hypotheses concerning flexibility

literature

on international cooperation reviewed

However, before evaluating these propositions,
of

flexibility discussed in

Chapter

it

analyzes the dimensions of flexibility in

3.

2.

3.

in

MEAs

Before evaluating specific propositions concerning

Chapter

Chapter

will be helpful to review the indicators

Dimensions of Flexibility

flexibility set forth in

in

MEAs

flexibility, this

chapter

by examining the several indicators of

These are summarized below
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in

in

Table

6.2.

Table 6.2

Indicators of Flexibility

Indicator

Measurement

Description

ESCAPE

Dichotomous

Does

the agreement include a formal escape

clause?

RESERVE

Dichotomous

Does

the agreement permit reservations?

PRECISE

Ordinal

How

precise are the agreement’s rules?

AMEND

Nominal

How

does the agreement provide for formal

amendment?

SUNSET

Dichotomous

Does

the agreement include a sunset clause?

This study operationalizes adaptive flexibility in terms of formal escape

mechanisms.

Among

surveyed agreements, escape clauses are found

in several

agreements constituting the Baltic Sea regime (centered around the 1974 Helsinki
Convention), the London

Dumping Convention,

the 1971

Ramsar Convention on

Wetlands, the 1994 International Tropical Timber Agreement, and the 1954 Oil Pollution

Convention. The great majority of surveyed agreements do not include an escape

mechanism; such clauses are found

As discussed

in

only eleven of fifty-three agreements.

earlier, interpretive flexibility

can be either formal or informal.

Formally, negotiators can provide interpretive flexibility by permitting states to attach
reservations to the signature of an agreement.

interpretive flexibility

enough

that states

by specifying

can exercise

rules,

Informally, negotiators can create

commitments, and obligations broadly

some degree of discretion

in interpreting

and applying

them.
In this study, the precision of an agreement’s rules

PRECISE. This measure

classifies agreements’ rules
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is

captured by the indicator,

on a five-point ordinal

scale,

from

vague and indeterminate (most
Since almost

reflects the

each

rule;

criteria

it

all

flexible) to precise

and easy

surveyed agreements specify more than one

mean of all

does not attempt

6.1

precision score

th

to

to

weight rules according

75

th

shows, the observed values for

some predefined

to

4

among surveyed

percentiles) ranges

from

1

multilaterals

is

6.1

Distribution of

PRECISE

00-

3.00-

2.50-

200 -

1.50-

oo1

Rule Precision
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2.0,

Thus the

.4 to 2.8.

3.50-

1

PRECISE

general

PRECISE of 2.94.

PRECISE

agreements surveyed.
Figure

value of

of importance. For example, eighteen rules are identified for the 1994

As Figure

(25

rule, the

substantive policy rules. This measure accords equal weight to

Convention on Biological Diversity, with a mean score on

mean

to interpret (least flexible).

range from

and the middle

CBD

is

1

to 4.

fifty

one of the

The

percent

less precise

Relatively precise agreements include the 1995 Waigani Convention (1.13); the 1987

Montreal Protocol (1.29); and the 1949 Convention for the Establishment for the
Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission

(

1

.44).

Relatively

imprecise agreements include the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change

1974 Helsinki Convention (3.08); and the 1971 Ramsar Convention on

(3.61); the

Wetlands of International Importance.
In addition to granting

may

negotiators

members leeway

to interpret an

agreement’s rules,

formally allow parties to condition their acceptance of an agreement by

expressing reservations to specific parts of the agreement. The surveyed agreements
are evenly divided

explicitly prohibit

between those

that permit reservations

(50%) and those

that

them (50%). All but one of the surveyed agreements permitting

reservations do so implicitly.

The one exception

is

the 1973

CITES

treaty,

which also

specifically delimits the range of permissible reservations.

The
possibility

third

form of institutional

flexibility

considered here concerns the

of changing an agreement as new circumstances

arise.

This can be achieved

passively, by specifying formal procedures for modifying the terms of an agreement, or

actively,

(i.e.,

by stipulating

by including

that

an agreement will remain

a ‘sunset clause’).

International Tropical

Among
permissive

clauses.

surveyed agreements, the 1994

Timber Agreement provides one

The 1997 Kyoto Protocol

clause.

Among

clear

example of a sunset

also provides for cooperation a limited time period.

surveyed agreements, negotiators were

amendment procedures than they were

Only

in force for a limited duration

three of the agreements in the

IRD
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far

more

to use active

likely to design

mechanisms

did not specify a formal

like sunset

amendment

procedure: the 1976 Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Against Chlorides, the

1996 Black Sea Strategic Action Plan, and the 1999 Protocol

Convention for the

to the

Establishment of an Inter- American Tropical Tuna Commission (1ATTC).

However, these may be marginal examples of negotiators

failing to provide for

amendment. The 1976 Rhine Chlorides Convention was negotiated simultaneously, but
separately from the broader Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Against

Chemical Pollution, which did include a formal amendment procedure. The 1996
Black Sea Strategic Action Plan was mainly an aspirational declaration, made by

Environment Ministers of the Black Sea

states, outside the existing institutional

framework provided by the 1992 Black Sea Convention.
the

to

IATTC

become

is little

but

real variation

how amendments

decision rules governing

permit regional economic organizations

among surveyed MEAs
are adopted

amendments

The most common decision
at least

to

parties to the original convention.

Thus, the

amended

more than an amendment

Finally, the 1999 Protocol to

rule

is

As Table

is

not whether they can be

6.3 shows, the distribution of

strongly bimodal

among surveyed

among surveyed agreements

consensus, to successfully

is to

amend an agreement. Nearly

as

agreements.

require unanimity, or

many agreements

require a numerically-defined supermajority (e.g., support by two-thirds or three-

fourths of parties).

Very infrequently did

either a simple majority or a

parties did negotiators

more complex

choose

qualified supermajority.
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to require

Table

Amendment

6.3

Decision Rules

Frequency

No

provisions

Percent
9.4

5

Permitted with simple majority

Permitted with supermajority

2

3.8

21

39.6

Permitted with qualified supermajority

1.9

1

Permitted by consensus or unanimity

24

45.3

Total

53

100.0

Evaluating Hypotheses on Flexibility

The IRD

data on use of institutional flexibility in multilateral environmental

agreements reveals patterns

in negotiators’ use

of the various forms of flexibility. This

seetion uses that data for an empirical analysis of the several hypotheses concerning

flexibility in

MEAs, which

are

summarized below

in

Table 6.4

Rational Institutionalist Hypotheses on Flexibility

Rational institutionalist theory yields a
use of flexibility in institutional design

(IF

l

)

The

number of expectations concerning

first rational institutionalist

posits that flexibility will increase with the use of enforcement

logic behind this hypothesis

is

that the

hypothesis

mechanisms. The

presence of enforcement mechanisms in a

multilateral

agreement can amplify the distributional problems surrounding an

agreement

By making

participation

incentives for states to bargain

more

the

more

costly,

enforcement mechanisms create

intensively over the initial terms of an agreement

(Fearon 1998). The provision of flexibility mechanisms

may be

necessary to mitigate

distributional conflicts over initial terms, and to facilitate the successful conclusion of

an agreement. Thus,

it is

not the presence of distributional problems, per se, that

explains negotiators’ choice to provide institutional flexibility. Rather, distributional
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conflict follows

from negotiators' decision

to include

enforcement mechanisms

in

an

agreement.

Hypotheses Concerning

Table 6.4

Theoretical Approach

Label

Rational

1F1

Flexibility

Hypothesis

Adaptive

flexibility will increase

with the use of

enforcement mechanisms

Institutionalism

IF2

Rational

Flexibility (particularly transformative) will

increase with uncertainty.

Institutionalism

Rational

IF3

Institutionalism

Transformative
the

RF1

Realism

RF2

decrease with

number of parties.

Agreements driven by
incorporate

Realism

flexibility will

little

a

hegemonic actor

will

transformative flexibility.

Agreements negotiated among

relative equals

will feature high levels of adaptive

and

interpretive flexibility.

CF1

Constructivism

Transformative flexibility will increase with
uncertainty.

CF2

Constructivism

Transformative flexibility will increase with
policy dissensus.

Therefore, to

test

hypothesis I FI,

enforcement mechanisms

in multilateral

it is

necessary to have an indicator of

agreements. To accomplish

measure of enforcement mechanisms was constructed
compliance provisions, or

privileges are

coded

as having

that

an ordinal

Agreements with no

that provide only positive incentives are

“no" enforcement mechanisms. Agreements

this,

coded as having

permit restricting membership

“medium” enforcement. Agreements

that permit

imposing financial penalties or sanctions are coded as having “strong” enforcement
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1

As Table
IF

I

Among

.

6.5 shows, the surveyed agreements are not consistent with hypothesis

common among

surveyed agreements escape clauses were not more

agreements with significant enforcement provisions. Rather, the frequency of escape
clauses appears to be constant regardless of enforcement provisions; negotiators

provided for escape in roughly one-fourth of surveyed agreements. In absolute terms,
nine of the eleven agreements that provide for escape incorporate no enforcement

mechanisms, and four of five agreements

that provide substantial

enforcement do not

provide for escape.

Table 6.5

Cross Tabulation:

ESCAPE

ENFORCEM

x

Enforcement Provisions

Escape

No

Clause

Yes

Total

Two

further tests

increased flexibility to

support hypothesis IF1

None

Medium

Strong

Total

34

2

4

40

9

1

1

43

3

5

were conducted

to

1

51

examine whether negotiators provided

accompany enforcement mechanisms. Neither of the

.

First,

RESERVE

results

was cross tabulated with ENFORCE.

Agreements incorporating no enforcement mechanisms were evenly divided with
respect to provision for reservations. Twenty-three (51.1%) of such agreements permit

reservations; twenty-two (48.9%)

do not

However, among the eight agreements

that

do incorporate enforcement mechanisms, only two (25.0%) permit reservations. This
runs contrary to hypothesis IF

l,

flexibility to mitigate the effects

IFF

which expects negotiators

to

provide increased

of enforcement mechanisms. In contrast

negotiators do not appear to provide institutional flexibility to

enforcement provisions.
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to hypothesis

complement

Finally, a Kruskal-Wallis test

was conducted

to

determine whether rule

precision differed significantly across agreements that included no,

medium

or strong

enforcement mechanisms. The results were opposite what hypothesis IF1 would
expect.

Agreements featuring strong enforcement mechanisms also provided

interpretive flexibility

mechanisms

fell in

(mean rank

the middle

20.3); agreements featuring

flexibility

2

these results are not statistically significant, % (2, 50)

summary, these

by hypothesis IF

1

.

moderate enforcement

(mean rank 21.2) and agreements featuring no

enforcement provided the most interpretive

In

the least

results provide

(mean rank

=

1.074, p

=

26,4).

However,

.585.

no evidence of the causal mechanism entailed

Negotiators were not more likely to provide flexibility to mitigate

the effects of enforcement

mechanisms on bargaining. To

the contrary, in the great

majority of cases, negotiators provided for withdrawal regardless of enforcement

mechanisms. Likewise, negotiators did not provide
choice to provide enforcement.

of the Kruskal-Wallis

Though they

for reservations, regardless

of their

are not statistically significant, the results

test actually are consistent

with the opposite hypothesis, that

negotiators' provision of flexibility will decrease with the provision of enforcement

mechanisms.

The second

rational institutionalist hypothesis

flexibility will increase

on

flexibility (1F2) expects that

with uncertainty about the state of the world. Specifically, this

hypothesis expects that transformative flexibility will increase with uncertainty. For

example, uncertainty increases the probability

that the benefits

decrease over time, due to unforeseen events and changes
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in

of an agreement will

circumstances over time.

In response, rational institutionalists

have hypothesized

that risk averse states will

respond by limiting the duration of agreements negotiated under uncertainty (Harris

and Holmstrom 1987; Koremenos 2005hegnegota).

Even

among

a cursory glimpse reveals that such a relationship

is

unlikely to be found

the surveyed agreements; only three of fifty-three agreements incorporate sunset

provisions.

A

backward-stepwise

logistic regression

was conducted

to

determine

whether any of the indicators of scientific knowledge/uncertainty were significant

No

predictors of negotiators' decision to limit agreement duration.

found

to explain negotiators’

was conducted

to

indicators

were

Mann- Whitney

choice to limit duration. Next, a

U

test

determine whether limited duration agreements addressed problems

characterized by greater uncertainty. Again, the results were negative.

The

three

limited duration agreements ranked slightly higher than open-ended agreements on

uncertainty concerning the causes and extent of a problem (SCIENTIF), uncertainty

concerning policy options (OPTIONS), and uncertainty concerning the consequences of
different policy options

slight,

and none of the three
Accordingly,

were not more

The

(EFFECTS). However,

this

tests

statistically significant,

likely to limit the duration

at the 0.

1

level.

is

of agreements negotiated under uncertainty

that risk-averse states will act to limit the potential

of cooperation to decrease. The only way

renegotiation necessary to sustain cooperation. This

make an agreement more

even

study finds no evidence to support hypothesis 1F2; negotiators

logic behind hypothesis IF2

for the benefits

was

these differences were extremely

beneficial to

Such beneficiaries can be expected

some

to resist

is

to

do

this is to

make

because unforeseen events can

states than they originally anticipated.

attempts to
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amend

or renegotiate

agreements. Therefore, permissive approaches to transformative flexibility, such as

amendment procedures, do

not address the motive of risk-averse negotiators posited by

hypothesis IF2. Risk-averse negotiators will insist on sunset clauses

too great.

As we have

seen, however, there

no evidence

is

at all

of

if

this

uncertainty

process

is

among

surveyed agreements.

The

third rational institutionalist hypothesis (IF3) expects that transformative

flexibility will

decrease with the number of parties. The reason for this

transaction costs of (re)negotiation increase as

more

states participate.

is

that

These

increasing transaction costs mitigate the anticipated benefits from renegotiating an

agreement. Therefore hypothesis IF3 expects that negotiators will be
require renegotiation as

demanding decision

The

first

numbers

increase, and that they will be less likely to choose

rules for adoption of

way

amendments

to test hypothesis IF3 is to

as

numbers

test

was conducted

participating in negotiations

first to

compare

(NSTNEGOT)

the

Among

negotiated by a greater

number of states (mean rank on

number of states

this, a

actively

surveyed agreements, those with limited duration were

with indefinite duration (mean rank

.953, p

To accomplish

between limited duration agreements and

indefinite agreements.

1

increase.

determine whether larger negotiations

are increasingly likely to produce limited duration agreements.

Mann- Whitney

less likely to

=

24.5).

This

test

NSTNEGOT = 40.8)

was

than those

statistically significant, z

=

= 05

Next, a logistic regression was conducted to determine whether the

states actively participating in negotiations

decision to limit an agreement’s duration

is

a significant predictor

The number of states
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is

number of

of negotiators'

not by itself a

-

.

significant predictor; the increase in the odds ratio of negotiators choosing to limit

duration

was

slight

( 1

.0

The second way
rules

8),

1

and the

test

was not

to test hypothesis IF3 is to

governing amendments are different, and

by larger negotiations. To accomplish

compare mean ranks on

significant, p

this a

less

=

.

1

41

determine whether the decision

demanding,

Kruskal-Wallis

NSTNEGOT among surveyed

in

test

agreements produced

was conducted

to

agreements with different

decision rules governing amendments.

Table 6.6

NSTNEGOT

Mean Ranks:

NSTNEGOT x AMEND
N

Amendment Decision Rule
No Amendment Provisions
Permitted by Consensus or Unanimity
Permitted with Simple Majority
Permitted with Supermajority

Permitted with Qualified Supermajority
Total

Mean Rank
5

9.50

23

18.67

2

28.00

21

38.33

1

40.00

52

Table 6.6 presents mean ranks on number of negotiating states for surveyed
agreements, grouped by amendment decision rules. The group of agreements
negotiated by the smallest

number of states

specified no formal

amendment

rules.

The

group of agreements negotiated by the largest number of states required supermajority
approval for the adoption of amendments, These results are mostly consistent with
hypothesis IF3; the groups that appear to be out of place include only one or two

agreements.

As Table

6.6 also

makes

among surveyed agreements

is

clear, the distribution

strongly bimodal;

consensus or supermajority support

to

of amendment decision rules

more than

four-fifths require either

adopt amendments to the agreement

Since these

are negotiators’ predominant design choices concerning the adoption of amendments,
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it

is

worthwhile

conducted
test

was

to

compare these groups

compare

to

significant,

of amendments

t

(M =

the

=

mean number of negotiating

5.362, p

66.05,

<

of negotiations was

negotiating agreements

test

was conducted

matched the
In

5

1

SD = 43. 14)

states,

with a

(NSTNEGOT)

summary,

of the
this

was

two groups. The

states for the

were the product of larger negotiations than

95%

is

C.l.

SD =

8.03); the

of 3 1-71

.

mean

The

results

were

difference in

Since the number of states

not normally distributed, a

to verify these results.

results

t-test

Agreements requiring supermajority approval

.001.

were agreements requiring consensus (M = 14.78,
size

A

directly against each other.

Mann- Whitney

statistically significant,

and

t-test.

study finds strong support for hypothesis IF3. Nearly

all

surveyed agreements permit amendments, either by consensus or with supermajority
support.

size

amendments

Negotiators are less likely to require consensus to adopt

of negotiations increases. Additionally, there

less likely to limit

is

some evidence

agreement duration as the number of negotiating

However, the low number of limited duration agreements means
are very sensitive to individual cases, and

would be susceptible

as the

that negotiators are

states increases.

that statistical results

to

change given

additional observations.

These

results provide strong support to the rational institutionalist claim that

transaction costs influence negotiators' choice of flexibility provisions.

analyses above demonstrate that there

is a

significant relationship

The empirical

between the size of

negotiations and the choice of decision rules governing the adoption of amendments.

Specifically, the theoretical significance of these findings

is to

highlight the

which transaction costs influence negotiators’ choice of decision
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rules.

The

way

in

text

of

)

makes reference

nearly every surveyed agreement

of consensus

to the value

making, providing evidence of a general norm of consensual decision making

However,

larger negotiations tend to relax this requirement

majontarian decision rule

in the

by stipulating

decision

in

in

MEAs.

a super-

event that reasonable attempts to reach consensus

Thus, increasing numbers lead negotiators

to alter the general

norm and

fail.

practice of

consensual decision making.
Realist Hypotheses

Whereas

on Flexibility

rational institutionalism generally treats efficiency as a goal of

institutional design, realism is

especially, coercive power.

more concerned with sovereignty,

The

first realist

relative gains, and,

hypothesis concerning flexibility (RF1

expects that hegemon-led negotiations will produce agreements with

Hegemonic

transformative flexibility.

and they are unlikely

to

little

states are unlikely to design sunset provisions,

choose amendment decision rules

that

do not provide them

a

veto over potential changes to the terms of an agreement. The logic behind these

expectations

is

are an efficient

problem.

that

hegemonic

states

sometimes use multilateral processes because they

means of internationalizing

If a state exerts

reasonable to expect that

flexibility provisions

add

their preferred policy

hegemonic influence over
it

will secure

little

value

in

its

the course

on an issue or

of negotiations,

it

is

desired terms of cooperation. Transformative

such situations because

to the extent they

decentralize control over an agreement, they can be used against a hegemon's interests.

The
are, in fact,

first test

of hypothesis RF1

more commonly used

measure was constructed

in

to indicate

is

to see

whether

restrictive

amendment

hegemon-led negotiations. To do
whether the multilateral agenda
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this a

rules

new

(HEGAGEND)

and negotiating process
indicator

(HEGEMON)

was cross tabulated with

The bimodal

is

AMEND

Table 6.7 presents the

distribution of decision rules

hegemony. The most
hegemonic actors

both reflect hegemonic influence. This

common

decision rule

present

is still

among agreements

results.

when

controlling for

negotiated by

consensus/unanimity, as expected by hypothesis RF1

one-third of such agreements require the less

support, failing to ensure that the

new

However,

.

demanding standard of supermajority

hegemon possesses veto power over unwanted

changes.

Table 6.7

Cross tabulation of

AMEND x HEGEMON
HEGEMON
No

AMEND

No

Provisions

Permitted with Simple Majority

Permitted with Supermajority
Pennitted with Qualified Supermajority

5

2

0

2

15

6

21

0

1

13

Total

35

SUNSET was

Total

1

1

Penmtted by Consensus or Unanimity

Next,

Yes

4

1

1

18

24
53

cross tabulated with the indicator of hegemony to

determine whether hegemonic actors were

less likely to limit the duration

of

agreements. Results are printed in Table 6.8.

Cross tabulation of SUNSET by

Table 6.8

HEGEMON
No

SUNSET

No

30

48

18

3

0

3

33

18

51

None of the agreements driven by
However, given the

Total

Yes

Yes
Total

HEGEMON

rarity

a

hegemonic

state incorporated a sunset clause

of such clauses among surveyed agreements, the significance
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of this finding
surveyed

is

modest; there

ME As that there

In

such

is

very

is

little

summary, these findings

Although both findings are

that there is

To

flexibility.

for

hegemony

cast doubt

RF1

.

among

to explain.

on the accuracy of hypothesis RF1.

in the right direction, there are too

for this study to place confidence in

is

variation in the use of sunset clauses

little

The most

many unexplained

cases

plausible explanation for the findings

no significant relationship between hegemony and transformative
the extent that states have exerted

negotiations, those states

may

hegemonic control over some

not have been worried about their ability to control later

developments. Prohibiting amendments or requiring consensus are blunt instruments of
institutional design,

The second
negotiated

among

and they
realist

The

Without

,

when designing
first

some

way

a

hegemon

to coerce

states will act out

of concern for maintaining

cooperative arrangements.

to test hypothesis

this,

RF2

is

to

determine whether adaptive and

is

among agreements

the indicators of sunset and withdrawal clauses

tabulated with the indicator of hegemony,

RF2. There

of adaptive and

agreement or present an agreement

interpretive flexibility provisions are actually less frequent

by equals. To do

cases.

hypothesis on flexibility (RF2) expects that agreements

accompli relatively equal

sovereignty

not be appropriate in

relative equals will feature generally high levels

interpretive flexibility.

as a fait

may

The

results offer

little

negotiated

were cross

support to hypothesis

no significant relationship between hegemony and provision

for

withdrawal; the few agreements that do not explicitly provide withdrawal clauses are
divided evenly on hegemony. Agreements negotiated
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among

relative equals included

escape clauses

less frequently than those negotiated primarily

by a hegemonic

actor,

contradicting hypothesis RF2.

Next, this study compared the precision of agreements negotiated

among

relative

equals with those negotiated by a hegemonic state, to determine whether the former
offered greater levels of interpretive flexibility. Figure 6.2 presents a boxplot of the

distributions of rule precision for the

Figure 6.2

As Figure

Distribution of

6.2

makes

clear,

two categories of agreements.

PRECISE

by

HEGEMONY

agreements negotiated among relative equals provide

substantially greater interpretive flexibility, on average, than

mainly by a hegemonic

state.

A

t-test

comparison of means
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do agreements negotiated

(

t(

44 = 2,026, p = ,049) and
)

Mann- Whitney U

the nonparametric

difference in distributions

is

(HEGEMON)

=

-2.

1

12,

p = .035) both found that the

statistically significant.

(PRECISE) was regressed on

Finally, rule precision

of hegemony

test (z

to

the original, ordinal

determine whether hegemony

is

measure

a significant predictor of

rule precision. Table 6.9 presents the linear regression results.

Table 6.9

Regression of

HEGEMON

PRECISE on

Unstandardized

Standardized

Coefficients

Coefficients

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig.

HEGNEGOT

-.946

.409

-.329

-2.313

.025

(Constant)

2.475

.209

E855

.000

1

Dependent Variable: PRECISE

Hegemony

a significant predictor

is

of rule precision, though
1

.

amount of variation
Taken

in rule precision (R~

that are relevant to

Adaptive

is

the only type for

actor.

is

.108).

to highlight the types

hegemonic diplomacy.

flexibility

hegemonic

explains only a modest

together, these results provide substantial support for hypothesis RF2.

Their overall theoretical significance

particular,

=

it

which there

and transformative

Very few

MEAs

of institutional

Interpretive flexibility, rule precision in

is

significant evidence of

flexibility

most

likely

have

hegemonic influence.

less relevance for a

incorporate sunset provisions or escape clauses to

begin with. Since these institutional mechanisms do not further hegemons’
there

is

no reason

to

flexibility

expect such mechanisms

to

be more

common among

interests,

agreements

driven by hegemonic influence.
Constructivist Hypotheses on Flexibility

The

constructivist hypotheses

examined

in this

Chapter focus on the significance

of knowledge/uncertainty and consensus/disagreement for the design of multilateral
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agreements. The

constructivist hypothesis expects that negotiators will respond to

first

uncertainty by providing transformative flexibility. Although observationally similar to

the second rational institutionalist hypothesis, the

two spring from very

different causal

mechanisms. Hypothesis IF2 conceptualizes uncertainty as an exogenous, stochastic
shock

from participating

to states' utility

the other hand, consider uncertainty as

constructivists, uncertainty

must respond

cooperative agreement. Constructivists, on

endogenous

For

to institutional design.

not simply an exogenous constraint to which negotiators

Rather, negotiators

and extent of uncertainty
relationship

is

in a

may

use institutional design to influence the presence

in the first place.

between uncertainty and

Constructivism envisages a reflexive

institutional design

where

rational institutionalism

envisages institutional design primarily as a reactive activity.
Consistent with their more dynamic view of institutional design, constructivists

emphasize negotiators’

ability to (re)shape

than their ability to “limit the

agreements

in light

damage” of uncertainty by

of new knowledge, rather

limiting agreement duration

Thus, a constructivist theory of institutional design would be concerned not only with the
origination of agreements but with their evolution over time. While definitely a

worthwhile possibility
scope of

this project.

for

extending the current project, such an endeavor

Nevertheless,

‘original’ institutional design

First,

particularly

institutions

from

it

is

a constructivist perspective.

when designing agreements
in

outside the

possible to derive specific expectations about

one should expect negotiators

over time

lies

to include formal

in the face

response to learning

is

amendment

of uncertainty. The

provisions,

ability to

a hallmark of this strand of constructivist

thought. Second, one should expect negotiators to avoid requiring unanimity or
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change

consensus to adopt amendments

an agreement. As the uncertainty surrounding the

to

nature of a problem and the effects of policy interventions lessens, the clearer the

distributive

consequences of policy choices become, and the more likely

distributive conflict will inhibit consensus. Therefore, hypothesis

it

is

that

CF1 expects

that

negotiators will respond to uncertainty by including formal

amendment provisions

design of agreements. Furthermore, although consensus

important for the

is

in the

initial

adoption of an agreement, hypothesis CF1 expects that negotiators will not require

consensus or unanimity for the adoption of amendments.

The

first

way

to test hypothesis

two groups of agreements: those
that

do

not.

Mann- Whitney U

CFT

is

to

recode the indicator

that include formal

tests

scientific knowledge/uncertainty.

were conducted

AMEND to create

amendment procedures and

for each of the several indicators of

For each indicator, agreements establishing an

amendment procedure ranked higher on

uncertainty than did agreements that did not

provide an amendment procedure. However, the only difference that was

SCIENTIF,

significant involved

compared

procedure (z

As

=

to a

mean rank of

-2.405, p

=

12.2

.016).

SCIENTIF) were

was conducted

to see if

any of the uncertainty

significant predictors of negotiators' choice to

provide for amendments. Backward selection starting with
the chance that there

SCIENTIF of

among agreements without an amendment

a next step, logistic regression

indicators (especially

statistically

uncertainty concerning the causes and extent of a

problem. Agreements with an amendment procedure had a mean rank on

28.5,

those

all

indicators

were significant interactions among indicators
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that

was chosen, on

were not

The

individually significant.

results

show

predictor of the decision to provide for

Table 6.10

that

is,

indeed, a significant

amendment.

Logistic Regression Coefficients for

Dependent

SCIENT1F

AMEND

B

Wald

1.777

4.837

-1.349

.830

Independent

Sig.

Odds Ratio

1

.028

5.911

1

.362

.260

df

AMEND
SCIENTIF
Constant
Variables entered on step

1

:

SCIENT1F, OPTIONS, EFFECTS

The second implication of hypothesis CF1
demanding decision
increases.

To

is

rules governing the adoption of

test this

conjecture,

indicator of uncertainty, to

Mann- Whitney

U

that negotiators will adopt less

amendments
tests

as uncertainty

were conducted

for

each

compare mean ranks on uncertainty between agreements

requiring supermajority approval and agreements requiring consensus to adopt

amendments

(the

differences, and

In

two modal observations). None of the

none were

summary,

this

tests

showed

substantial

statistically significant.

study finds mixed support for hypothesis CF1. There

evidence that scientific uncertainty significantly predicts negotiators’ decision
a formal

amendment procedure. This supports

hypothesis CF1, that uncertainty

logistic regression results

number of agreements
results

of the second

is

on which

that

endogenous
this

to

provide

mechanism posited by

to institutional design.

However, the

conclusion rest are sensitive, given the low

do not include

test cast

the causal

is

a formal

amendment provision

In contrast, the

doubts on the theoretical significance of the second

implication of hypothesis C’Fl

.

The

strongest explanation so far for negotiators’ choice

of decision rules governing amendments

is

not uncertainty but, rather, the size of

negotiations, as suggested by hypothesis IF3.
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Whereas hypothesis CF1 considers
aspects of uncertainty, hypothesis

among

CF2

qualitative

by considering the existence of consensus

starts

negotiating states concerning the state of knowledge concerning the problem and

the consequences of different policy choices.

will

measures of the extent of different

respond

to dissensus

The expectation here

that negotiators

is

by providing for amendments, and by choosing more lenient

decision rules to permit implementation review and facilitate learning.

To

test this, the indicators for

agreement concerning policy options and effects

were cross tabulated with the indicator for formal amendment provisions.

Table

Crosstabulation of

6. II

AMEND x OPTAGREE and EFFAGREE

Disagreement
Concerning Options

AMEND

No
Yes

Total

As Table

6.1

1

Disagreement
Concerning Effects

No

Yes

5

0

4

30

18

25

23

35

18

29

24

No

Yes

Total
5

1

48

shows, negotiators nearly always provided for amendment

which there was disagreement concerning

the reliability of

in cases in

knowledge concerning policy

options or disagreement about the likely consequences of different options. However,

there

is

not a statistically significant relationship between the presence of either type of

disagreement and the decision

is

a significant predictor

significance

may

to

provide for amendment. Neither type of disagreement

of the decision

to

be a product of the low

provide for amendment. This lack of

number of cases

that

do not provide

for

amendment
The second implication of hypothesis CF2

is

that negotiators will

disagreement concerning policy options and effects by choosing
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less

respond to

demanding decision

rules for adopting

the

amendments. To

test this,

rules

two indicators of policy disagreement. Table 6.12 presents

Table 6.12

Crosstabulation of

were cross tabulated with
the results.

AMEND x OPTIONS and EFFECTS
Disagreement Concerning

Disagreement Concerning

Policy Options

Policy Effects

Amendment Rules

No

amendment

No

Yes

No

5

0

4

2

0

2

0

13

8

8

13

0

0

provisions

Permitted with simple majority

Permitted with supermajority
Permitted with qualified supermajority

1

Yes
1

1

Pennitted by consensus or unanimity

14

10

15

9

Total

35

18

29

24

The bimodal

distribution of agreement rules

reproduced even
negotiations in

if

among surveyed agreements

one controls for the existence of policy disagreement.

which

parties disagreed concerning the

essentially

is

Among

adequacy of information about

policy options, a majority produced agreements that required consensus for the adoption

of amendments, contrary

to the

expectations of hypothesis CF2.

which there was substantial disagreement among
of different policy choices,

a majority

is

negotiations

parties concerning the likely

produced agreements

that required

supermajority support to adopt amendments. While this result

hypothesis CF2, there

Among

is

at

outcomes

only

consistent with

not a statistically significant association between disagreement

about policy effects and the choice of a supermajority rule for adopting amendments.

Though

this

could change with the addition of more cases, the observed relation

surveyed agreements
hypothesis

CF2 from

Hypothesis
solidity the terms

is

so modest that this study cannot infer

much

among

support for

the data presented in Table 6.12.

CF2

proceeds from the belief that negotiators will be reluctant to

of cooperation when negotiating parties disagree about the adequacy of

information about different policy options, or about the probable consequences of
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choosing different policy options. Rather, negotiators will respond to such disagreement

by designing agreements

that are relatively easy to

modify

in light

of experience, new

information, or other changes in circumstances. Although the surveyed agreements
generally do not contradict hypothesis CF2, they provide only very modest support for

the hypothesis.

Taken

together, the empirical analyses of hypothesis

policy consensus probably

amendment

rules.

To

is

suggest that

not a significant influence on negotiators’ design of

the contrary, the strongest evidence this study found supports the

rational institutionalist hypothesis that the size

of amendment

CF2

of negotiations largely dictates the choice

rules.

Ultimately, the

weak support

explanations of multilateralism as

CF2 may

for hypothesis

much

as

it

not challenge constructivist

challenges the particular significance of

consensus claimed here. Indicators of disagreement

may be

less useful as a

guide to

understanding institutional design than indicators of general knowledge and uncertainty.
This

is

because disagreement concerning the adequacy of knowledge

may

itself

be

motivated by other considerations, such as anticipated distributional consequences.

Without any way

to ascertain the “true”

source of disagreement concerning the adequacy

of policy-relevant information, constructivist approaches

more general

may

be better off focusing on

indicators of knowledge rather than manifest indicators of

consensus/dissensus.

Summary of Findings
The

results of the empirical analyses of rational institutionalist, realist,

constructivist hypotheses concerning flexibility are

To

recap, this study found very

mixed support
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summarized below

in

and

Table

for the rational institutionalist

6. 13.

hypotheses. Contrary to rational institutionalist expectations, this study found no

evidence that negotiators provided flexibility mechanisms to mitigate the heightened
distributional bargaining created

by enforcement mechanisms (1F1

).

Likewise,

this

study found no evidence that negotiators responded to uncertainty by limiting the
duration of agreements (IF2). In contrast, this study found strong support for the third

rational institutionalist hypothesis (1F3).

The

size

of negotiations

the

is

most

convincing explanation for negotiators’ choice of decision rules governing the adoption

of amendments

The

to

an agreement.

statistical findings

provide similarly mixed support for the two

hypotheses. Sunset clauses were extremely rare

Although none of the three

among surveyed agreements.

them were negotiated by

that did include

the great majority of agreements negotiated

no ground

among
draw

is

agreements are distinctive for

their indefinite duration

hegemony was

hypotheses. There

problem

there

is

is

hegemonic

actor,

hegemonic

a strong conclusion that

(RF1

).

On

the other hand,

a significant predictor of decreased transformative flexibility.

Finally, the empirical results provide very

a

a

relative equals did not incorporate

them, either. Therefore, there

to

realist

is

modest support

for the constructivist

significant evidence that uncertainty about the causes

a significant predictor of the decision to provide for

no significant evidence

negotiators choose less

to

and extent of

amendment. However,

support the second implication of hypothesis CF1, that

demanding decision

rules in response to uncertainty.

Similarly,

although the observed cases are consistent with hypothesis CF2, this study did not find a
statistically significant relationship

for

amendment

between policy dissensus and the choice

to

provide

Indeed, the fact that the great majority of agreements provide for
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amendment, regardless of uncertainty or policy dissensus,
infer strategic design

theory

from the simple provision

may have much

to

for

on our

casts doubt

amendment. While

ability to

constructivist

say about other aspects of institutional design,

it

does not

appear that the constructivist mechanisms discussed here explain negotiators’ choice of
institutional flexibility.

These

examines these hypotheses

results are

in light

summarized

in

Table

6. 13.

The next

section

of two specific cases: the 1987 Montreal Protocol on

Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Table 6.13

Hyp
IFI

Summary

of Hypotheses and Findings on Flexibility (continued on the next page)

Notes

Support

Description
flexibility will

None

increase with the use of

There

enforcement mechanisms.

adaptive flexibility increasing

Adaptive

is

no evidence of

In fact,

enforcement

may be

associated

with less

flexibility.

with enforcement.

IF2

Transformative flexibility

None.

will increase with

There

uncertainty.

evidence of negotiators

rare regardless

limiting agreement duration

uncertainty.

in

IF3

Transformative

flexibility

Limited duration
is

no systematic

agreements were very
of

response to uncertainty.

Strong.

However, many small
make no

will decrease with the

Supermajority rule

number of parties.

associated with larger

provision for

negotiations, consensus with

amendment.

is

negotiations

smaller negotiations.

RF1

Transformative flexibility

Weak.

Sunset clauses are

will decrease with

Data are consistent with

rare

hegemony.

RF1, but no significant

agreements,

relationship exists.

regardless of

among surveyed

hegemony.

RF2

Agreements negotiated by

Strong.

relative equals will feature

Hegemony

hegemony

leaves

higher levels of adaptive

predictor of greater rule

substantial

amount of

and interpretive

precision

variance

precision

flexibility

Nevertheless,
is

a significant

in

unexplained
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Table 6.13

Hyp
CF1

Summary

of Hypotheses and Findings on Flexibility (continued)

Support

Description

Notes

Transformative flexibility

Moderate.

will increase with

Uncertainty

uncertainty.

predictor of the decision to

provide for

Empirical results
is

a significant

amendment

based on a small

number of cases that
do not provide for
amendment; results

may

CF2

Transfonnative flexibility

Weak.

will increase with policy

Nearly

dissensus.

dissensus provide for

be sensitive

Since the great
all

cases of policy

agreements provide

amendment. However,
policy dissensus

is

for

not a

significant predictor

majority of

of

amendment,

is little

there

variation for

dissensus to explain.

provision for amendment.

Exploring Institutional Flexibility: Case Studies

The object of this

section

is

not to choose a representative sample of

all

multilateral environmental agreements but, rather, to illuminate the hypotheses under

consideration by searching for theoretically interesting differences between two similarly
structured cases. These cases are especially well

design of the Kyoto Protocol

comparison

(e.g., Barrett

commonly

matched because recent studies of the

use the Montreal Protocol as a

2003). Victor (2001

)

benchmark

emphasizes the design of

for

flexibility

provisions, in particular, as one reason for the agreements’ varying effectiveness.

Kyoto Protocol
Article 7.2 (a) of the

UN

Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC)

created a Conference of Parties to the Convention that

would

examine the obligations of the Parties and the
arrangements under the Convention, in the light of
the objective of the Convention, the experience gained in its
Periodically

institutional

implementation and the evolution of scientific and technological

knowledge.
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As mandated by

Article 7.4 of the

March -

held in Berlin from 28

FCCC

Mandate charged
been effective

became known

that the

in limiting

the

FCCC

FCCC’s

legal instrument” that

would

objectives” (DePledge 2000,

establishment of the

review of the institutional arrangements of
delegates to

COP-1 adopted

decision

voluntary commitments and mechanisms had not

(GHG)

emissions

this situation, the Berlin

to “take appropriate action

1

one year following the Convention’s

First,

greenhouse gas

commitments of Annex

(COP-1) was

as the “Berlin Mandate.” Essentially, the Berlin

To remedy

(industrialized) parties.

to the

parties’

yielded two major outcomes.

1/CP.l, which later

the First Conference of Parties

7 April 1995,

The

entry into legal force in 1994.

the

FCCC,

Parties

.

.

.

among Annex
Mandate

beyond 2000, including

I

called

the strengthening of

through the adoption of a protocol or another

“set quantified emission limitation

and reduction

The second major outcome of COP-1 was

6).

Ad Hoc Group on

on parties

the Berlin

the

Mandate (AGBM), charged with

the

task of developing a formal legal instrument to institutionalize the policy objectives

expressed in the Berlin Mandate.

The

AGBM

met

eight times

between COP-1 (Berlin) and COP-3 (Kyoto).

Negotiation of what would become the Kyoto Protocol began in earnest

at

AGBM

4

in

July 1996. At this meeting, state delegates charged the chair of the meeting with the

task of producing a “Synthesis

December. True

to

its

name,

of proposals”

this

menu of choices from which

significant

time for the

document collected

proposals that delegates had advanced in the

the

in

first

four

in

fifth

AGBM

one place

AGBM

all

meeting

in

the various

meetings and provided

negotiators produced the Kyoto Protocol. Another

development occurred

at

AGBM

6,
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when

delegates charged the chair of the

meeting, Raul Estrada, with the task of producing a negotiating text in time to distribute

to

FCCC

the

parties before

FCCC

least six

AGBM

requires proposed

months prior

7 in July 1997, This deadline

amendments or protocols

to a vote

‘consolidated negotiating text’ initiating a

(Depledge 2000,
text,

the

10).

and forwarded

AGBM’s

it

At

significant because

communicated

on adoption, and COP-3 was scheduled

1998. Following the review of the negotiating text at

view of a possible compromise

to be

was

AGBM

AGBM

8,

AGBM

December

Estrada drafted a

7,

new phase of discussions by

text for consideration at

for

to parties at

8 in

setting out his

October 1997

negotiators revised the consolidated negotiating

for consideration at the

Kyoto conference (COP-3), concluding

work.

The Kyoto Protocol provides no

when

insight into the

first

rational institutionalist

mechanisms

to

promote

compliance, they will also provide adaptive flexibility mechanisms

to

make

hypothesis, that

agreement easier

negotiators choose enforcement

to conclude,

previous study put

because

it

the

does not adopt an enforcement approach, As a

it:

During the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol,
the tenns of any

The

new compliance
main

seems to have been accepted that
would have to be deferred to the

it

institutions

controversy

concerned the possible inclusion of
“consequences” (beyond the predictable list of cautions, suspension of privileges,
etc.) (Sands and Linehan 2004, 107).
future.

Article 18 of the

Kyoto Protocol -

enforcement by postponing them

the primary compliance article

until the first

meeting of Parties

- sidesteps questions of
after the Protocol’s

entry into force.

The measures included
to

compliance

in the Protocol provide a strongly

managerial approach

Article 5 facilitates implementation review by directing parties to

develop national systems for estimating

GHG emissions
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Article 7 directs

Annex

1

(industrialized) countries in particular to provide “supplementary information” as

needed for the Conference of Parties
the

compliance. Article 8 establishes that

Conference of Parties will assign “expert” review teams

Article 9 requires the

first

agreement’s terms “in

meeting of parties

light

(c) facilitate the

adopted by parties,

(f)

in light

is

review the

to

implementation of the protocol,

of experience and evolving scientific

exchange of information concerning specific measures

make recommendations concerning implementation of the

protocol, and (g) secure financial resources for the

of these measures

Kyoto Protocol

to (a) assess parties’

re-examine parties’ obligations

knowledge,

to the

to assess national reporting.

of the best available scientific information.” Article 13

Conference of Parties

directs the

(b)

to assess

FCCC’s

financial

mechanism. Each

indicative of the concern for capacity-building emphasized

by a

‘managerial’ approach to compliance.

In

summary,

hypothesis (IF1

distributional

the

)

the

Kyoto case sheds

little

light

on the rational

that negotiators will supply flexibility

mechanisms

institutionalist

to mitigate

problems created or exacerbated by enforcement mechanisms. Parties

Kyoto negotiations bargained

to

‘hard’ despite the protocol’s lack of enforcement

provisions.

The Kyoto case generally supports

the second rational institutionalist

hypothesis, that negotiators will be increasingly likely to provide transformative

flexibility

when they

are faced with uncertainty.

provide transformative flexibility
only a limited duration,
sustain cooperation

i.e.,

is

The most

to specify that the

direct

agreement

way
shall

for negotiators to

be

in force for

including a ‘sunset clause’, thus requiring renegotiation to

While the Kyoto Protocol does not include a sunset clause,
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it

does

Annex

incorporate an equivalent provision. Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol directs

parties to reduce their emissions

‘commitment

period’.

by

5 percent

from

a

The concept of a commitment

1990 baseline
period, as

conventional deadline, provides parties with flexibility

least

two ways.

weather,

may

compliance

It

in

in the

opposed

1

2008-2012
to a

meeting their obligations

in at

sidesteps the possibility that unanticipated shocks, such as extreme

require abnormally high energy use, preventing a state from achieving

in a specific year.

provided they accommodate

States

may exceed

this in other years.

their emissions target in

one year

Second, requiring reductions

in a

limited period grants states flexibility in choosing specific policies to meet those

targets.

Additionally, as discussed in the preceding section, the

several provisions designed to facilitate periodic

Kyoto Protocol contains

amendment and

review.

The protocol

requires parties to establish national reporting systems to estimate emissions, provides

of national communications, and delegates authority

for expert review

Conference of Parties

and annexes

to assess implementation,

to the

compliance, and to adopt amendments

to the Protocol (for those parties that

have accepted them)

in light

of

implementation review.
Since the Protocol incorporates a limited commitment period, requires

implementation review, and permits amendments and annexes

may seem odd

to

in

response

to

argue that the Kyoto case provides only moderate support

hypothesis IF2. The reason for this surprising assessment

between the two provisions just described
within a five-year

lies in a

review,

it

for

necessary tension

Permitting parties to achieve compliance

commitment period grants them

255

extra flexibility in determining

how

to

meet emissions

targets.

However, as Oberthiir and Ott (1999, 127-8) have noted,

“under a commitment period of several years, half of the following period will have
passed by the time the results of the compliance assessment of any given period

become
3,

available.” Other proposals, such as the one advanced by

Germany

at

AGBM

incorporated two single year targets for 2005 and 2010. Under this system, the

Conference of Parties could review compliance with the

recommend measures

to facilitate

first

deadline in time to

compliance by the second deadline. Under the actual

Kyoto review mechanism, knowledge gained from

a review

period could only be used to inform policies for a third

of the

first

commitment

commitment

period.

The

review process likely could not provide timely information for use in negotiating a

second commitment period. Therefore, despite the profusion of formal
provisions in the Kyoto Protocol, Oberthiir and Ott

agreement

is

“likely to be a rather

clumsy and slow

(

flexibility

1999, 127-8) predict that the

to

develop treaty

.

.

.

because of

its

inflexible structural design.”

The

third rational institutionalist hypothesis expects that, other things equal,

negotiators will be less likely to provide transformative flexibility as the

parties to a negotiation increases.

In the

Kyoto

number of

case, this hypothesis cuts against

hypothesis IF2, which expects negotiators to provide transformative flexibility in

response to uncertainty.

In

evaluating these hypotheses,

greater weight on the second

Because of the

it

seems reasonable

scientific uncertainty

to place

surrounding climate

change, and the ultimate consequences of different mitigation options, mechanisms for
periodic review and

amendment

are unavoidably central to the design of the agreement.
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Despite creating obvious burdens, there

is little

evidence

diplomatic

in the

history suggesting that negotiators designed formal provisions of the protocol to

A

minimize transaction costs created by the large number of participants.

possible

exception might be the Protocol’s requirement of three-fourths voting approval, rather
than consensus, for the adoption of amendments and annexes. Nevertheless, even this

requirement
Rather,

it

is

quite strict given the

seems

that the

most

number of states

direct responses to the

participating in the

Kyoto process.

problem of transaction costs were

informal: state preferences routinely were consolidated in voting blocs (e.g.,

JUSSCANNZ,

G-77,

etc.),

and

states routinely delegated considerable discretion in

agenda management and resolving impasses
2000; 2005).

In

summary,

the

AOSIS,

Kyoto case

is

to chairs

of negotiating sessions (Depledge

neither inconsistent nor completely

consistent with hypothesis IF3.

The

first realist

hypothesis on flexibility expects that hegemonic actors will not

provide transformative flexibility

when

interesting claim, as with the

rational institutionalist hypothesis,

this case.

first

The Kyoto Protocol does not

using multilateral processes. While this

reflect

it

is

is

an

not relevant to

hegemonic diplomacy. Though

individual states exercised significant influence over the design of various aspects of

the agreement,

no single actor dictated the terms of the

The second

among

realist

relative equals will

entire agreement.

hypothesis expects that multilateral agreements negotiated

emphasize the use of adaptive

flexibility

mechanisms

escape clauses, withdrawal clauses) and interpretive flexibility provisions
reservations).

The Kyoto Protocol provides only very modest support

RF2. Although

rife

with flexible provisions, the Kyoto Protocol
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is

(i.e.,

(e.g.,

for hypothesis

not strong on

adaptive flexibility.

It

incorporates no escape clause to speak of. Article 27 of the

Kyoto Protocol does provide

a formal

chapter explained earlier, nearly
further support for hypothesis

all

mechanism

surveyed agreements do

RF2 would

designed the withdrawal mechanism

However,

for withdrawal.

so.

as this

What might provide

be evidence that negotiators consciously

to serve the

purpose claimed by the hypothesis.

Actually, however, the Kyoto Protocol's withdrawal clause occasioned very

little

discussion during the entire negotiation process. There was

the withdrawal proposals contained in the

reviewed

at

AGBM

Estrada simply “chose to repeat
96). This language

[FCCC]

the

It

is

first

remained unchanged throughout

difficult to find

the negotiators of the

among

consolidated negotiating text,

provisions on withdrawal” (Depledge 2000,

Kyoto Conference (COP-3, December 1997), and
Protocol.

variation

“Framework compilation” document

when designing

Later,

6.

little

any evidence

is

AGBM

8 (October 1997)

reflected in the text of the

and the

Kyoto

in the diplomatic history that suggests that

Kyoto Protocol attached

a great deal of significance to the

withdrawal clause, other than there being one. The direct carryover of the withdrawal
clause from the

FCCC

to the

treated the withdrawal clause

Kyoto Protocol suggests,

more

instead, that

most negotiators

as diplomatic boilerplate than as a central aspect of

institutional design.

Contrary to the expectations of the second Realist hypothesis, negotiators did
not permit reservations to the Kyoto Protocol; Article 26 expressly forbids states from

attaching reservations to their signature of the Protocol

This clause, like the

withdrawal clause (Article 27), remained unchanged throughout the negotiation of the
Protocol.

None of the proposals contained

in the
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“framework compilation” reviewed

at

AGBM

6 permitted reservations. At

AGBM

8,

US] disagreed with

indicate that one party [the

was revised

the article. This note

withdrawn during the Kyoto Conference. The
Protocol mirrors Article 24 of the

the negotiating text

final text

FCCC. Again,

to

was subsequently

of Article 25 of the Kyoto

the diplomatic history surrounding the

negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol’s reservation clause does not support hypothesis RF2.

At no point during the negotiations did

a substantial

number of parties express

interest

Arguably, only the United States acted consistently with

in permitting reservations.

hypothesis RF2. The most that can be claimed for the hypothesis
favorable terms of cooperation, the

US

is that,

after securing

delegation to the Kyoto negotiations no longer

had any incentive to support a provision allowing reservations.
In

summary,

hypotheses on

the

Kyoto Protocol does not
With respect

flexibility.

offer

much

support for the Realist

to adaptive flexibility provisions, the protocol

does not incorporate an escape mechanism.

does permits formal withdrawal from the

It

Protocol, but withdrawal provisions are theoretically less flexible than escape

mechanisms because
triggered the escape

the latter permit cooperation to continue after the event that

mechanism

agreement - withdrawing are free to stop

compliance

interpretive flexibility;

it

passes.

is less

in

Ending participation

significant

still

in a cooperative

for Realists,

who assume

that states

any event. Moreover, the Protocol does not offer much

specifically forbids states

from attaching reservations

to their

signature of the agreement

Mostly, however, the Kyoto Protocol offers

hypotheses because there

is

so

little

evidence

in the

actually bargained over these provisions in the
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little

support for the Realist

diplomatic history that negotiators

manner envisaged by

the Realist

To

hypotheses.

the contrary,

most of the formal

flexibility provisions

seriously debated at any point during the negotiations, and

common

boilerplate

to

numerous agreements.

negotiators as these hypotheses predict, one

some appear

If these provisions

would expect

to find

Finally, the

that

it

be

much more

to

discussion

That there

itself.

constitutes a strong argument against the Realist hypotheses on flexibility.

little

concerning

to

were as significant

of them during the preliminary meetings and the Kyoto conference

was so

were not

Kyoto Protocol

flexibility.

The

first

is

consistent with both constructivist hypotheses

constructivist hypothesis

is

similar to hypothesis IF2 in

focuses on the significance of uncertainty for institutional design.

As explained

previously, however, constructivism departs from rational institutionalism by

considering uncertainty to be endogenous to institutional design. Negotiators do not

merely react
reduce

it.

to uncertainty, they

As

is

respond

to uncertainty

by designing institutions

readily apparent from the preceding discussion, the

to

Kyoto Protocol

is

very consistent with hypothesis CF1. The Kyoto Protocol’s procedure for

implementation review focuses not simply on

of the protocol's terms.

It

state

compliance, but also the adequacy

specifically emphasizes the importance of expert review, and

emphasizes the importance of using the best available
incorporating

new knowledge

as

it

becomes

scientific

knowledge,

available.

Likewise, the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated amid considerable dissensus

concerning both

and

(

(2) the likely

1

)

the

adequacy of scientific knowledge concerning policy options,

consequences of choosing different options. Indeed, the

mechanisms themselves were
In

the subject of serious disagreement

among

flexibility

negotiators.

almost every case, however, negotiators chose flexibility over specific, but disputed,
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standards, including the decisions to maintain the

delineated in the

FCCC;

to adopt a basket

common

approach to greenhouse gases;

implementation and emission trading; and the decision
rather than single-year targets.

but differentiated approach

to specify

to

permit joint

compliance windows

However, although the Kyoto case provides

considerable support for the claim that negotiators provide interpretive flexibility in

response to uncertainty and policy dissensus,

it

that negotiators will provide formal flexibility

provides

little

mechanisms

support for the claims

(e.g., reservations,

escape

clauses) in response to uncertainty or disagreement concerning policy.

Montreal Protocol

The Montreal Protocol on Substances
negotiated fairly rapidly.

that Deplete the

Ozone Layer was

May

Preliminary negotiations activity took place from

November, 1996. Formal negotiations took place

in

four rounds between

to

December 1996

and September 1987. During much of this time, discussion of final clauses such as
signature, reservations, entry into force,

and withdrawal took

a

back seat

more

to

substantive concerns, as consensus developed around the scientific basis for the

Protocol’s measures (Anderson and

The

Sarma 2002; Benedick 1998; Haas 1992).

first rational institutionalist

hypothesis expects that negotiators will

supplement enforcement mechanisms with institutional
agreements easier

to conclude.

As with

the

flexibility to

Kyoto Protocol,

this

make

international

hypothesis

is

not strictly

applicable to the Montreal Protocol because negotiators adopted a managerial, rather than

punitive, approach to dealing with noncompliance.

extensive reporting requirements (Articles 4,

review (Article

6),

7, 9,

The Protocol contains

and

1

I

),

provides for assessment and

and emphasizes technological and financial transfers
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fairly

to

promote

capacity building (Articles 5 and 10). Article 8 of the Montreal Protocol, which deals
directly with compliance, postpones the consideration

the first

Meeting of Parties. As a

result,

of compliance mechanisms

until

hypothesis IF1 makes no determinate prediction

with respect to the Montreal case.

Hypothesis IF2 expects that negotiators will respond
frequent re-evaluation of the terms of the agreement.

moderate support for
for frequent review

to uncertainty

by requiring

The Montreal Protocol provides

Clearly, the designers of the Protocol provided

this hypothesis.

of the terms of the agreement. Article 2.9

(a) establishes that the

parties to the Protocol can adjust both the ozone-depleting potential ratings for the

substances listed in

Annex A and

substances. Article

2.

the levels of permitted

consumption of controlled

10 (a) permits parties to add additional substances to

Articles 6 and 7 establish a through review process for assessing the

Protocol and

to the

its

implementation by the

Meeting of the

Parties to adopt

parties.

measures

Article

in

Yet the Montreal Protocol must be judged
hypothesis 1F2 because of its duration. Since, in

institutions,

it

makes sense

regular renegotiation.

utility

this

it

accordance with these provisions.
to

this

be only moderately consistent with
view, uncertainty

facilitates

targets for parties, the last

it

exogenous

is

of agreements

can states ensure that the actual

for change, the Montreal Protocol

require regular renegotiation. Rather,

adequacy of the

delegates sufficient authority

agreement will not vary too greatly from

from participation. Although

mechanisms

1

for designers to limit the duration

Only by doing

their participation in the

1

Annex A.

to

to force

utility

of

their anticipated

information review and provides

was not

prescribes a

written in such a

way

as to

number of successive reduction

of which continues indefinitely beyond the July 1998 - June
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1999 compliance period (Article

2.4).

Accordingly,

this

study finds only very modest

support for hypothesis IF2.
Finally, the third rational institutionalist hypothesis expects that increasing

transaction costs will motivate negotiators to provide less transformative flexibility as

the

number of parties

The Montreal

to a negotiation increases.

The

Protocol, does not appear to be consistent with this projection.

Montreal Protocol simultaneously sought

( 1 )

to

maximize

agreement (particularly, by granting concessions
strong

mechanisms

Kyoto

negotiators of the

participation in the

developing

states),

and (2)

to create

and amendment of the agreement. The

for implementation review

simultaneous presence of these factors makes

to

Protocol, like the

it

difficult to accept

hypothesis IF3’s

explanation that transaction costs create an inverse relationship between participation

and transformative

were concerned

to

maximize

adjustment of the agreement
political climates,

the leakage of

In the case

flexibility.

both.

in

of the Montreal Protocol, negotiators clearly

They provided

accommodate

response to evolving scientific knowledge and shifting

and they were concerned

CFC

for flexibility to

to

maximize participation

production to states outside the Protocol

to

guard against

Accordingly,

this

study

concludes that the Montreal case does not support IF3.

The

first realist

hypothesis (RF1

)

expects that hegemonic negotiators will not

provide transformative flexibility, to prevent favorable terms of cooperation from being
altered against their interests.

expectation.

As mentioned

internationalize

The Montreal Protocol provides no support

earlier, the

ozone protection

if

U.S,

was prepared

for this

to take unilateral

measures

negotiations failed, and the U.S exercised great

influence over the Montreal negotiations

(DeSombre 2000). Flowever,
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rather than try

to

to solidify

cooperation on one particular set of terms, the United States supported an

agreement

that

provided for extensive transformative

flexibility.

The Montreal Protocol provides more support
rational institutionalist or realist approaches.

Protocol as a

work

in progress; they

for constructivist than for either

Negotiators consciously designed the

developed a framework for the international

regulation of ozone-depleting substances but intentionally

vague and

in

left

many

specific aspects

need of further development. Consistent with constructivism’s

understanding of uncertainty as endogenous to design, negotiators did not simply
provide a sunset clause to safeguard against unanticipated developments; they

and

institutionalized processes for review

scientific input to serve as the basis for

subsequent negotiations.

Conclusions
This chapter has explored claims that negotiators design three types of

institutional flexibility

Specifically,

it

under certain conditions and

in

response to certain problems.

evaluated explanations of institutional flexibility drawn from three

theoretical orientations: rational institutionalism, realism,

examined these expectations

A number

in light

and constructivism. Finally,

of two specific cases.

of conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing discussion.

primary source of variation

it

among surveyed agreements

First, the

derives not from provision of

formal adaptive or transformative flexibility mechanisms but from interpretive flexibility

—

the leeway they provide to states in

agreement surveyed

in the

1RD

complying with agreement

rules.

Nearly every

included a formal provision for denunciation or

withdrawal. Almost none permitted reservations to states’ signature. Almost
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all

provided for amendment.

Few

incorporate escape

mechanisms and even fewer

are of

limited duration. In contrast, the surveyed agreements vary widely in their precision and

in the

leeway they provide

to

members

in

complying with agreement

variation in adaptive and transformative flexibility provisions

arguments of increasing

institutional

may

rules.

This lack of

support constructivist

isomorphism (Finnemore 1996) or the strength of

previously-established international diplomatic practices functioning as default rules.

Second, none of the three theoretical approaches fares consistently well

in

explaining institutional flexibility. Moreover, the hypotheses considered in this chapter,

taken together, have varying success

flexibility.

in

explaining the three types of institutional

Rational institutionalism fails to explain adaptive flexibility and has only

modest success explaining transformative

flexibility.

Realism fares poorly

at

explaining

adaptive and transformative flexibility but succeeds in explaining interpretive flexibility

Finally, constructivism has

little to

say concerning adaptive and interpretive flexibility,

but fares moderately well in explaining transformative uncertainty.

Fhe strongest explanation for interpretive

flexibility is

hypothesis (RF2) that interpretive flexibility will be higher

by relative equals and lower

among agreements

provided by the

among agreements

realist

negotiated

No

negotiated by hegemonic actors

hypotheses were found to explain negotiators’ decision whether to permit reservations.

There was almost no variation on

this issue;

only one agreement (CITES) permits

reservations.

Constructivism and rational institutionalism combine to provide strong
explanations of what variation exists in interpretive flexibility

first

constructivist hypothesis, uncertainty

is

First, consistent

a significant predictor
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with the

of negotiators’

)

decision to provide for amendment. However, neither uncertainty nor policy dissensus
predict negotiators’ choice of decision rules governing the adoption of amendments.

only explanation for this that receives significant support

is

the size of negotiations.

The

As

expected by the third rational institutionalist hypothesis (IF3), consensual or unanimous
decision rules are significantly less likely

Finally,

there

was

large negotiations.

none of the hypotheses examined

variation in adaptive flexibility.

explain; nearly

among

all

In part this is

chapter adequately explain

because there

is

very

surveyed agreements provided for withdrawal.

variation in the provision of escape

Nevertheless, escape mechanisms were far

Similarly, escape

in the

little

On

variation to

the other hand,

mechanisms among surveyed agreements.

more infrequent than realism would

mechanisms were not found

provision of enforcement mechanisms, as the

to

be significantly associated with the

first

hypothesis expected.
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expect.

rational institutionalist (IF1

CHAPTER

7

CONCLUSION

It is

time

to

draw together

the

many

strands of analysis that this study has

produced. This chapter offers conclusions and suggests productive avenues for future

work on

institutional design.

It

proceeds

results presented in the last three chapters

in

four sections.

and

The

first

summarizes the

identifies patterns in those results.

completes the “y centered,” “causes of effects” analysis of the factors
negotiators' choice of institutional forms.

The second

Thus

it

that influence

section reverses the perspective by

adopting an “effects of causes,” or “x-centered” approach to delve more deeply into the
question of which explanatory variables are meaningful for design (Gernng 2007). This

perspective

can select

is

particularly useful because

among

it

emphasizes the

fact that negotiators usually

several design options that negotiators in responding to a given

problem. Building on

this,

section three examines

which aspects of agreements

negotiators actually design, and which are artifacts of custom or habit. Section four

concludes the chapter by exploring avenues for future research on institutional design

Causes of Effects: Membership, Delegation, and

Flexibility

m MEAs

This section reviews the findings of the previous three chapters regarding use of

membership, delegation, and
that

flexibility provisions

may have been hidden by each

and searches

for interaction effects

chapter’s focus on an individual aspect of institutional

design.

Membership
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.

Table

7.1

summarizes the hypotheses advanced concerning possible influences on

membership
Table

criteria

chosen by negotiators.

Summary

7.1

Number

Hypothesis

IM1

Negotiators will

of Findings Concerning

Membership
Empirical Support/Cases

restrict

Modest/Weak

membership when

Cases do not provide leverage on 1M

designing agreements providing excludable

1

benefits.

IM2

Negotiators will respond to use entry into force

Modes t/VVeak

conditions to create a tipping effect, encouraging

Case studies are inconsistent with 1M2.

participation.

RM1

Negotiators will design inclusive membership

Strong
However, LRTAP represents a deviant
case, membership influenced by other

rules in response to distributional problems.

criteria.

RM2

Negotiators will design demanding entry into

Mixed/Strong

force conditions in response to

Cases support hypothesis RM2,

distributional/relative gains concerns

CM1

CM2

Negotiators will be less likely to

restrict

Mixed/Strong

membership when responding

perceived crises.

Cases do not provide strong leverage.

to

Negotiators will prioritize breadth of participation

over depth of cooperation

when

Mixed/Modest
Cases are somewhat inconsistent. The
LRTAP negotiations show signs of a
‘sequential’ approach; Vienna and

tradeoffs are

necessary.

Montreal negotiations were

parallel.

This study finds very modest support for hypothesis IM1, which expects that
negotiators will not provide excludable benefits without restricting membership.

contrary,

among surveyed agreements

open than are

restricted.

this

the

provide such benefits, more agreements are

Nevertheless, the majority of surveyed agreements, including

those chosen for case study analysis

goods. Therefore,

that

To

in

Chapter

4,

do not involve potentially excludable

study’s findings concerning 1M1 remain preliminary.

This study also finds modest support for hypothesis IM2, which expects that
states confronting

prior to

its

enforcement problems

entry into force

The

will not

promise to comply with an agreement

logic behind this claim
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is

that negotiators faced

with

enforcement problems can use entry into force conditions

to set

minimum

participation

thresholds (Barrett 2003). Unlike normative accounts which emphasize

“appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1998) as a guide to behavior, this rationalist
explanation emphasizes that the perceived benefits of environmental cooperation

sometimes depend on the number of parties

participating.

If this is the case,

one would

not expect states to promise compliance before entry into force.

In fact, states did not agree to

comply

prior to entry into force in any of the

surveyed agreements that addressed the problem of ensuring that

would join by
promised

stipulating substantive conditions for entry into force.

comply

to

all

important states

In general, states

prior to entry into force for nearly half of agreements characterized

by no or low enforcement problems, but

for only one-eighth

of agreements coded as

having moderate or higher enforcement problems. Nevertheless, although these
preliminary results are consistent with IM2, this study found no statistically significant
relationship between severity of enforcement problems and early compliance.

This study finds greater support for the two
strong empirical support for hypothesis

membership

criteria in

response

RM1,

not to restrict membership

not explain

all

in multilateral

is

hypotheses.

that negotiators will

to distribution

distributional conflict during negotiations

realist

First, there is

choose inclusive

problems. Logistic regression shows

a strong predictor of negotiators’ decision

agreements. However, distribution problems do

variance in membership rules, and the case discussion identified a

discordant case, the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution regime.

negotiations the

same membership

that

criteria

were used

In these

for each protocol, regardless of

underlying distributional politics. The balance of the evidence shows that increasing
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membership may be

a relevant strategy for negotiators in dealing with distributional

problems, but distributional conflict

is

not the only factor influencing negotiators’

decision whether to restrict membership.

This study also finds generally strong support for hypothesis
that negotiators will

entry into force.

respond

Though

ratification or approval

to

there

enforcement problems by requiring

is

no evidence

RM2, which

strict

expects

conditions for

to suggest that negotiators require

by a higher proportion of signatories when faced with concerns

such as free riding, there

is

strong evidence that negotiators are

more

likely to design

substantive criteria for entry into force (such as participation by parties representing a

certain percentage of the behavior in question)

It

when enforcement problems

appears that simply requiring a larger number of ratifications

to mitigate

is

too crude an instrument

concerns about cheating or free riding. The two case studies provide mixed

The Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol on Substances

results.

Ozone Layer
regression

RM2, though

are consistent with

shows

that the salience

the

LRTAP

regime

of enforcement problems

is

is

regime simply

In

is

summary, there

an outlier on

is

that

not.

Deplete the

Since logistic

a strong predictor of the

negotiators’ decision to design substantive entry into force criteria,

LRTAP

are salient..

it

is

possible that the

this issue.

strong statistical evidence to support both Realist

hypotheses. Further case studies will be necessary to demonstrate the causal validity of

RM

1

Though

there

is

evidence that negotiators do not choose to

response to distributional conflicts, there

expand membership

to

minimize

quantitative evidence that

RM2

is less

restrict

membership

evidence that they actively seek to

relative gains concerns.

There

is

even stronger

accurately describes the design of entry into force
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in

conditions. Moreover, Benedick’s (1998) diplomatic history of the Montreal Protocol

shows

that

major proponents of the Protocol (and the United

States, in particular)

understood entry into force conditions as significant largely for the same reasons posited

by RM2.
This study finds mixed support for the constructivist hypotheses.

CM1,

support for hypothesis

be

crisis generally will

shock or perceived

membership

less likely to restrict

crisis

is

by

far the

Rather,

demanding entry

responding to a perceived shock or

the surveyed agreements,

for restricting

membership.

membership. Inspired by the

crisis.

CM

1

.

This corollary holds that

into force conditions

when

they are

This study finds significantly more support for

There were no surveyed agreements

this hypothesis.

restrict

hypotheses, this study examined a corollary that arguably

better expresses the original insight behind hypothesis

negotiators will choose less

among

most commonly used basis

are otherwise unrestricted in

realist

partial

membership. The presence of an external

appears to have no influence on negotiators’ decision to

Most of these agreements
of tests on the

found

motivated primarily by a perceived shock or

or participation in an agreement.

geographic location

results

that negotiators

It

in

which negotiators responding

primarily to a shared sense of crisis designed substantive conditions for an agreement’s

entry into force.

crisis required,

While

statistical tests

on average,

ratification

force than did agreements that

difference

is

showed

that

agreements motivated by a perceived

by a lower percentage of signatories

were not negotiated

in

to enter into

response to a perceived

crisis, the

not statistically significant. Therefore, this study cannot reject the null

hypothesis that there

is

no difference between the two group means.
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Finally, this study finds

prioritize breadth

There

is

mixed support

for the

CM2

claim that negotiators will

of participation over depth of cooperation when designing agreements.

strong evidence that negotiators do not restrict participation in

political or

economic grounds. Thus,

general

norm of non-exclusion among

Ruggie

( 1

993b) suggests. However,

hypothesis

CM2

this

MEAs

study finds evidence that there

may

on
be a

negotiators of multilateral agreements, such as

study found very

this

that suggests negotiators

little

choose a pathway

agreements. The logic behind this hypothesis

is

maximizes the nonnative power of agreements,
deepened through the use of transfonnative

that such an

cooperation that

to

emphasizes breadth of participation over depth of cooperation

support for the part of

in the

design of

approach

to

membership

the substantive content of

flexibility provisions.

which can be

However,

this

study

found no significant evidence or a tradeoff between participation and depth of

Some

cooperation.

agreements

entail fairly

membership
In

with a

restricted

is

geographical, this

summary,

only shallow cooperation and some open

entail

deep cooperation. Since the primary of observed variation

is

the design of

restricted

on

political or

generally do not restrict

Indeed, as the

IWC

membership

rules in

new members

state’s influence

to

practical criteria;

MEAs

generally seems consistent

to this rule generally restrict

membership

in

MEAs

economic grounds. This study also found

membership when strong

example

in

in

not surprising.

norm of non-exclusion. The few exceptions

membership on geographic or

recruit

agreements

distributional

generally

if

those

new members

over decisions. Entry into force
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not

that negotiators

problems are present.

Chapter 4 shows, distributional conflict can lead

an agreement

is

states to

will reinforce the recruiting

criteria are generally consistent

with

realism's focus on free-riding and incentives to ‘cheat’ on commitments. This study

found

that negotiators

designed specific thresholds for entry into force

in

response to

such enforcement problems.
Delegation

Table 7.2 summarizes the hypotheses advanced concerning possible influences on
delegation in multilateral environmental agreements.

Table

Summary

7.2

of Findings Concerning Delegation

Number

Hypothesis

Empirical Support

ID1

Delegation increases with the severity of the

Mixed

enforcement problem.

Cases are consistent with ID

ID2

Delegation increases with uncertainty about the
state

Delegation increases with the number of relevant
parties.

/

Cases

Moderate
1

Moderate

LRTAP

of the world.

little

ID3

/

consistent; Basel case provides

is

leverage.

Strong
Cases provide

less support,

demonstrating

the potentially mitigating influence of

coalitions

ID4

RD1

on ID3

Delegation increases with complexity (when

Weak

distributional conflict

Cases do not provide leverage on 1D4,

is

low).

Multilateral agreements generally will feature low
levels

of delegation.

Moderate
Basel case

is

generally consistent with

RD1

RD2

In hegemon-led negotiations, delegation
accompanied with high precision

CD1

will

be

Strong
Cases provide

Multilateral agreements generally will feature

Weak

high levels of delegation.

Though

the

little

leverage.

“norm of multilateralism”

is

supported by the Basel negotiations, which

were more norm-driven than sciencedriven.

CD2

Delegation will increase with uncertainty

when

expert groups supply policy knowledge states.

Strong

Though 11 AS A involvement failed to
produce deep cooperation in LRTAP
Convention.

This study finds varying levels of support for the institutionalist hypotheses

There

is

mixed support

for hypothesis

ID

1

,

that negotiators readiness to delegate
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authority increases in response to greater enforcement problems. In

that face little or

many agreements

no enforcement problem, negotiators simply delegate administrative

responsibilities to

one of the

state parties.

In absolute terms,

agreements involving more

salient

enforcement problems more commonly involved delegation of administrative

power

to

an independent body (usually a secretariat). However, the difference

in

mean

salience of enforcement problems across various institutional choices (no secretariat,

state party

performs secretarial duties, administrative duties delegated

agreement creates new administrative body) was not
Similarly, this study finds

modest support

for the

to existing 10,

statistically significant.

second rational

institutionalist

hypothesis (ID2), that delegation will increase with uncertainty about the state of the
world. Although

it

did not find evidence that negotiators were increasingly likely to

delegate decision making or dispute resolution authority

in

response to uncertainty,

it

did

find evidence that, in designing agreements, negotiators responded to uncertainty by

delegating resources for specific functional purposes. Specifically,

it

found a significant,

positive association between complexity and uncertainty about policy options and

delegation of problem monitoring functions. Additionally, as Table 5.6 shows,

that various

it

found

elements of uncertainty were significant predictors of negotiators' decision to

delegate resources for

( 1 )

researching problem causes and effects, (2) compliance

monitoring, (3) managing financial and technological transfers, and (4) providing an
information clearinghouse for relevant knowledge.

This study found strong support for hypothesis 1D3, that delegation increases with

the

number of parties. Unlike previous work, which has tended

variable simply as the

number of

to conceptualize this

‘relevant’ parties (parties significant in causing the
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problem), this study found evidence that

it

is

primarily the

number of states

affected by a

problem, not the number of states responsible for creating or contributing to a problem,
that influences negotiators.

associated with the

It

also found that the scope of agreements

number of states

affected by a given problem. This

the rational institutionalist belief that as the

so, too,

is

number of parties

does the potential for conflicts of interest

among

strongly

is

congruent with

to a negotiation increases,

the parties. Conflicts

of interest

spur negotiators to broaden an agreement to facilitate logrolling and gains from

exchange.

There

is

modest support

for the rational institutionalist hypothesis ID4, that,

absent strong distributional conflict, increasing complexity will lead negotiators to

increase delegation

make
cases,

it

High complexity and low distributional concerns may combine

prohibitively costly for states to develop strong policy preferences.

1D4 suggests they

making

will delegate greater decision or policy

administrative body. This study found that such a combination

associated with negotiators’ decision to create a

new

was

authority to an

significantly

However,

it

also found

coded as having the highest levels of complexity were associated with

negotiators’ decision not to delegate any administrative capacity at

According
delegation

In these

administrative body, rather than

delegate administrative authority to an existing IO or state party.

that the cases

to

to realists, the

when designing

negotiations conducted

primary influence on negotiators’ decisions regarding

MEAs

among

all.

is

a

concern for upholding

relative equals, hypothesis

state sovereignty

RD1

expects that sovereignty

concerns will prevent negotiators from delegating significant levels of authority
study found modest support for hypothesis

RD
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I

In

This

Although many surveyed agreements

go beyond simple cooperation
little

to establish administrative bodies, these generally enjoy

independence from member

states.

This study also supported Hypothesis RD2, that the delegation of significant

implementation or enforcement power

strongly associated with the

is

hegemonic

influence during negotiations. In particular, hegemon-led negotiations are strongly

among

associated with higher levels of rule precision than are negotiations conducted

relative equals.

The
argument
rules.

It

first

constructivist hypothesis

that multilateralism involves a

on delegation,

commitment

CD l,

parties since they are better able act

case, this study finds

little

evidence

derived from the

to general principles

expects both that the rules governing delegation in a

principles and that multilateral negotiations

is

MEA

and impartial

will accord with these

would involve delegation of authority

on impartial, general principles. Insofar
in

favor of hypothesis

CD1

.

is this is

endow

generally meager resources to such bodies.

empirical evidence in favor of hypothesis

CD1

is

the

Although surveyed

agreements frequently create administrative organizations, they delegate very
discretion and

to third

As

little

a result, the

broad, but very shallow.

This study finds stronger support for hypothesis CD2, that delegation will
increase with the combination of expert group participation and the existence of policy-

relevant knowledge. Ordinal logistic regression demonstrated that three variables in

particular are significant predictors of an agreement’s depth:

specific policy options (the strongest

and most significant

knowledge concerning

effect), the

presence of an

external shock or crisis, and provision of expert advice to states. Notably, expert group

participation, by itself,

is

not associated with deeper agreements.
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They appear

to foster

deeper cooperation only
This

is

in

combination with the provision of expert advice

consistent with hypothesis

that expert

group participation

CD2, and with

may

to states.

sociological approaches that suggest

be strategically selected by states that already hold

strong policy preferences.

In

summary,

this

study finds that although negotiators readily created

administrative organizations to oversee agreements, they generally delegated low levels

of resources, authority and independence to these bodies. The specific functions

that

negotiators delegate are generally consistent with institutionalist and constructivist

expectations. Additionally, in examining the hypotheses on delegation, this study found

that the functional breadth

of agreements generally increases with size of negotiations,

consistent with rational institutionalism, and that states generally negotiate deeper

agreements when they seek out policy advice. Expert group participation, by

itself,

does

not influence either the breadth or depth of cooperation.

Flexibility

Table 7.3 summarizes the hypotheses concerning influences on institutional
flexibility.

This study found

little

support for two of the rational institutionalist

hypotheses, but strong support for the third. Neither
studies supported hypothesis IF

1

,

statistical

that negotiators will

analyses or nor the case

provide institutional flexibility to

mitigate distributional conflict arising from the provision of enforcement mechanisms.

None of the surveyed agreements

with the strongest enforcement mechanisms included

escape mechanisms. Conversely, they were most

little

or no enforcement mechanisms.
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common among

agreements with the

.

Table

7.3

Summary

Number

Hypothesis

IF1

Adaptive

of Findings Concerning Flexibility
Empirical Support

flexibility will increase

enforcement mechanisms.
IF2

IF3

Cases

Cases do not support hypothesis IFF

Transfonnative flexibility will increase with

None

uncertainty.

Although empirical analyses found no
significant relationship, Kyoto is consistent
with limiting agreement duration.

Transformative

flexibility will

Strong
Although Kyoto and Montreal provide
amendment, neither uses a bargainingintensive requirement of consensus

decrease with the

number of parties.

RF1

/

None

with the use of

Hegemonic agreements

will use

for

Weak

little

Kyoto case provides

transfonnative flexibility.

little

leverage,

Montreal case contradicts RF1

RF2

CF1

CF2

Agreements negotiated among

use high levels of adaptive and interpretive

Strong
Kyoto provides

little

flexibility.

escape clause

inconsistent with

Transfonnative flexibility will increase with
uncertainty.

Moderate
Both Kyoto and Montreal
with CF1

Transfonnative flexibility will increase with

Weak

policy dissensus.

Both Kyoto and Montreal are consistent;

relative equals will

is

support; Montreal's

RF2.

are consistent

Kyoto also provides considerable
interpretive/means flexibility.

Likewise, this study finds no support for hypothesis IF2, that scientific
uncertainty drives negotiators to limit the duration of multilateral environmental

agreements. While uncertainty

does not appear

may

influence the negotiation and design of

to influence the decision to limit an

are extremely rare

among

In contrast, this

all

IRDB

MEAs,

it

agreement’s duration; sunset clauses

agreements, irrespective of scientific uncertainty.

study does find support for hypothesis 1F3, which expects that

transformative flexibility decreases with the

number of parties. Although

variation concerning the choices to provide formal

surveyed agreement does) or

to

amendment procedures

there

(nearly every

provide sunset clauses (very few do so), there
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is little

is

variation

choice of decision rule governing the adoption of formal amendments. Most

in the

surveyed agreements require either supermajority support or consensus to adopt an
agreement. The primary difference between the two groups

lies in the

The mean number of states involved

participating in negotiations.

number of states

in negotiating

agreements requiring consensus (13) was only one-fifth that for agreements requiring
only supermajority support (65). Although
rather than causes, this difference,

realist

statistical analysis identified correlations

combined with the negative

results

of the several

hypotheses concerning decision rules, suggests that the transaction cost

explanation advocated by rational institutionalists provides the most plausible account of
negotiator’s choice of decision rules governing

The

results for realist

amendments.

hypotheses are similarly mixed. This study finds

support for hypothesis RF1, that flexibility provisions will feature prominently
negotiation and design of

MEAs. Concerning

little

in the

adaptive flexibility, although nearly every

surveyed agreement includes a formal withdrawal clause, only one in five includes an
escape mechanism. Similarly, with respect to interpretive

flexibility,

most agreements

include fairly precise rules. Only one agreement in the database explicitly permits

reservations.

Finally, although

flexibility (formal

amendment

most agreements incorporate passive transformative
provisions), very

few incorporate

a ‘sunset clause' to

actively require renegotiation.

In contrast, this

study found greater evidence in favor of a second strand of realist

thought concerning international cooperation.

RF2,

that negotiations driven

by a hegemonic

It

found significant support for hypothesis

state

produce more precise agreements

(with less institutional flexibility) than do negotiations conducted
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among

relative equals.

This

is

consistent with the realist view that hegemons,

flexibility,

who have

less use for institutional

can use multilateral diplomacy as a tool of coercion. However, there was

little

evidence to suggest that negotiations driven by hegemonic actors produce agreements
with lower levels of adaptive or transformative flexibility. The major reason for

this is

lack of variation in these formal mechanisms. For example, although not a single

‘coercive’ agreement included a sunset clause (consistent with hypothesis RF2), such

provisions were so rare

among

all

agreements

that

it

is

impossible to find significant

support for the claim that coercive negotiators will be less likely to limit the duration of

an agreement.
Finally, this support finds only

on

institutional flexibility.

flexibility in

Hypothesis

weak support

CF

1

,

for the

two constructivist hypotheses

that negotiators will increase transformative

response to scientific uncertainty, runs into difficulty because of the lack of

variation in formal flexibility provisions.

sunset clauses are extremely rare

The case study of Kyoto notwithstanding,

among surveyed agreements,

Likewise, almost every agreement includes a formal
uncertainty. There

is

regardless of uncertainty.

amendment procedure

regardless of

neither any evidence that negotiators relax requirements for

adopting amendments (by not requiring consensus or unanimity) in response to scientific
uncertainty nor evidence that negotiators are

more

likely to require

consensus

in the face

of uncertainty.
Similarly, this study finds

little

support for hypothesis CF2, that negotiators are

increasingly likely to provide transformative flexibility in response to policy dissensus.

The presence or
their likely

lack of political consensus on the

consequences,

is

menu of available

policy options, and

not a significant predictor of negotiators’ decision to provde

280

)

for

amendment. With respect

the

most plausible explanation found

to decision rules

governing the adoption of amendments,

for the observed variation

is

the

number of states

actively participating in negotiations.

This

is

not to say that scientific uncertainty and policy consensus do not influence

the negotiation of

MEAs,

nor

is it

to

deny the relevance of constructivist arguments

concerning international policy processes. Rather,

it

may be

that the

two hypotheses

advanced here do not adequately represent the significance of uncertainty and policy
consensus. In short, while uncertainty

flexibility provisions

to these concerns.

do not appear

to

may

influence the negotiation of

MEAs,

formal

be negotiators’ the vehicle of choice for responding

Whether they are provided

(e.g.,

withdrawal) or prohibited

reservations), formal institutional flexibility appears to follow

custom or

(e.g.,

habit.

Insofar as

negotiators provide flexibility in response to specific problems, they generally choose

interpretive, or

means

flexibility (as in the

Kyoto Protocol).

Effects of Causes: Power, Interests, and

As mentioned above, another way

Knowledue

to interpret the results

attention on independent variables of interest

and

of this study

is

to

focus

to search for patterns or regularities in

the multilateral agreements that negotiators have designed in response to them. This

section briefly reconsiders the foregoing results from this perspective. Consistent with

the ‘y-centered’ analysis, this section focuses attention

on three broad categories:

power-based variables, (2) interest-based variables, and

(1

(3) ideational variables.

The Influence of State Power
This study has considered the influence of three independent variables related to
state

power: hegemony, sovereignty, and concern for relative gams. The most direct
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test

of hegemonic influence on the design of MEAs would consider the extent
specific agreements correspond to the interests of the

However, such

a test

is

empirically intensive;

it

hegemonic

state, if

to

one

which
is

present.

requires reliable information about

specific state preferences for each of the surveyed agreements. Nevertheless, this study

provides leverage on the question by deriving and testing two general hypotheses

concerning a hegemon’s behavior. Hypothesis
negotiated under

RF2

hegemony

RD1

expects that delegation in

will be sharply delimited, or ‘precise’.

MEAs

Similarly, hypothesis

expects that hegemon-led negotiations will produce relatively inflexible agreements.

Conversely,

it

expects that agreements negotiated

it

relative equals will feature

This study found significant empirical

relatively high levels of institutional flexibility.

support for each of these hypotheses. While

among

is

impossible to predict the substantive

content of an agreement, hegemonic influence over negotiations

with the design of precise, relatively inflexible agreements

is

among

strongly associated

the agreements

analyzed in the IRD.
Preservation of state sovereignty also factored into a

number of design

hypothesis.

Hypothesis RF2 expects that non-hegemonic negotiations will emphasize adaptive and
interpretive flexibility.

Further, hypothesis IF1 expects that negotiators will not design

strong enforcement provisions without also providing adaptive flexibility mechanisms.

This study found very

little

support for these hypotheses as a group, other than the

support for RF2, mentioned above. Contrary to expectations, adaptive flexibility
provisions such as escape clauses are rare

among surveyed agreements.

interpretive flexibility (e.g., reservation provisions)
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is

relatively

Similarly, formal

low among surveyed

agreements. This suggests

that,

contrary to the Realist expectations, enforcement

concerns trumped sovereignty concerns
Finally, hypothesis

RM2

in the negotiation

of the majority of agreements.

expects that concern for relative gains will lead

negotiators to design strict entry into force conditions for multilateral agreements

when

enforcement concerns are relevant. This study found mixed support for hypothesis

Among

surveyed agreements, negotiators did not respond

to

RM2.

enforcement problems by

requiring ratification by a greater percentage of signatories for entry into force.

However, they were more

likely to require ratification

by signatories constituting

a

specific proportion of rule-governed activity.

Overall, the several hypotheses driven by power-based independent variables

have a very mixed empirical record when judged against surveyed agreements. There
consistently

low support

for the sovereignty-driven hypotheses.

Concern

sovereignty did not influence negotiators to provide adaptive flexibility.

that find the

most support are those concerning

agreement design. There

is

substantial evidence that

agreements with more precise rules and with

among

relative equals.

the effect of coercive

These

is

for preserving

The hypotheses

diplomacy on

hegemon-led negotiations produce

less flexibility than

agreements negotiated

results are consistent with Realist accounts

of hegemon-led

cooperation: assuming that an agreement’s rules already reflect the hegemon’s

(perceived) interests, there will be

little

incentive for a

flexibility or to delegate discretion in interpreting or

The
The second

set

hegemon

to

provide institutional

applying rules.

Influence of Interests

of explanatory variables considered here includes distribution

problems, enforcement problems, and the number of parties actively participating in
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,

negotiations. This study considered three hypotheses concerning the influence of

distributional conflict.

First,

hypothesis

RM

expects that increasing salience of

1

distributional conflicts during negotiations will lead negotiators to adopt inclusive, if not

expansionary, criteria for membership or participation. Hypothesis ID4 expects that
negotiators will be

and low

more

likely to delegate authority

under conditions of high complexity

distributional conflict. Finally, hypothesis IF1 expects that distributional conflict

will influence negotiators to provide greater institutional flexibility.

This study finds generally weak support for these hypotheses as a group. The
only individual hypothesis that receives substantial empirical support
regression

shows

that distributional conflict

is

to restrict

membership

membership. The cases examined
the cases

dampen

in

not the

may

membership

RM2

logistic

same

consistent with

is

by demonstrating

criteria cle novo.

RM

1

as pursuing expansionary

Chapter 4 do not find evidence of the

empirical support for

necessarily design

single regime

is

RM1;

a significant predictor of negotiators’

decision to choose open membership rules. While this result

choosing not

is

latter.

that negotiators

In fact,

do not

Rather, different agreements within a

share identical membership criteria regardless of underlying

differences in problem structure.

Hypothesis ID4 receives modest support.

Among

surveyed agreements

negotiated under conditions of high complexity and low distributional conflict, states

were

relatively

However,
coded

more

likely to delegate rule

the relationship

at the

is

making authority

to

an external body.

not perfectly linear. Agreements concerning problems

highest degrees of complexity involved very

little

delegation of authority,

suggesting that there are limits or constraints to states’ willingness to cede policymaking
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In cases

authority.

of moderate complexity, states

may

find

it

too costly to develop

policy preferences on their own; in cases of very high complexity, states

concerned about unknown distributive consequences, and therefore

may

be more

less willing to

delegate authority.

Finally, this study

facilitate

found no support for hypothesis IF 1 that negotiators seek to
,

agreement by providing

institutional flexibility to mitigate the distributional

bargaining caused by anticipation of enforcement.

agreements

that included

few agreements

enforcement with

to the

flexibility.

bolstered enforcement

the contrary,

none of the

enforcement mechanisms included escape mechanisms. The

that did include

mechanisms. Contrary

To

escape mechanisms did not include enforcement

premise of IF 1 negotiators did not hedge by coupling
,

Among

surveyed agreements, as often as not, negotiators

mechanisms by choosing not

not provide for enforcement at

to

provide adaptive flexibility or did

all.

Likewise, this study finds only modest support for the several hypotheses that
focus on the influence of enforcement problems. This study finds no support for
hypothesis

1M

1,

that negotiators will restrict

problems. This logic behind this hypothesis

agreement’s benefits only to
excludable. This

is

its

good

in the first

is

members. For

in

response to enforcement

that negotiators will seek to restrict an

this to

work, benefits must potentially be

not always the case with international environmental agreements.

Moreover, restricting membership often
the

membership

place

(e.g.,

is

problematic with respect to the provision of

pollution abatement).

Hypothesis IM2, that enforcement problems will lead negotiators
specific entry into force criteria, receives greater support
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There

is

to

design

evidence that

negotiators routinely address enforcement concerns by designing substantive criteria

(e.g., participation

into force

will not

by parties representing x percent of regulated activity) for the entry

of MEAs. The moderate empirical support for hypothesis IM3,

promise compliance prior

conclusion. This

is

to

that negotiators

an agreement's entry into force, reinforces that

significant because

it

strengthens the strategic interpretation of entry

into force conditions that underlies hypothesis

IM2. Finally,

this

study finds only weak

support for hypothesis ID1. that negotiators will increase delegation

in

response to

enforcement problems. As mentioned above, among surveyed agreements surrounded by

enforcement problems, there
functions.

For example,

in

is

evidence of increased delegation of basic administrative

such cases

it

is

uncommon

for negotiators simply to delegate

administrative responsibilities to a single state party. However, the logic behind the

hypothesis

is

that negotiators will

be increasingly likely to create or delegate authority to

external bodies for rule enforcement or dispute resolution.

There

is

very

little

evidence

of this among surveyed agreements, substantially dampening support for hypothesis 1D1

The

last

two hypotheses primarily address

increasing numbers of parties.

As

the

the rising transaction costs created

number of parties

by

to a negotiation increases,

hypothesis ID3 expects that negotiators will be increasingly likely to delegate authority,

and hypothesis IF3 expects that negotiators
flexibility.

will be less likely to provide transformative

This study finds strong support for both

to delegate administrative authority as the

explanation for this

is

that negotiations

Negotiators are increasingly likely

number of parties

increases.

become more complex

as

more

The hypothesized
parties

become

involved, which creates incentives for negotiators to centralize negotiations. In

among surveyed agreements, “number”

is

a strong predictor of the scope of an
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fact,

agreement, giving further support to hypothesis ID3, Likewise,
substantial support for hypothesis IF3.

among

all

study finds

Although sunset clauses are extremely

rare

agreements, regardless of number, negotiators were significantly less likely

number of parties involved

require consensus for the adoption of amendments as the

The

negotiations increased.

to

in

lack of empirical support for other hypothesized

amendment procedures provides

explanations for

In

this

summary, evidence

further support for hypothesis IF3.

for the interest-based hypotheses

is

mixed. The hypotheses

concerning the influence of the number of parties on formal agreement design, through
increasing transaction costs, find strong support

strong evidence that increasing the

that these are significantly

more

among surveyed agreements. There

number of parties

leads to broader agreements, and

likely to centralize negotiations

administrative functions. Likewise, the

is

and delegate

number of parties appears

to provide the best

explanation for negotiators’ choice of decision rule governing the adoption of

amendments.

On

the other hand, the hypotheses concerning distribution

problems receive much more limited support. Evidence
influence

membership

dependency of such
relative scarcity

criteria is tenuous,

and

criteria within specific

is

that these

and enforcement

concerns directly

undermined by the apparent path

regimes

of enforcement mechanisms among

(e.g.,

LRTAP). Likewise,

the

IRDB agreements dampens

for those hypotheses that suggest negotiators will delegate authority to

support

overcome

distribution or enforcement dilemmas.

The Influence of N onus and Knowledge
The third
variables.

set

of hypotheses

Specifically,

it

this

study considered focus on ideational explanatory

considered hypotheses concerning the influence
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of:

(

1

)

perceptual framing (shocks and crises), (2) scientific knowledge and uncertainty, and

(3) international

norms. With respect to perception and issue framing,

this

study

considered two hypotheses concerning the influence of a shared sense of urgency on

agreement design.
perceived

crisis will

membership
is

that the

First,

is

hypothesis

be less likely to

CM1

expects that negotiations responding to a

restrict

membership. Here, the logic

for inclusive

not the rationalist process of maximizing gains from exchange.

symbolic

political value

of responding quickly

Rather,

it

to a crisis generally is

incompatible with rationalist strategies of excluding benefits. This study found

little

support for hypothesis C'Ml, not because of the existence of crisis negotiations restricting

membership. Rather, very few agreements

restrict

membership, regardless of whether

there existed a shared sense of crisis at the time of negotiations.

The

actual

membership

criteria

chosen by the negotiators of the surveyed agreements are more consistent with a

general

norm of non-exclusion (hypothesis CM2) than they

An

additional hypothesis this study considered

shared sense of crisis would choose less
proposition finds

to a

strict

was

are with hypothesis

that negotiators

responding

CM1.
to a

entry into force conditions. This

more empirical support among surveyed

cases: negotiators responding

perceived crisis did not create substantive conditions for entry into force, and, on

average, they required ratification by a lower proportion of participating countries for

entry into force.

This study also examined a number of hypotheses concerning the influence of

scientific

knowledge and uncertainty on agreement design. With respect

to delegation,

hypothesis 1D2 expects that scientific uncertainty will influence negotiators to delegate
greater resources, and hypothesis

CD2

expects that the participation by expert groups in
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the design stage will produce agreements that are broader in scope than those designed

without the input of such groups. This study found empirical support for both
hypotheses. Concerning ID2, this study found that negotiators were systematically

likely to delegate resources for specific, functional

more

purposes in response to given

environmental factors. Greater uncertainty concerning policy effects was associated with
increased delegation of resources for monitoring. Increasing issue complexity was

associated with delegation of resources to support original research. Likewise,

concerning hypothesis CD2, ordinal regression showed that expert group participation

was

a strong predictor

of agreement depth, but only in conjunction with the variable

indicating that expert groups provided specific policy advice to states. This result

consistent both with sociological approaches to

knowledge

that

emphasize the

is

political

selection of scientific knowledge, and constructivist accounts of learning.

This study also considered three hypotheses concerning the influence of
uncertainty on institutional flexibility. Hypothesis IF2 expects that scientific uncertainty

in

general will lead negotiators to provide greater (transformative) flexibility.

Hypotheses CF1 and CF2 predict
scientific uncertainty

that transformative flexibility will increase with

and policy dissensus, respectively. The surveyed agreements

provide no support for a

strict

reading of hypothesis 1F2

In

designing these agreements,

negotiators did not include sunset provisions in response to scientific uncertainty.

provisions were extremely rare

among surveyed agreements,

uncertainty surrounding negotiations. There

is

not

regardless of the level of

much more

empirical support for

hypotheses CF1 and CF2. The general lack of variation in institutional flexibility
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Such

among

agreements makes

it

very difficult to establish support for the causal influence of specific

explanatory variables.

summary,

In brief

that negotiators

criteria.

Upon

this

responding

study finds mixed empirical support for the proposition

to a

shared sense of crisis will choose inclusive membership

further scrutiny, however, this relationship

negotiators' general reluctance to restrict

membership

in

seems

MEAs.

because agreement benefits are non-excludable public goods.
reluctance to restrict

membership seems guided more by

to

In

be an

artifact

many

of

cases, this

is

In other cases, negotiators'

a general

norm of non-exclusion

than by strategic calculation of interest. Interestingly, this study also finds support that

expert group participation

in the

negotiation and design of agreements

linked to increasing depth of cooperation but, rather,

is

is

not directly

contingent on states' recognition

of their policy expertise. This finding supports both sociology of science and social
learning accounts of the role of scientific

However,
and

this

study finds surprisingly

institutional flexibility.

There

is

knowledge

little

in international cooperation.

support for hypotheses linking uncertainty

remarkably

mechanisms among surveyed agreements. While

little

it

variation in institutional flexibility

would be an exaggeration

conclude that scientific uncertainty does not influence agreement design,
flexibility

when

mechanisms were not

it

to

appears that

negotiators’ tool of choice for responding to uncertainty

they designed the surveyed agreements.
Rational Institutionalism, Realism, and Constructivism

As
examined

the preceding discussion suggests,

in this study

none of the three

theoretical approaches

can claim a monopoly of truth concerning the negotiation and

design of multilateral environmental agreements. This study found substantial empirical
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support for the realist hypotheses concerning membership and, to a lesser extent,
delegation, but not institutional flexibility. This study found generally strong support for

the rational institutionalist hypotheses

concerning membership and

on delegation, but significantly

flexibility.

less for those

Finally, this study found reasonably strong

support for a constructivist account of membership, but less for those concerning

delegation or flexibility.

Though tempting,
to

an individual approach

it

in

would be

entirely too facile simply to ascribe causal priority

explaining one of the primary elements of institutional form.

Neither the three elements of institutional form, nor the various hypotheses examined in

this

study are exhaustive. Moreover, the research design employed here provides more

leverage on

some questions

than others. Specifically,

it

is

better suited to address

synchronic processes than diachronic, or longitudinal questions.
discovering broad empirical patterns than

it

is at

It

is

better at

identifying and tracing the

microfoundations of a specific hypothesis. Studies such as the present one are essentially
stock-taking exercises that identify general strengths and weaknesses of current

explanations of international environmental cooperation.

specific hypotheses, this study has

In considering a multitude

of

uncovered a number of additional puzzles and

questions for future research. These will be addressed in the next section of the chapter.

The remainder of this

section focuses on this study’s strongest findings

concerning membership, delegation, and

flexibility in

membership, maybe the most significant finding

membership

criteria.

While participation

in

is

MEAs.

First,

concerning

the general lack of variation in

some agreements

is

restricted to parties to a

previous (framework) agreement, most surveyed agreements do not restrict membership
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in

any way. The majority of those

geographic

criteria (e.g., the

do

substantial,

and

membership do so by simple

1976 Rhine Chloride Convention, participation

norm of nonexclusion does seem

With respect

restrict

While there are exceptions

restricted to riparian states).

a general

that

to

(e.g., the

in

which

is

1959 Antarctic Treaty),

have influenced negotiators.

to delegation, this study’s strongest findings are

statistically significant, positive relationship

( 1 )

that there is a

between the number of

participating states and the scope of agreements, and (2) broad agreements with high

participation are associated with generally greater levels of delegation to agreement-

related bodies.

reinforces this.

much
trend

less

It

is

also very plausible that the

is that,

individual state control over administrative responsibilities

In contrast,

common among

norm of nonexclusion (mentioned above)

larger,

broader agreements.

among surveyed agreements,

An

important exception to

delegation of enforcement powers

is

this

low

is

across the board. This runs counter to rational institutionalist expectations, and suggests

that aversion to

enforcement

may

also reflect norm-driven behavior by negotiators.

Finally, given the lack of variation

clear that negotiators

do not

to strategic interests or

among formal

flexibility provisions,

strategically manipulate flexibility

mechanisms

in

it

seems

response

knowledge-related factors. Instead, the primary source of

variation in institutional flexibility consisted of rule precision. This strongest relationship

this

study found in this area was a positive association between coercive diplomacy and

increased rule precision.

The academic

literature

on international cooperation has also

conceptualized rule precision as an element of delegation - discretion (Hawkins

et al

2006). Thus, this study can be interpreted as supporting hypotheses that hegemonic
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actors (presumably having succeeded in establishing favorable terms) will seek to

minimize discretion

in rule

implementation.

How
One

do Negotiators Design

general conclusion that

theoretical explanations

MEAs

be drawn from the foregoing discussion

is

that

of institutional design specify more design variables than are

actually used in practice.

negotiation of

may

MEAs?

In other words, there

is

less

purposive design

in the actual

than realist, institutionalist, and constructivist scholars collectively

suggest. This section reviews

which design features among the many examined

in this

study appear to be meaningfully designed, and which appear to be artifacts of habit.

Membership
The

first

choice states have in designing an agreement

membership. Figure

4.

1

shows

substantial variation in

surveyed agreements; nearly three-fourths

However, closer scrutiny

common

criterion for

restrict

is

whether or not

membership

among

criteria

membership according

some

to

casts doubt on the significance of this observation.

membership among surveyed agreements

is

to restrict

criteria.

The most

membership

in

another

(framework) agreement. Agreements such as the 1987 Montreal Protocol and the 1997

Kyoto Protocol have formally

restrictive

agreements are restricted only

to

membership

members of other agreements with

membership. Thus, many agreements with formally
practical purposes open.

The

However, these and several other

restricted

unrestricted

membership

are, for all

great majority of the remaining agreements that restrict

membership do so on geographic or

function, as opposed to political or

grounds.
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economic

This contradicts the argument that multilateral agreements are designed more to
“screen”

members

than to constrain

them (von Stein 2005). The

membership based on geographic or functional
not to reveal

unknown

(i.e.,

rationale for restricting

users of a regulated good) criteria

to maintain existing preferences,

is

and

to

avoid vote-stacking, such as in the International Whaling Commission example noted

in

Chapter

4.

The

membership

preferences. Rather,

statistical

evidence bears

desire to exclude

1

)

this out; the

restriction that received strong support

negotiators to choose open

1M

is

it

membership

was hypothesis

RM

1

,

which expects

rules in response to distributional problems.

non-members from enjoying

was not an important

only hypothesis concerning

factor influencing

The

the benefits of cooperation (hypothesis

membership

rules

among surveyed

agreements.

Given

the prevalence of open, or virtually open,

membership

rules

among

surveyed agreements, and the lack of evidence of negotiators using membership rules to
exclude benefits (IM1), the most plausible reading of the evidence
generally choose open membership; that something like a

operate

in the

agreements

is

that negotiators

norm of non-exclusion may

design of global-level multilateral environmental agreements.

that

govern

strictly regional

goods

(e.g., the

the Rhine River) are restricted on geographic grounds.

membership rank

significantly lower than

MEAs

governing the pollution of

However, agreements

open agreements with respect

that restrict

to distributional

problems. This suggests that states are reluctant to limit participation when

their benefit to recruit

Some

it

may

be

new, sympathetic members.

The second decision

states

make concerns

the

minimum

level

of participation

necessary for agreements to take effect. Rational institutionalists claim that negotiators
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can

set thresholds strategically to

encourage participation (1M2);

realists

hold that

strict

entry into force conditions can ease concerns about free-riding; constructivists expect

relatively permissive entry into force conditions

effect the earlier

because the quicker agreements take

norm entrepreneurs can begin shaming

laggards.

among

This study found substantial variation in the entry into force conditions

surveyed agreements. As Figure 4.2 shows, some required participation by only
proportion of signatories; others required nearly unanimous participation.

a small

others

Still

incorporated conditions requiring participation by specific states. The statistical and case

evidence show that

this

observed variation in entry into force conditions

is

not random;

entry into force conditions of surveyed agreements do reflect deliberate design.

However, some of the observed variation

in entry into force

conditions

is

not

theoretically significant. For example, this study found that increasing distribution

problems were significantly associated with greater numbers of required ratifications for
entry into force. There

is

a further correlation

and larger negotiations. As a

result,

when

between stronger distribution problems

controlling for the

number of states

eligible to

sign and ratify an agreement, this study finds no significant relationship between

distribution

problems and the number of ratifications required

for entry into force.

This negative result probably results from the simplifying assumptions
the formal

models from which

rational institutionalist hypotheses are derived.

negotiations, there are usually strong asymmetries

among

made

in

In actual

participating states in terms of

resources and responsibility for causing an environmental problem. Therefore, requiring
a simple

number of ratifications may be too

seeking to establish meaningful

minimum

blunt a design instrument for negotiators

participation thresholds to ease fears of free-

295

riding.

Instead, this study found that negotiators

specific criteria

when

the Montreal Protocol

facing serious enforcement problems.

shows

into force conditions as a

evidence examined here
use

minimum

is

to mitigate fears

history of

agreement’s entry

of free-riding. Furthermore, the

statistical

consistent with the institutionalist claim that negotiators can

participation thresholds as tipping points

hypothesis IM2: the

likely to design

The diplomatic

that states did, in fact, understand that

way

will require further research,

to the

were significantly more

however, and

members of the

at least

(I

M2). Substantiating

this

claim

one surveyed case contradicts

Thirty percent club’

made vocal commitments

conclusion and entry into force of the second sulfur protocol to the

prior

LRTAP

Convention.
Delegation

The second group of decisions
of functions and authority

in

MEAs.

this

It

study examined concerned states’ delegation

found substantial variation in a number of aspects

of delegation; creation of administrative organizations (Figure

5.1

),

discretion of

administrative organizations (Figure 5.2), funding for these organizations and their

programs (Figures

5.3

and

5.4), as well as specific functional tasks (Figure 5.5).

This study found preliminary evidence that negotiators tend to respond to

enforcement problems by delegating administrative authority either
or to an existing

IGO

(hypothesis ID1).

Though

to a

new

the results of statistical analysis

consistent with this hypothesis, the results were not statistically significant.

discussion highlights one possible reason why.

that

secretariat

The

were

The case

logic underlying hypothesis ID1

groups of relatively equal states will delegate administrative and enforcement

capabilities to third parties

when

states

have incentives
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to “cheat”

on obligations.

is

However,

in

some

cases, negotiating states

of material resources and
conditions,

levels

some

may be

in responsibility for the

states will find

it

strongly asymmetrical, both in terms

environmental problem. Under such

in their interests to

block the delegation of significant

of resources or authority. This was precisely the case

Though

in the Basel negotiations.

negotiators created an independent secretariat, developed states,

who were

net

exporters of hazardous wastes, successfully thwarted developing states’ attempts to

delegate substantial resources or authority to the secretariat. This dynamic

RD1, which expects

consistent with the realist approach of hypothesis

levels of delegation in

ME As,

is

much more

generally low

except in cases of hegemonic coercion.

Although the surveyed agreements generally delegated low levels of
independence

to secretariats, there

the analyses in Chapter 5

was

were some exceptions. One of the notable

results

of

the failure to find any significant explanation for the

independence of secretariats. This study found no significant relationship between
enforcement or distribution problems and secretariats’ independence. Likewise,

it

found

no significant relationship between uncertainty/knowledge and independence.
Explaining variation in delegated discretion remains an opportunity for further research

The dimensions of delegation

for

which

this

study did find significant

explanations were the delegation of specific functional responsibilities. For example,
consistent with the expectations of hypothesis

I

D

1

,

this

study found enforcement

problems were significantly greater for agreements that delegated functions such as

compliance monitoring, implementation review, and compliance verification, designed

to

mitigate states’ fears of cheating and free-nding. Likewise, this study found that certain

aspects of uncertainty/knowledge were significant predictors of negotiators’ decision to
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delegate problem monitoring, research into causes and effects of problems, compliance

monitoring, financial and technological transfers.
options and consequences

is

It

also found that consensus

on policy

a significant predictor of negotiators’ decision to delegate

informational clearinghouse programs.

In addition to finding significant explanations for the

functions, this study also found significant explanations for

programmatic delegation

in

MEAs.

relationship between the

more general aspects of

Consistent with hypothesis ID3, which expects

number of parties,

delegation to increase with the

development of specific

number of states

this

study found a significant, positive

actively participating in negotiations and the

programmatic breadth of negotiated agreements. Consistent with hypothesis CD2,

this

study also found two significant predictors of the depth of cooperation: the provision of
expert advice to states and the shared perception of

crisis.

Flexibility

Chapter 6 argued that there are three different types of institutional

flexibility:

adaptive flexibility, interpretive flexibility, and transformative flexibility. Adaptive

flexibility provisions are prerogatives

of state sovereignty; they can be exercised

unilaterally to suspend cooperation under certain conditions (escape clauses), or to

denounce or withdraw from
This study found

a cooperative

some

arrangement altogether (withdrawal clauses).

variation in provision of escape clauses

among surveyed

agreements: roughly one-fifth of agreements included an escape mechanism. However,

this

study did not find any convincing empirical support for either of the hypotheses

concerning adaptive

flexibility.

There was no relationship between the provision of

enforcement mechanisms and adaptive

flexibility (IF
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I

).

The

realist

hypothesis on

adaptive flexibility (RF2) expects such mechanisms to be more

negotiated

among

relative equals,

Among

to

among agreements

agreements

agreements, in which they serve

surveyed agreements, however,

tendency. Escape clauses were more

in

heightened sovereignty and relative gains

common among hegemon-led

concerns, and less

purpose.

due

common

this study

little

observed the opposite

common among hegemon-led

agreements than

negotiated by relative equals.

In contrast to escape

mechanisms,

this

study found very

variation in

little

withdrawal clauses. Nearly every surveyed agreement explicitly provided for
denunciation or withdrawal. The most plausible interpretation of some agreements’
failure to include

parties’ right

A

such a clause

is

not that they preclude withdrawal but, rather, that

of withdrawal remains implicit.

similar situation obtains with respect to interpretive flexibility.

Reservations

were almost universally prohibited among surveyed agreements. Moreover, the one
agreement

that

does permit reservations (CITES)

restricts reservations to a specific pail

of the agreement only; CITES does not permit general reservations.
therefore, provisions for reservations

negotiators

in

designing

do not appear

In practice,

to be a significant variable for

ME As.

The primary source of interpretive

flexibility in

MEAs

lies

not in the formal

provision for reservations but, instead, in the precision of agreements’ rules.

Some

agreements advance specific and precise rules and obligations. Others articulate
relatively precise goals, but are silent with respect to specific policies

providing states flexibility in determining

how

to

and actions,

meet obligations. Others

still

advance

vague, even indeterminate rules, resulting in a de facto delegation of discretion to parties
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in interpreting

and implementing an agreement. This study found

domination of negotiations
decreased interpretive

Finally,

is

a significant predictor

flexibility), as

that

hegemonic

of increased rule precision (and thus

expected by hypothesis RF1.

Chapter 6 considered two forms of transformative

flexibility.

Negotiators

can require renegotiation to sustain continued cooperation by limiting the duration of
agreements. This approach to transformative flexibility involves the inclusion of sunset
clauses in

MEAs.

In contrast to this active

approach

to transformative flexibility,

negotiators can take a permissive approach to transformative flexibility by designing

formal procedures for amending agreements.
This study found very

flexibility.

Only

six percent

little

of surveyed agreements included a sunset clause. This

confounds the second rational
of uncertainty

variation in the active provision of transformative

institutionalist hypothesis (IF2).

in the negotiation

mechanisms would be prevalent

of

MEAs,

this

Given

the omnipresence

hypothesis expects that sunset

features in environmental agreements (Harris

Holmstrom 1987; Koremenos 2005a). However,

the rarity of such clauses

and

among

surveyed agreements suggests that sunset clauses are not a significant tool for negotiators
in designing

MEAs.

Likewise, there

is little

provision for amendment;

variation

among surveyed agreements concerning

the

more than ninety percent of surveyed agreements include

formal procedure for amendments. The real variation here

lies in

a

the decision rules

governing the adoption of amendments. Surveyed agreements commonly required either
consensus or supermajority support

agreements use different decision

to

adopt amendments.

rules, like

A

small minority of

simple majority rule, or weighted voting.
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It is

questionable whether the observed variation

in

decision rules governing the

adoption of amendments reflects theoretically significant institutional design. This study

found no significant support for any of the hypotheses
rules to concerns such as

enforcement problems or

scientific uncertainty.

strongest evidence that this study found concerning variation in

suggests that such variation simply

is

on average; agreements

negotiated on average by

more than

decision rules for adopting

be used only after

all

to

amendment

The surveyed

adopt amendments were negotiated by

Agreements

amendments commonly
at

rules

that required supermajority support

fifty states.

reasonable attempts

decision

Rather, the

a function of the size of negotiations.

agreements that require consensus or unanimity
less than fifteen states

amendment

that linked

were

that use supermajority

specify that such voting rules should

consensus have

failed.

plausible explanation for the observed variation in decision rules

is

Thus, the most
consistent with that

suggested by hypothesis 1F3. Negotiators generally follow a norm of consensus, but
relax this requirement

when

large

numbers of participants

transaction costs for reaching consensus. Negotiators

rules in response to

more

entail excessively

high

do not manipulate amendment

specific, substantive concerns.

The Design of MEAs
In

summary,

membership

this

study has found that negotiators generally choose open

rules, particularly

they do restrict membership,

when responding

it is

to serious distribution

is

done

When

almost never on substantive political or economic

grounds. Rather, restricted membership almost always
or (2)

problems.

to require participation in a parent, or

is

either

(

1

)

geographic in nature,

framework, agreements. Negotiators

generally delegate administrative and programmatic functions to independent
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However, they usually delegate few resources and

organizations.

discretion,

little

much

preferring to maintain close control over such organizations. This study has found

more convincing evidence
for explanations of

found

little

flexibility

for explanations of which functions negotiators delegate than

how much independence

negotiators delegate. Finally, this study

variation in the provision of formal flexibility mechanisms. Adaptive

mechanisms, and withdrawal clauses

usage. Almost

all

the adoption of

amendments

in particular,

seemed

to

follow customary

agreements allow amendments. Negotiators’ choice of rules governing

is

more

a function of the size of negotiations than a strategic

response to any substantive concerns. Finally, negotiators almost invariably do not

choose

to

allow reservations

manipulate

is

to

ME As.

Rather, the form of flexibility that negotiators do

rule precision/specificity.

Looking Back: Contributions of This Study
Studies of institutional design, particularly

among

rational institutionalists,

have

proliferated over the past several years. Yet recent rational institutionalist approaches to

explaining institutional design have devoted more attention to developing formal models

of expected institutional outcomes under different circumstances than they have
the accuracy

to testing

of those explanations empirically. To date, empirical studies of institutional

design have suffered from a number of serious shortcomings that have hindered the

development of the research program. As discussed
empirical studies have focused on a very small

capture the

full

in

Chapter

number of cases

range of variation in institutional design.

institutionalist literature

trade institutions, in

on

many

2,

some of these

that are ill-suited to

Much of the

institutional design has focused

rational

on the design of international

cases the same agreements that inspired the development of
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rational institutionalist theories of international cooperation.

studies of institutional design test hypotheses against

the

development of those hypotheses; the

results

may

Additionally,

much of the same

many of those

data that inspired

be somewhat endogenous. Finally,

previous empirical studies of institutional design have focused on one specific theoretical

orientation to international cooperation

- usually

rational institutionalism

- without

fully

engaging alternative explanations.

More

recently, institutional design hypotheses

larger datasets, e.g.,

more

Koremenos (2005a). However,

have begun

to

be tested against

the sampling procedures used in

recent studies have biased results in favor of bilateral agreements, which far

outnumber

multilateral

agreements

many of the

environmental law,
multilateral in form.

If scholars

in international law.

Yet

in international

highest profile and most salient agreements are

want eventually

to link research

on

institutional design

choices to research on institutional effectiveness, then for the most part they will be

examining multilateral agreements, not

bilateral ones.

This study was designed to overcome these shortcomings, and has found a

number of ways

to

do

so.

First, this

hypotheses concerning the design of
there

is

study has performed empirical tests of theoretical

MEAs;

a trend of such investigations.

I

hope

Second,

this

that they are the first

of many and

that

study has been able to explore the

strengths and weaknesses of the concepts that scholars have considered “design

elements"

in

agreements.
large

formal models through the evidence of actual negotiations and multilateral

It

has refined the concepts accordingly. Third, this study has examined a

number of multilateral environmental agreements

representative of the larger universe of

that, collectively, are

MEAs. Most of the
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empirical work that has been

performed before

this

MEAs

concerning

study has focused on trade and security agreements, while data

has been understudied. This study’s basis in environmental agreements

creates fodder for comparison with other sorts of agreements, and

a

more comprehensive theory of the design of international

is

a critical element in

institutions

more broadly.

Fourth, this study’s use of the combination of statistical analyses and case studies

has allowed

MEAs,

it

some leverage

to understand not

only what happens in the negotiation of

but whether the causal chain that the statistical tests indicate

of the information

that

we have

makes sense

in light

about the actual negotiations. Fifth, rather than narrowly

addressing the rational institutionalist research program, this study has incorporated and
tested causal

mechanisms

that

would be predicted by

the realist and constructivist

research programs. This comparative approach has allowed for the consideration of a

broader range of causal mechanisms and greater empirical validity for the results of the

tests.

It

design.

hold

has also provided

Its

some

insight into the evidence for each theory in institutional

conclusion, that power-based, interest-based, and norm-based explanations

some weight, has implications

for the relationship

between the theories

in 1R

all

more

generally.

The

each of the three dependent variables that
flexibility.

comes

sixth contribution of this study

Through descriptive

statistics,

it

in the intensive

work done

to

consider

has covered: membership, delegation, and

hypothesis testing, and case studies, this study

has been able to clarify these ideas conceptually, determine their applicability to the

surveyed agreements, and gain some understanding of

how and why

states use them.

This can be informative both for the study of institutional design more generally, and for

emergent research programs studying one element of design or another
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(see, e.g..

Boockmann and Thumer 2006; Koremenos
this

2005a). Finally, the “y-centered” portion of

conclusion includes provides an important direction for future research: the study of

explanatory variables themselves, their interactions, and their meaning for institutional

design.

Looking Ahead

The primary purpose of this study was

to

examine the design of MEAs

in light

of

hypotheses drawn from recent research on international cooperation. However, the
pursuit of this goal has yielded insights that speak directly to other, related controversies

in the

academic

literatures

international cooperation.

on global environmental
Future research

different aspects of uncertainty

in

Chapter

6.

A

may

and knowledge

in

productively explore links between

and the specific forms of institutional

second productive avenue for future research will be

breadth and depth of international cooperation

among

flexibility described

to

compare the

different institutional

pathways

convention-protocol approach vs. the plurilateral approach), and to explore

(e.g., the

whether

politics

study

is

correct to find that the depth-breadth tradeoff in international

environmental law

is

overstated.

this

In addition to these, this section briefly

examines two

additional possibilities for further research: exploring potential interactions

among

explanatory variables and exploring the implications of this study’s findings for the

reform of existing international environmental institutions.
Interactions in Institutional Design

It

was beyond

the scope of this study to explore fully the interactions

explanatory variables. Nevertheless, this study’s dataset

is

uniquely well suited

existing sources for exploring links between explanatory variables.
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between

among

For example, the

may be

surveyed agreements suggest that there

theoretically interesting interactions

between distribution and enforcement problems, between number of states and
distribution problems,

scientific

between number and uncertainty and, especially, between

knowledge/uncertainty and distributional problems. This study concludes by

demonstrating the potential for investigating theoretically interesting interactions,
specifically an interaction

Dimitrov (2003)

regime formation
scientific

criticizes previous research

Andresen

on international environmental

2000) for adopting a one-dimensional view of

et al

knowledge, and for assuming the existence of a positive relationship between

knowledge and
scientific

(e.g.,

between uncertainty /knowledge and distribution problems.

international cooperation.

knowledge

consequences

suggests that disaggregating the concept of

into three constituent elements

knowledge about

the problem, (2)

He

- would

-

“(

1

)

knowledge about

the causes of the problem, and (3)

better account

seeming

2003

will

develop

problems themselves provides further
scientific

problem vary independently from each

the International

is

tk

If the state

of

seems unlikely

that

Thus, the nature of ecological

rate.

of

of knowledge on different aspects of a

other, then literally speaking, they are discrete

examined separately” (Dimitrov 2003,

seems reasonable enough on
vary independently

same

it

justification for the analytic disaggregation

knowledge and uncertainty.

variables and should be

at the

its

128).

Because of the complexity of current ecological problems,

knowledge

knowledge about

irregularities in the empirical record

international environmental regime formation (Dimitrov

different types of

the extent of

face, ultimately

is

Though

this

claim

whether these different types of knowledge

an empirical question. Fortunately,

Regimes Database (IRD)

129).

it

is

an empirical question that

uniquely well-positioned to address. The
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IRD

contains indicators that

Additionally,

it

map

onto Dimitrov’s three types of knowledge.

contains indicators that capture the “malignancy” of environmental

problems, as described by Underdal (2000).
Dimitrov’s claim can be explored by using
structural equation

model of uncertainty and

that distributional conflicts

- which dampen

hamper processes of social

learning,

agreements
uncertainty.

-

are influenced by

M plus 4.2 to specify and test a simple

distributional conflict.

the influence of epistemic communities,

and make

difficult the

two underlying

factors:

(COMPLEX)

and technological

(1MPLEMEN). Following Dimitrov
indicated by scientific uncertainty

conclusion of multilateral

problem malignity and

The underlying concept of problem malignity

of issue complexity

is

(EFFECTS).

If

Dimitrov

difficulty

of policy implementation

(2003), the underlying concept of uncertainty

i.e.,

there

is

too

is

(SCIENTIF), knowledge of possible policy options

is right,

goodness-of-fit tests, because there

indicators,

scientific

indicated by the measures

(OPTIONS), and knowledge of the probable consequences of policy
inaction

The model assumes

is

too

we

interventions or

should expect the model to

much unique

much dimensionality

for

variance

among

one factor by

fail

standard

the three

itself to

account for the

different indicators of uncertainty.

Figure

7.1 depicts the

relationships between the

variable.

It

covariance

also reports

among

model, provides unstandardized coefficients for

two underlying

factors, their indicators,

two goodness-of-fit

scores.

In brief

and the dependent

summary,

there

is

sufficient

the three indicators to discard the claim that they vary independently

from one another and therefore must be analyzed as discrete variables. However
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it

does

not necessarily follow from this that Dimitrov

knowledge carry

EFFECTS

is

wrong

to

argue that different aspects of

different weight with respect to different elements of regime formation.

RMSEA
SRMR

*

In fact, in the

model specified below, the

do not carry equal weight

in

= 0.089
= 0.073

three indicators constituting uncertainty

influencing distributional conflict. Specifically, uncertainty

with respect to policy consequences makes the greatest contribution to general
uncertainty’s negative effect on distributional conflict.

policy options

is

Uncertainty concerning possible

nearly as important; general uncertainty about the extent of the problem

carries the least weight. Thus, this study contributes to existing debates

it

is

by clarifying

that

not necessary to posit independence for multiple indicators of a construct to claim

that they carry differential

beyond

weight

in

explaining a given phenomenon. Although

the scope of this study to pursue this line of inquiry further,
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it

is

easy

to

it

is

imagine

that future research

combining these analytic techniques and

significant, substantive contributions to debates

this study’s data

can

make

on the role of scientific knowledge

in

international environmental cooperation.

Such research represents one way
Another would be

broaden the analysis to

to

extend the findings established here.

to usefully

facilitate

comparisons across issue-types,

to

assess whether different logics drive negotiations on different issues. Expanding the

number of cases

also will allow us to have greater confidence in the results of

the statistical procedures

this

employed

here. Finally,

study has found empirical support for a

it

important to stress

is

number of hypotheses,

that,

future case

many of
although

work

incorporating process tracing (George and Bennett 2005) or analytic narratives (Bates

1998) will be necessary to evaluate whether there
causal

mechanisms implied by

the hypotheses, or

is

empirical support for the specific

whether the cases are merely congruent

with hypothesized expectations.

Institutional

Reform

in

Global Environmental Governance

In recent years, dissatisfaction

with the effectiveness of existing international

environmental agreements and institutions has fueled
desirability

of reforming existing international environmental

United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

have been suggested
(see, for

a persistent

to

A

debate concerning the

institutions,

such as the

multiplicity of institutional reforms

improve the effectiveness of global environmental governance

example, Biermann and Bauer (eds) 2005; Kanie and Elaas (eds) 2004; Esty and

Ivanova (eds) 2002; Whalley and Zissimos 2002).

Although
possible to offer

it

is

beyond the scope of this study

some conjectures concerning

to

review these

in detail here,

it

is

the likely trajectory of institutional reform
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based on

this study’s findings.

proposals currently on offer

With respect

demand

to

proposed

far greater delegation than states are likely to

provide, if the findings of this study are any guide. This study has

states

have not been reluctant

have been reluctant
discretion.

The

to

distributional

to create

is

significantly predicted

problems among

states.

would be necessary

to

support

all

that,

although

MEAs,

substantial financial resources

likelihood of a secretariat depending on assessments on

significantly less likely to consent to

difficult to

shown

independent bodies to administer

endow such bodies with

fund functional activities

most

institutional reforms,

they

and policy

member

states to

by the presence/absence of

Where such problems

are substantial, states are

mandatory assessments. Since such assessments

but the most modest proposed institutional reforms,

it is

argue that states would consent to mandatory assessments on a larger scale.

Another possible implication

for institutional reform

is

that this study has also

found a significant relationship between hegemonic influence and agreement depth.

However, while hegemonic influence has occasionally

facilitated issue-specific

international environmental cooperation, the prospects for

global level are

much dimmer.

states.

among

great

powers and between great

This suggests that the prospects for a

strong monitoring and enforcement powers are exceptionally low.

raison d’etre for any

political

new

at a

Currently, there exist strong conflicts of interest

concerning global environmental politics both

powers and developing

hegemonic leadership

institution created

new

More

institution with

likely, the

under such conditions will be to provide

cover for states vis-a-vis domestic constituencies (Drezner 2007).

Given these
in the near future.

constraints, the prospects are poor for substantial institutional reform

As

certain strands of thought suggest, a focusing event (e.g., a crisis or
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shock)

may be

necessary

if a

environmental governance

is

change
to

in states’

perceptions of their interests in global

occur in the short term.

Conclusion
In

summary,

this

study contributes to the literature on institutional design by

examining existing hypotheses and assessing which are promising for further study, by
doing so with the aid of the most sophisticated and information-rich dataset currently
available,

and advances the research frontier by demonstrating potential gains from using

recent methodological innovations permitting computational analysis of causal pathways

involving unobserved variables and ordinal indicators (structural equation modeling with

ordered categorical dependent variables). Ultimately, by increasing our understanding of
the circumstances under

that they do,

alternatives

we may

and

negotiations.

to

which

MEAs

have been designed, and

why

they take the form

be in a better position to judge the effectiveness of design

provide practical advice to future multilateral environmental

1

APPENDIX
LIST OF

1

VARIABLES AND INDICATORS USED

IN THIS

STUDY

Independent Variables
Distribution Problems

COMONINT

How

compatible were the interests of the negotiating states concerning the

primary issue under consideration?

Measure: ordinal
6 - Very strongly incompatible
5 - Strongly incompatible
4 - Minor incompatibility

3

- Minor

2

- Strongly compatible
- Very strongly compatible

1

Source:

compatibility

1RD

How

DISTBEN

variable 101

were agreement benefits distributed among

Measure: ordinal
4 - Agreement provides benefits to

parties?

all

- Agreement provides benefits broadly
2 - Agreement provides benefits narrowly
- Agreement concentrates benefits to very few
3

1

Source:

Coded by author from IRD

How

D1STCONF

salient

was

variable

103B

(NARRATIVE BENEFITS)

distributional conflict to the negotiation of the

Measure: ordinal
4 - Very strong relevance
3 - Strong relevance
2

- Medium relevance

Low

1

relevance

0 - Not relevant
Source:

DISTCOST

IRD

How

variable 10 IF

(INTEREST COSTS)

were the costs of implementing the agreement distributed?

Measure: ordinal
4 - All parties incurred costs equally
3
2
1

- Costs were distributed widely
- Costs were distributed narrowly
- Costs were concentrated in a few

parties
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agreement?

Source:

Coded by author from IRD

variable

103B

(NARRATIVE COSTS)

Enforcement Problems

ENFORCEM

How

strong were incentives to disobey agreement rules after entry into force?

Measure: ordinal
4 - Very strong relevance of incentive to disobey rules even after regime was put

in

place

- Strong relevance of incentive to disobey rules even after regime was put in place
2 - Medium relevance of incentive to disobey rules even after regime was put in place
1 - Low relevance of incentive to disobey rules even after regime was put in place
0 - No relevance of incentive to disobey rules even after regime was put in place
3

Source:

IRD

variable

101G (INTEREST DISOBEY)

Hegemony
Were the negotiating
hegemon?

ISSUEE1EG

states

roughly symmetrical or was there an issue-specific

Measure: ordinal
5

-

Issue-specific

hegemon

that they

present:

One

single actor can get

otherwise would not do with regard

all

other actors to do things

to nearly all issues at stake in the

issue area.

4 - Highly uneven distribution: Very uneven distribution of power resources can lead to

more powerful actors being able

to get other nations to

do something

otherwise would not do with regard to a significant number of issues

that they
in the

issue

area.

- Considerable unevenness: Uneven distribution of power resources can lead to more
powerful actors being able to get other nations to do something they otherwise
would not do with regard to a limited number of issues in the issue area.
2 - Slightly uneven distribution: Besides a slightly uneven distribution, no single nation
has a greater ability to get other nations to do something they otherwise would
3

not do.
I

- Completely even

among
Source:

HEGAGEND

distribution: Issue-specific

power resources

are evenly distributed

nations.

(POWER SETTING SYMMETRY)

IRD

variable

Was

the inclusion of issues

102C

on the agenda determined by a single

stale or a small

group of states?
Measure: ordinal
4 - Very strongly dominated by a single state or a small group of potential regime

members: A single state or a small group of potential regime members
dominated agenda formation. The main issues on the agenda were imposed on
other actors. One or more dominant powers succeeded in setting the agenda in
the issue area.
3

-

Strongly dominated by a single state or a small group of states: Between 2 and 4 on
the scale.
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2

- Relevance of domination by a single state or a small group of potential regime
members: One or more states tried to dominate agenda formation and to impose
the main issues on the agenda on other actors, but the dominating states were
only partly successful in forcing the others to agree to the main issues on the
agenda.

- Minor relevance of domination by a single state or small group of potential regime
members: Between 0 and 2 on the scale.
0 - Domination by a single state or a small group of potential regime members not at all
relevant: Domination by a single state or a small group of potential regime
1

members
Source:

HEGEMON

1RD

did not play a role during negotiations

variable

Were

108D

(AGENDA STATE DETERMINED)

the negotiations

dominated by a single

Measure: ordinal
4 - Very strongly dominated by a single
a small

state or a small

state or a small

group of states?

group of states:

A

single state or

group of states dominated the negotiations. Negotiations consisted of a

process

in

which

a single state or small

group of states imposed the main regime

provisions on other actors.
3

- Strongly dominated by a single

state or a small

group of states: Between 2 and 4 on

the scale.

group of states: One or more
impose the main regime provisions
on other actors, but the dominating states were only partially successful in
forcing the others to agree to the main regime provisions.
- Minor relevance of domination by a single state or a small group of states: Between
0 and 2 on the scale.
0 - Domination by a single state or a small group of states not at all relevant: Domination
by a single state or a small group of states did not play a role during
Relevance of domination by a single

2

states tried to

state or a small

dominate negotiations and

to

1

negotiations

Source:

IRD

Number of Relevant

NCAUSERS

variable 109J

(STATE DOMINATION)

States

How many

nations were important because of their role in causing the problem?

Measure: ordinal

More than 20
5-61-120 states
6 -

1

states

4 - 31-60 states
3

2

- 16-30

states

6-15 states

1-1-5
Source:

states

IRD

variable 101

A (NUMBER CAUSERS)
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How many

NAFFECT

nations were important because they were affected by the problem?

Measure: ordinal

- More than 120
5-61-120 states

6

states

4 - 31-60 states
3

- 16-30

states

2-6-15 states
1-1-5 states
Source:

I

RD

variable

1

0

1

B

(NUMBER AFFECTED)

Uncertainty/Knowledge

COMPLEX

How complex was the primary issue-area under negotiation ? Draw your
judgment on the following items: 1=N umber of single issues to be regulated;
2=Number of states involved; 3=Number of different state interests;
4=Implications of regulations for other issue areas.

Measure: ordinal
4 - Very strong complexity
3

2
1

- Strong complexity
- Medium complexity
-

Low

complexity

Not

at all

Source:

IRD

0

complex

How

EFFECTS

variable 101

H (INTEREST COMPLEXITY)

well established

was knowledge of the probable consequences of different

options for solving the problem?
Selecting different options involves considering future consequences. States

must

first

develop a clear understanding of the future consequences of doing

nothing about the problem. They must then develop a clear understanding on
outputs, outcomes, and impacts of the other options at

hand

These

consequences can occur within as well as outside the issue area.
Measure: ordinal
4 - Strongly established understanding: States are aware of the possible outcomes,
outputs, and impacts of doing nothing as well as of other available options

3

- Mostly established understanding: Between 2 and 4 on

the scale.

2 - Partially established understanding: Despite the achievements of a partial

understanding of these consequences, there are

still

some major

uncertainties

with regard to possible consequences of doing nothing and consequences of
other options.

- Weakly established understanding. Between 0 and 2 on the scale
0 - No established understanding: States do not have an understanding of the possible
1

consequences of doing nothing or of the consequences of other possible options,
Source:

Computed by author from IRD

variable

(KNOW CONSEQUENCES OPTIONS)
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104D

EFFAGREE

Did

the parties disagree about the probable consequences of different options?

Measure: ordinal
4 - Very strong disagreement

- Strong disagreement
- Medium disagreement
- Low disagreement
0 - No disagreement
3

2
1

Source:

Computed by author from 1RD

variable

104E

(CONSEQUENCES OPTIONS DISAGREE)

EPICOM

The following four communities should be understood

as social groups

consisting of transnational networks of experts: science-based communities,

bureaucratic communities, principled belief communities, legal beliefs

communities. Each group

is

held together through shared beliefs

(e.g.,

about the

causes and consequences of the problem, or about necessary policies, or

normative and principled beliefs, or legal instruments for a regime). More than

one of these groups may

exist during

regime formation, and there

may

also be

overlaps between the four different kinds of expert groups.

Were

transnational scientific expert networks present/active during

negotiations?

Measure: dichotomous
- Yes
1

0-No
Source:

IMPLEMEN

Coded by author from IRD

Were

variable 104F

the proposed solutions difficult to

(EXPERT GROUPS)

implement (technological or cost-

intensive)?

Measure: ordinal
5

- Very

difficult:

Some

or

all

of the following

difficulties occurred;

l=Proposed

solutions were cost-intensive; 2=Financial/technological capabilities were not
available; 3=Solutions involved

many

different sectors within domestic societies

and/or affected a significant portion of domestic populations; 4=Solutions

included

new

policies not

implemented before; 5=Domestic

interest

negative views about implementation.

4
3

Difficult: Between 3 and 5 on the scale.
- Balanced: Some implementation problems were

present, but

pronounced.
2
1

- Relatively easy: Between 1 and 3 on the scale.
- Easy: No implementation problems occurred.

Source:

IRD

variable 101

L (SOLUTIONS
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IMPLEMENT)

were

far less

groups had

What
Were

INTSCI

types of non-state actors were actively involved?
international scientific organizations present/active during negotiations?

Measure: dichotomous
1

- Yes

0-No
Source:

NATSCI

Coded by author from IRD

What
Were

variable

106A

(NONSTATE GROUP)

types pf non-state actors were actively involved?
national scientific organizations present/active during negotiations?

Measure: dichotomous
1

- Yes

0-No
Source:

Coded by author from IRD

How

OPTIONS

the

variable

I06A

(NONSTATE GROUP)

complete was the information about the options available for dealing with

problem?

Options for tackling a problem
sectors.

may

focus on measures taken within different

Options for tackling an international problem are based on information

about the variables most important for solving the problem

Measure: ordinal

Very high completeness:

4

All necessary information on the different options

was

available.

High completeness: Between 2 and 4 on

3

2

Medium

-

the scale.

completeness: Despite the availability of information on available options

there was still a lack of certain kinds of information for some or all options.
- Low completeness: Between 0 and 2 on the scale
0 - Very low completeness: Information on most of the possible options was not
1

available and even the options themselves

Source:

Computed by author from IRD

variable

may

not

all

have been

identified.

104B

(INFORMATION OPTIONS PROBLEM)

OPTAGREE

Did the parties disagree about the completeness or accuracy of information
about the options?

Measure: dichotomous
1

-

0 -

Yes

No

Source:

IRD

variable

104C

(INFORMATION OPTIONS DISAGREE)
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Was

SCIENTIF

the extent and causes of the

problem well understood?

The degree of uncertainty in an issue area depends on consensus about solutions
and what should be maximized in the issue area (e.g., whether the actors value
protecting fish resources or harvesting a resource to provide food).

Measure: ordinal
5 - Not at all established: Understanding was not established with regard

to nature,

causes, and consequences of a problem, or to solutions or what should be

maximized
4 3

-

Low

in the issue area.

established understanding:

either by
of the different variables (nature, causes, and
consequences of the problem as well as solutions and what should be maximized

consensus on some but not
in the issue area) or

consensus on
2
1

Between 3 and 5 on the scale.
Consensus was partially achieved,

Partially established understanding:

all

all

by generally growing, but

still

not fully developed

the different variables.

- Strongly established understanding: Between and 3 on the scale.
- Very strongly established understanding: There was general consensus regarding
1

nature, causes, and consequences of the problem, as well as regarding solutions
and what should be maximized in the issue area.

Source:

SHOCKNEG

(PROBLEM UNDERSTAND)

1RD

variable

Was

the inclusion of issues

104A

on the agenda determined by factors largely outside

deliberate efforts of potential regime

To what

extent

was

the negotiating

members?

agenda driven by a shared perception of

crisis?

Measure: ordinal
4 - Very strongly determined by factors outside deliberate efforts of potential regime

members: Agenda formation was driven by
efforts

of potential regime members

(e.g.,

factors largely outside deliberate

external shocks, actions of

nongovernmental actors, intergovernmental organizations, individual experts,
or actions of states considered as not being potential members of the regime).
3 - Strongly determined by factors outside the deliberate efforts of potential regime
members: Between 2 and 4 on the scale.
2 - Relevance of determination by factors outside deliberate efforts of potential regime

members: Agenda formation was only

partially

outside deliberate efforts of potential regime

determined by factors largely

members

(e.g., external

shocks,

actions of nongovernmental actors, intergovernmental organizations, individual
experts, or actions of states considered as not being potential

members of the

regime).
1

0

Minor relevance of determination by factors outside deliberate efforts of potential
regime members: Between 0 and 2 on the scale.
Determination by factors outside deliberate efforts of potential regime members not
all relevant' Agenda formation by factors largely outside deliberate efforts of
potential

Source:

IRD

regime members did not play any

variable

role.

108D (NEGOTIATION OUTSIDE DETERMINED)
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at

Dependent Variables
Membership

ACTEARLY

Did the

parties agree to act as if the

agreement were already

in

force before

it

became operational?
Measure: dichotomous
1

- Yes

0-No
IRD

Source:

BENEXCLU

variable

Does

the

1

10D (OPERATIONAL

problem involve trying

Collective (or public) good:

Even

if

some

No

ALREADY)

supply a collective good?

to

one can be excluded from the use of the good.

actors try to define rules for the use of the collective good, actors

outside such a system can behave as free riders without complying with such
rules.

Measure: dichotomous
1

-

Yes

0-No
Coded by author from IRD

Source:

EIFCOND

variable

I01N

(GOOD TYPE)

Did the agreement specify substantive conditions for entry into legal force
conditions beyond a simple minimum number of ratifications)?

(i.e.,

Measure: dichotomous
1 - Yes
0 -

No
Coded by author from

Source:

How many

ELIGIBLE
Measure:
Source:

states

treaty text.

meet the

criteria for

membership

ratio

Coded by author from IRD

variable

208B

(NARRATIVE MEMBER CRITERIA)

MEMCRIT

What

criteria

govern

eligibility for

membership?

Measure: nonexclusive dichotomous indicators

No criteria
Geographic

good
Membership in another (prior) agreement
Domestic government type
Domestic economy type
Status as user of a

Role

in

causing a problem

319

in the

agreement?

problem

Potential to help solve

Expertise in issue area

IRD

Source:

NRATIFY

variable

How many

Measure:

208A

(MEMBER CRITERIA STATE)

ratifications are

needed for the agreement

ratio

Coded by author from agreement

Source:

NSTNEGOT

How many

Measure:

texts

states actively participated in negotiating the

agreement?

ratio

Computed by author from 1RD

Source:

to enter into force?

PCTRATIFY

What percentage of eligible

variable

109D (NEGOTIATE ACTORS)

states are required to ratify

an agreement for

it

to

enter into legal force?

Measure:
Source:

RESTRICT

ratio

Computed by author using ELIGIBLE and NRATIFY

Is

membership

in

an agreement open or restricted?

Measure: dichotomous
1

- Restricted

0-

Open

Source:

Coded by author from IRD

variable

208A

(MEMBER CRITERIA STATE)

Delegation

ADMFUND

How

are the agreement’s administrative activities funded?

(Check as many as apply)
Measure: nonexclusive dichotomous indicators
Nationally funded activities

National contributions

Assessments on members
In-kind contributions
Relies on voluntary contributions

Has independent source of income
Source:

IRD

variable 2

1

1

A (FUNDING ACTIVITIES)
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AGRDEPTH

Is the
its

agreement shallow or deep as measured by the density and specificity of

rules?

Measure: ordinal
5 - Very deep: Compared

problems

to the density

in the issue area, the

of rules considered necessary for managing the

regime comprises a very comprehensive

rules and/or established rules are rather strong
rules considered necessary for

managing

adjustments to the Montreal Protocol

Copenhagen (1992)

(

the

compared

problems

1987) adopted

led to a rather deep regime with

of

set

to the specificity

of the

in the issue area [e.g., the

in

London (1990) and

comprehensive and strong

rules],

4 - Deep: Between 3 and 5 on the scale.
3 - Medium: Compared to the density of rules considered necessary for managing the
in the issue area, the regime comprises a sizable number of rules to
manage the problem and/or established rules have developed some strength
compared to the specificity of rules considered necessary for managing the

problems

problems

in the issue area.

2 - Shallow: Between
1

and 3 on the scale.
- Very Shallow: Compared to the density of rules considered necessary for managing
the problems in the issue area, the regime comprises only a very limited number
of rules, and/or established rules are rather weak compared to the specificity of
rules considered necessary for managing the problems in the issue area (e.g. the
1979 Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild
Animals is a very shallow regime with a very limited number of weak rules).

Source:

AGRSCOPE

IRD

Is

variable

1

205G (REGIME

SHALLOW)

the agreement narrow or broad as

measured by the functional scope of its

rules?

Measure: ordinal
5

- Very broad: The regime has

a very

comprehensive functional scope and covers all
in the regime (e.g., regime

important issues considered necessary for inclusion
includes regulations about

transboundary

river;

regulations about

all

all

important pollutants contributing to pollution of a

regime for conventional arms reductions includes

major types of weapons considered necessary

for

inclusion).

4 - Broad: Between 3 and 5 on the scale.
3

- Medium: The regime covers some important

issues

compared

to the range

of issues

considered necessary for inclusion

in the

regime. For instance, several issues

considered necessary for inclusion

in the

regime are regulated

(e.g.,

regime

includes regulations about several substances contributing to pollution of a

transboundary

important pollutants are not regulated; regime
arms reductions includes regulations about several types of
weapons, but other major weapons are not included)
2 - Narrow: Between
and 3 on the scale.
Very Narrow The regime has a very limited functional scope compared to the
river, but still other

for conventional

1

1

specific issues considered necessary for inclusion in the regime

number of important
are regulated compared

and covers only

For instance, only a very small number of

a limited

issues.

issues

to a large

number considered necessary

for

inclusion in the regime (e.g., regime includes regulations about a single

substance contributing to pollution of a transboundary

river, but regulations

about a large number of other substances of similar or even greater importance
are lacking; regime for conventional

321

arms reductions includes only regulations

about a single type or a small number of weapons, but other major types of

weapons
Source:

ENFORCE

1RD

are not included).

variable

To what

205F (RULES

NARROW)

extent does the agreement adopt an ‘enforcement’ approach to rule

compliance?
Measure: ordinal
2

- Strong enforcement

1

0 -

Weak enforcement
No enforcement

Source:

IRD

Coded by author from IRD variable 212C (COMPLIANCE)
was originally expressed as nonexclusive dichotomous indicators, which

variable

were interpreted as follows:

l=No compliance mechanisms (no enforcement)
2=Issuance of notices of violations (no enforcement)

3=Suspension of membership

rights

(weak enforcement)

4=Exclusion from membership (weak enforcement)
5=Imposition of military punishments (strong enforcement)
6=Imposition of financial/economic punishments (strong enforcement)

7=Support for capacity building to achieve compliance (no enforcement)
8=Granting of a transitional period to achieve compliance (no enforcement)
9-Dissolution of linkages (weak enforcement)

PROGRAMS

What programmatic

activities (if

any) does the agreement delegate?

Measure: nonexclusive dichotomous indicators

CLRNGHSE - Establish an information clearinghouse
C'MPLYMON - Monitor compliance with agreement
EXPERT AD - Provide expert advice to member states

MONPROB - Monitor problem causes and effects
RESEARCH

- Research problem causes and

effects

RVWADEQ Review adequacy of commitments
RVWIMPLM - Implementation review
VERIFY - Verification
Source:

PROGFUND

IRD

How

variable

of parties’ compliance

206A (PROGRAM ACTIVITIES)

are the agreement’s programmatic activities funded?

Measure: nonexclusive dichotomous indicators
Nationally funded activities

National contributions

Assessments on members
In-kind contributions
Relies on voluntary contributions

Has independent source of income
Source:

IRD

variable 21

1

B (FUNDING
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PROGRAM)

How much

SEC1NDEP

discretion have

member

states delegated to the secretariat?

Determine the independence of the secretariat according to the latitude the
when performing its core tasks (e.g., arranging and servicing
meetings of the Conference of the Parties and subsidiary bodies; performing the
secretariat has

functions assigned by legal documents; preparing and submitting reports based

on the information received from the Conference of the Parties and subsidiary
bodies; preparing reports on secretariat implementation activities for the

Conference of the
bodies and

Parties; ensuring coordination with relevant international

NGOs;

liasing/communicating with relevant authorities, non-parties,

and international organizations; compiling and analyzing data/information;
monitoring adherence to treaty obligations; giving guidance and advice

to the

and consulting/assisting) as well as when performing additional tasks or
roles (e.g., its political role as pusher or laggard for regime evolution/
parties;

ratification/compliance,
its

its

promotion of treaty

to non-parties, public relations,

influence on the agenda of the regime, etc).

Measure: ordinal
4 - Highly independent: The secretariat has broad latitude to take action independent of
3

2

member approval. Most of the important actions do not need state approval.
- Strong independence: Between 2 and 4 on the scale.
- Some independence: The secretariat has some latitude to take action with regard to
some, but not

1

0-

all,

important issues.

Less independence: Between 0 and 2 on the scale.

No

independence: The secretariat has no latitude to take independent action. All
action taken by the secretariat must have state approval.

Source:

SECRETAR

1RD

variable

209B (SECRETARIAT INDEPENDENCE)

Did the parties establish a secretariat

to

administer the agreement?

Measure: nominal

l=No secretariat established
2=Regime has a secretariat of its own operating independently of other organizations
(e.g., secretariat of the Framework Convention on Climate Change)
3= An intergovernmental organization performs the secretariat’s functions (e.g., ozone

4=A

secretariat operating under UNEP)
nongovernmental organization performs the secretariat’s functions
the Ramsar Convention specifies that "the International Union

of Nature shall perform the continuing bureau duties under

IUCN

this

[e.g..

for

Article 8 of

Conservation

convention,”

nongovernmental organization with a membership of 526
nongovernmental organizations, 99 government agencies, and 62 states
is

a

1993)].

5=A

nation state performs the secretariat’s functions.

Source:

IRD

variable

209A (SECRETARIAT)
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(in

Flexibility

AMEND

Does

the agreement provide for

amendment? What decision

rule governs the

adoption of amendments?

M easure: nominal
No

provision for

Amendments
Amendments
Amendments
Amendments
Source:

ESCAPE

amendment

require consensus or unanimity
require supermajority support
require weighted majority support

require simple majority support

Coded by author from agreement

Does

texts

the agreement include an escape

mechanism?

Measure: dichotomous
1

-

Yes

0-No
Source:

PRECISE

Coded by author from agreement

Are substantive

texts

rules generally precise

and easy

to interpret in the sense that

they call for well-defined actions, or are they ambiguous and indetenninate?

Measure: ordinal
4 - Precise and easy

to interpret: (e.g., precise rules for

emission reductions

to

achieve

a percent reduction goal within a certain timeframe and calculated from a base

economic indicators to achieve
European Monetary System by the end of the decade).
3 - Relatively precise: Between 2 and 4 on the scale.
2 - Medium: (e.g., exemption clauses that offer states latitude to interpret qualifying
year; rules that require the fulfillment of certain

membership

in the

conditions

- Relatively imprecise: Between 0 and
0 - Ambiguous and indeterminate: (e.g.,
for the work of journalists).
1

Source:

RESERVE

IRD

variable

Does

2

on the

205D (RULE PRECISE)

the agreement permit formal reservations?

Measure: dichotomous
1 - Yes

0-No
Source:

scale.

rules to guarantee “access to appropriate

Coded by author from agreement
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texts

means"

SUNSET

Does

the agreement incorporate a sunset clause?

Measure: dichotomous
1

- Yes

0-No
Source:

WITHDRAW

Coded by author from agreement

Does

texts

the agreement include a formal denunciation/withdrawal clause?

Measure: dichotomous
1

-

Yes

0-No
Source:

Coded by author from agreement
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texts

APPENDIX

2

SURVEYED REGIMES AND AGREEMENTS

Antarctic Regime

1959 Antarctic Treaty

1964 Convention on the Conservation of Flora and Fauna
1972 Convention on the Conservation of Seals

1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection
Baltic Sea

Regime

1974 Helsinki Convention
1992 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea
Biodiversity

1992 Convention on Biological Diversity

Black Sea Regime
1992 Bucharest Convention

1996 Black Sea Strategic Action Plan

CITES Regime
1973 Convention on International Trade

in

Endangered Species

Climate Change
1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
1

997 Kyoto Protocol

Danube River
1

985 Bucharest Declaration

1994 Danube River Protection Convention
Desertification

1994 United Nations Convention

to

Combat

Hazardous Waste Regime
1989 Basel Convention

989 Lome IV Regulations
1991 Bamako Convention
995 Basel Amendment
1995 Waigani Convention
1

1
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Desertification

APPENDIX

2 (continued)

IATTC Regime
1949 Conservation and Management of Tunas and Tuna-like Fishes

1976 Conservation and Management of Dolphins
1999 Protocol

IATTC

to the

ICCAT Regime
1966 International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas

London Dumping Convention Regime
1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes

and Other Matter
1978 Amendments

to

Pollution by

Annexes

to the

Convention on the Prevention of Marine
other Matter Concerning

Dumping of Wastes and

Incineration at Sea

LRTAP Regime
1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
1985

First Sulfur Protocol

1988

NO

1991

VOCs

1

x

Protocol

Protocol

994 Second Sulfur Protocol

North Sea Regime
1972 Oslo Convention on Dumping Waste at Sea
1974 Paris Convention on Land-Based Sources of Marine Pollution
1984 North Sea Conference
1992

OSPAR

Oil Pollution

Convention

Regime

1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil
1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
1978

MARPOL

1982 Regional

Protocol

Memoranda of Understanding

Ramsar Regime
1971 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance

1987 Regina Amendments

Rhine River Regime
1963 Berne Convention

1976 Chemical Pollution Convention

1976 Chloride Pollution Convention
1987 Rhine Action Plan
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APPENDIX

2 (continued)

South Pacific Fisheries
1979 South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention
Stratospheric

Ozone Regime

1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer

1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer

1990 London Amendment
1992 Copenhagen Amendment
Tropical Timber Regime
1983 Tropical Timber Agreement

1994 Tropical Timber Agreement

Whaling Regime
1946 International Convention

for the Regulation

328

of Whaling
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